

# MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

## PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

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### I.—MILL'S JOINT METHOD (II.).

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PROCEEDING now to the development of my thesis that what is novel in Mill's Joint Method ought to be subsumed under his Method of Difference, I begin by again referring to his introductory definitions<sup>1</sup> of the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference. In the definition of the Method of Agreement there is an obvious hiatus. The Method of Agreement proceeds "by comparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs." The Method of Difference proceeds "by comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does not." But just as the Method of Difference is held to consist in a comparison of not just any positive with just any negative instances, so must the Method of Agreement be held to consist in a comparison of not just any positive with just any positive instances. Although Mill, as we have seen, is not everywhere loyal to the stipulation, it will be admitted that he here intends us to understand that the "different instances in which the phenomenon occurs" must be in other respects *dissimilar*.

It is important for my purpose to insist on this measure of parallelism in the conceptions of the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference. For the Joint Method unquestionably

<sup>1</sup> III, viii, § 1.

compares positive with negative instances and must, therefore, be allowed to be a form of the Method of Difference, *as here defined*, unless on the plea that the positive and the negative instances which it compares are not "in other respects similar." Much depends, accordingly, upon the interpretation of this part of the definition of the Method of Difference. Now to me it seems that we shall avoid arbitrary discrimination only if we adopt an interpretation corresponding to our interpretation of the corresponding, but here suppressed, part of the definition of the Method of Agreement.

That the Joint Method can, no more than the Method of Difference, be held to consist in a comparison of just any positive with just any negative instances, we shall best appreciate by contemplating a course which Mill here silently condemns. He here selects the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference as "the simplest and most obvious modes of singling out from among the circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon, those with which it is really connected by an invariable law." But he nowhere distinguishes as a possible mode a comparison of merely negative instances. This mode needs only to be mentioned to elicit the protest that no sane mind would proceed in this way. The fantastical character of such a procedure does not, however, exempt us from the duty of seeing why it would be futile. It is the failure to perform this duty that is answerable for the doctrine that the Joint Method is "a double employment of the Method of Agreement." The general consideration, that in order to arrive at knowledge concerning something we need to examine it and not something else, is not a sufficient answer. For it is admitted that negative instances may be advantageously consulted. What we need to see is that, while both positive and negative instances may be relevant, positive instances may, but negative instances never can, *suffice* for the solution of a problem. When this has been seen we shall be better able to judge the conditions under which negative instances may be relevant.

The unique evidential value of the positive instance gets insufficient recognition in Mill's account because the question which he usually has before him is not, as he says it is, "*What* is the cause (or the effect)?" but "*Which* is the cause (or the effect)?" We are thought of as starting with a finite set of enumerable alternative solutions and as needing only to decide among these. But it is only when we ask how we enter into possession of such a partial solution of the problem that the unique evidential value of the positive instance reveals itself. The cause (or the effect) which we seek must be present in every positive, absent from

every negative, instance. It follows that a single positive instance, sufficiently known, may serve a purpose which no amount of negative instances, however known, could serve—that of yielding a knowledge of the field of possible solutions. For the possibilities are circumstances present in positive, but absent from negative, instances. And, while the circumstances absent from any negative instance and even from each of any set of negative instances are innumerable, it can be plausibly claimed that the possibly relevant circumstances present in even a single positive instance are, at least if we rely, as Mill thinks we must, on the conclusions of crude inductions already accomplished, not unmanageably many. It is only on these grounds that a comparison of merely positive instances can be held fruitful and a comparison of merely negative instances unfruitful.

But having once acquired, by the consultation of a positive instance, an exhaustive list of the candidates, we may prosecute our inquiry by comparing with the original positive instance either additional positive or negative instances. Whichever course we pursue, there are four ways in which it is conceivable that we may fare.

We may find an additional positive instance in all other respects dissimilar or a negative instance in all other respects similar to the original positive instance. But such instances are ruled out by Mill's causal postulates. Such an additional positive instance would involve, if our quarry were a cause, Plurality of Causes, and, if our quarry were an effect, Intermixture of Effects. Such a negative instance would involve, if our quarry were a cause, Intermixture of Effects, and, if our quarry were an effect, Plurality of Causes.<sup>1</sup>

We may find an additional positive instance in no respect dissimilar or a negative instance in no respect similar to the original positive instance. But such instances would be worthless, adding nothing to our evidence. Such a negative instance is pronounced worthless by the incorporation of the phrase "in other respects similar" in the definition of the Method of Difference. Such an additional positive instance ought to be

<sup>1</sup> In this paragraph I have taken the liberty of using "Plurality of Causes" to cover any set of instances whose consequents agree in more respects than do their antecedents and "Intermixture of Effects" to cover any set of instances whose antecedents agree in more respects than do their consequents. Let the original positive instance be *AB-ab*. Then, according as our quarry is the cause of *a* or the effect of *A*, it will be *a* or *A* whose presence or absence defines additional instances as positive or negative. The four types of additional instances here distinguished may, therefore, be represented thus: *CD-ac*, *AC-cd*, *AB-b*, *B-ab*.

pronounced worthless by the incorporation of the phrase "in other respects dissimilar" in the definition of the Method of Agreement.

We may find an additional positive instance in all but several other respects dissimilar or a negative instance in all but several other respects similar to the original positive instance. Such instances advance the inquiry by further limiting the field, but justify only an alternative conclusion.

We may find an additional positive instance in all but one other respect dissimilar or a negative instance in all but one other respect similar to the original positive instance. Such instances bring the inquiry to a successful conclusion by disqualifying all candidates but one.

If not only the successful conclusion but also the advancement of an inquiry be deemed worthy of the Methods, the defining principle of the Method of Agreement may be formulated: the whole of what is common to a plurality of complex antecedents is related to the whole of what is common to their complex consequents in the same way as is an antecedent to a consequent totality. And the defining principle of the Method of Difference may be formulated: The whole of what is both present in one or more complex antecedents and absent from one or more others is related to the whole of what is both present in the complex consequent or consequents of the former and absent from that or those of the latter in the same way as is an antecedent to a consequent totality. And the defining principle of the Method of Agreement applied to negative instances could be formulated: the whole of what is absent from each of a plurality of complex antecedents is related to the whole of what is absent from each of their complex consequents as is an antecedent to a consequent totality. In point of validity this principle would be unobjectionable. It is only because so much is absent from every instance that there can be no such Method.

Now the recognition of the evidential value of instances which advance an inquiry without bringing it to a successful conclusion is indispensable to the recognition of a fact which I believe to be the key to Mill's Joint Method, *viz.*, that a plurality of instances may justify a categorical conclusion though no selection from them justifies more than an alternative conclusion.<sup>1</sup> What we have to diagnose is the piecemeal attainment of an objective which Mill tends to represent as attainable only by a single *coup*.

The demand that only one circumstance (not to count, as Mill does not, the circumstance which makes an instance positive,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, pp. 434-435, 442.



"the phenomenon under investigation") be common to two or more positive instances would be most obviously satisfied by:  $ABC\text{-}abc$ ,  $ADE\text{-}ade$ . But the demand might also be satisfied by a set of more than two instances no selection from which would satisfy it, *e.g.*, by:  $ABC\text{-}abc$ ,  $ABD\text{-}abd$ ,  $ACD\text{-}acd$ . And by writing in the canon of the Method of Agreement "two or more instances" Mill, whether by accident or by design, rules such a set of instances within the scope of the Method. I say "whether by accident or by design" because I cannot be sure that Mill had in mind anything more than a set of instances of which every pair satisfies the demand.

Similarly the demand that only one of the circumstances (with the same reservation) present in a certain positive instance be absent from one or more negative instances, while it would be most obviously satisfied by:  $ABC\text{-}abc$ ,  $BC\text{-}bc$ , might also be satisfied by a set of more than two instances no selection from which would satisfy it, *e.g.*, by:  $ABCD\text{-}abcd$ ,  $\overline{ABCD}\text{-}\overline{abcd}$ ,  $\overline{ABCD}\text{-}\overline{abcd}$ . I submit that the way in which the two negative instances here deputise for the single negative instance,  $BC\text{-}bc$ , is precisely parallel to the way in which the two positive instances,  $ABD\text{-}abd$ ,  $ACD\text{-}acd$ , deputise for the single positive instance,  $ADE\text{-}ade$ . If the set of three positive instances is rightly viewed as affording a piecemeal satisfaction of the demand of the Method of Agreement, then the set of three instances, one positive and two negative, is rightly viewed as affording a piecemeal satisfaction of the demand of the Method of Difference. But by writing in the canon of the Method of Difference "an instance in which it does not occur" Mill, again whether by accident or by design, rules such a set of instances beyond the scope of the Method. Accidental accommodation would here be less easy. To write "one or more instances in which it does not" would hardly meet the need. Unambiguously to rule such a set of instances within the scope of the Method it would be necessary deliberately to recast the canon: "If only one of the circumstances present in a certain positive instance be absent from either a single negative instance or each of several negative instances" or, better, "If either a negative instance differs from a positive instance in only one circumstance or several negative instances have in common only one difference from a positive instance".

For such a revision of the canon of the Method of Difference I should be content to plead, were the sets of instances, which I have just distinguished, adequately typical. But we have further to make provision for sets of instances which deputise for the positive and the negative instance of Mill's canon although

they include no group of negative instances which deputise for his single negative instance. For the demand that only one of the circumstances present in a certain positive instance be absent from one or more negative instances is only a specification of the demand that only one circumstance be both present in one or more positive instances and absent from one or more negative instances. And this less specific demand might be satisfied by a set of instances comprising an indispensable plurality of positive instances. Such a set might comprise only one negative instance, *e.g.*,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-abc\bar{d}$ ,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-ab\bar{c}d$ ,  $\bar{A}B\bar{C}\bar{D}-\bar{a}bc\bar{d}$ , or might comprise an indispensable plurality of negative, as well as an indispensable plurality of positive, instances, *e.g.*,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}\bar{E}-abc\bar{d}\bar{e}$ ,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}\bar{E}-abcde$ ,  $\bar{A}B\bar{C}\bar{D}\bar{E}-\bar{a}bc\bar{d}\bar{e}$ ,  $\bar{A}B\bar{C}\bar{D}\bar{E}-\bar{a}bcde$ .

It will suffice to investigate the simpler of these two types in order to come to terms with the novelty presented by an indispensable plurality of positive instances. It makes no difference which of the two positive instances is taken as original and which, along with the one negative instance, as additional. And it might be contended that we should be justified in viewing the two positive instances as together deputising for the single positive instance of Mill's canon. Taken together,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-abc\bar{d}$  and  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-ab\bar{c}d$  are as good as  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-abc\bar{d}$ , which, supported by  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-ab\bar{c}d$ , satisfies Mill's canon for the Method of Difference. But could it not be as plausibly contended that we should be justified in viewing either of the two positive instances and the single negative instance as together deputising for one of the positive instances of Mill's canon for the Method of Agreement? Taken together,  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-abc\bar{d}$  and  $\bar{A}B\bar{C}\bar{D}-\bar{a}bc\bar{d}$  are as good as  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-ab\bar{c}d$ , which, supported by  $AB\bar{C}\bar{D}-abc\bar{d}$ , satisfies Mill's canon for the Method of Agreement. Against both suggestions it must be objected that we are not at liberty to determine the Method by reference to a mere fragment of the argument. And if we are to be guided, in classifying the Methods, by the distinction between original and additional instances, we must acknowledge that we are here confronted by the novelty that our additional instances comprise both positive and negative instances. We should have to conclude that, original instances being always positive, we must distinguish the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, and the Joint Method, according as the additional instances are exclusively positive, exclusively negative, or both positive and negative.

This solution of the problem must, so far as I can see, be allowed to be valid. But neither Mill nor, so far as I know,

anybody else who has championed the Joint Method, has conceived its differentia in this way.<sup>1</sup> Mill was not guided, in classifying the Methods, by the distinction between original and additional instances. Nor is that distinction a worthy guide. For the way in which an original instance limits the field is exactly the same as the way in which an additional instance further limits it. Where *ABC-abc* is original and *ADE-ade* is additional, it is plainly wrong, while representing *ABC-abc* as showing that our quarry is nothing but A or B or C (*a* or *b* or *c*), to represent *ADE-ade* as showing only that our quarry is neither B nor C (*b* nor *c*). It is only negative instances that are by nature additional. But if we reject the guidance of the distinction between original and additional instances we are left only with the distinction between elimination by exclusively positive, and elimination by both positive and negative, instances. Then we must hold that even the Method of Difference as conceived by Mill is already, in principle, a joint method. The solution I advocate is the abandonment of the Joint Method and the acceptance, as the canon of the Method of Difference, of the formula: "If only one circumstance

<sup>1</sup> Mill once describes the Method as "the peculiar modification of the Method of Agreement, which, as partaking in some degree of the nature of the Method of Difference, I have called the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference" (III, x, § 2). Nowhere else does he offer any explanation of this title. Mr. Joseph (*An Introduction to Logic*, pp. 439-440. Cf. pp. 434-435) distinguishes four "grounds on which we may eliminate" when seeking a cause. Of these the first, "Nothing is the cause of a phenomenon in the absence of which it nevertheless occurs," and the second, "Nothing is the cause of a phenomenon in the presence of which it nevertheless fails to occur", alone are relevant to my purpose. Mr. Joseph says: "On these grounds of elimination Mill's 'Inductive Methods' severally repose. The first is the foundation of his 'Method of Agreement', the second of his 'Method of Difference', the first and second jointly of his 'Joint Method of Agreement and Difference'." Now, even if we consider the Methods only as seeking a cause, it is only by ignoring its positive instance, as original, and concentrating on its negative instance, as additional, that we can view the Method of Difference as reposing on the second of these grounds rather than on the first and the second jointly. But the attempt to differentiate the Methods by reference to the grounds of elimination on which they severally repose is further frustrated by the consideration that the Method of Agreement, seeking an effect, reposes on the second ground, while the Method of Difference, seeking an effect, reposes in its treatment of its negative instance on the first ground. Mr. Joseph's footnote, "Or *mutatis mutandis* the effect", does less than justice to this consideration. His preoccupation with his main, and probably sound, thesis, that Mill's "treating these as so many separate methods darkens in a special degree the subject of induction" (p. 430), prevents him from taking very seriously the question, what treatment, resting on this mistake, avoids further mistakes.

be both present in one or more positive instances and absent from one or more negative instances, it is the cause (or the effect) of the phenomenon which determines instances as positive or negative."

It remains to be shown only that Mill fails to find any defensible alternative solution. Among the factors which conspire to prevent him from clearly grasping the nature of the problem is his acceptance of that relaxation of the canon of the Method of Agreement which leads him to view the Method as justified in concluding only to an invariable antecedent (or consequent). Given that the cause of the double refraction of light is a property belonging *inter alia* to Iceland spar, if "we wish to determine on which of the properties of Iceland spar this remarkable phenomenon depends, we can make no use, for that purpose, of the Method of Difference; for we cannot find another substance precisely resembling Iceland spar except in some one property".<sup>1</sup> Thus Mill insists on the inflexibility of the canon of the Method of Difference. But he infers: "The only method, therefore, of prosecuting this inquiry is that afforded by the Method of Agreement". Yet the available instances are as far from satisfying the canon of the Method of Agreement as they are from satisfying the canon of the Method of Difference. The known positive instances do indeed "agree in the circumstance of being crystalline substances". But they are not known to differ in everything else. On the contrary the investigator is represented as knowing that not all crystalline substances have the property of double refraction, in other words that some negative, as well as all known positive, instances "agree in the circumstance of being crystalline substances", and as therefore capable of inferring that all positive instances must agree in something other than this circumstance. Instead, however, of concluding that we can make no use of the Method of Agreement, Mill discriminates in the manner already familiar by extracting from an application of the Method the conclusion "that either crystalline structure, or the cause which gives rise to that structure, is one of the conditions of double refraction".

A source of possible misunderstanding is the unsuitability of this Iceland spar illustration to the part of his task to which Mill next proceeds, and nothing can be made of his account except upon the supposition that he tacitly abandons the illustration. His purpose is to show how what he variously describes as "a double employment of the Method of Agreement", as "the In-

<sup>1</sup> III, viii, § 4.

direct Method of Difference", and as "the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference" can depute for what he significantly contrasts as "the direct Method of Difference", in situations in which the latter is inapplicable. Now these situations are fairly described as "cases similar to the above, in which it is not possible to obtain the precise pair of instances which our second canon requires—instances agreeing in every antecedent except A, or in every consequent except *a*". They are, moreover, "similar to the above" in the further respect that it is known that all instances of *a* are also instances of A but not known that there is nothing but A of which they are also instances, so that on Mill's view the Method of Agreement only "bears testimony to a connexion between A and *a*". But here the similarity ends. For what the Method of Difference is conceived to accomplish in other situations and what the new Method is conceived to accomplish in these situations is "to convert this evidence of connexion into proof of causation". And there can be no *proving* that A is the cause of *a* unless it is.

The Iceland spar illustration, then, seems best viewed as exhausting its relevance in an accentuation of the danger of concluding that A is the cause of *a* from the premise that all known instances of *a* are also instances of A. For this purpose it is peculiarly apt just because A is not the cause but is only a condition of *a*. But the situations to which Mill is proceeding are situations in which A is the cause of *a* but in which, it having been already shown that this cannot be validly inferred from the premise that all known instances of *a* are also instances of A, there is some difficulty in seeing from what premise this can be validly inferred.

A being then not a mere invariable antecedent but the cause of *a*, Mill's question is how this can be known where neither a set of positive instances known not only to agree in A but also to differ in everything else, nor a negative instance known not only to differ from a positive instance in lacking A but to agree with some positive instance in everything else, is available as a basis for elimination. Traces of what I take to be the right answer, that a solution may be found in a piecemeal satisfaction of the canon of the Method of Difference, are discernible against the background provided by what I take to be the wrong answer, that a solution may be found in "a double employment of the Method of Agreement". Mill not only sees that the obstacle in the way of an application of "the direct Method of Difference" is our inability "in some one of these instances, as for example ABC, to leave out A, and observe whether by doing so, *a* is

prevented". He also grasps, if only for a moment, the general nature of the remedy: "Now supposing (what is often the case) that we are not able to try this decisive experiment; yet, provided we can by any means discover what would be its result if we could try it, the advantage will be the same". Unfortunately, in the elaboration of this suggestion, Mill allows his predilection for the notion of "a double employment of the Method of Agreement" to blind him to the indispensable conditions of the relevance of negative instances: "Suppose, then, that as we previously examined a variety of instances in which *a* occurred, and found them to agree in containing *A*, so we now observe a variety of instances in which *a* does not occur, and find them agree in not containing *A*; which establishes, by the Method of Agreement, the same connexion between the absence of *A* and the absence of *a*, which was before established between their presence. As, then, it had been shown that whenever *A* is present *a*<sup>1</sup> is present, so it being now shown that when *A* is taken away *a*<sup>1</sup> is removed along with it, we have by the one proposition *ABC*, *abc*, by the other *BC*, *bc*, the positive and negative instances which the Method of Difference requires." But of what are the "variety of instances in which *a* does not occur" instances? Their being instances of the absence of *A* as well as the absence of *a* suffices to qualify them as relevant to the solution of no problem whatever. Mill's claim, however, that they may together deputise for the unavailable negative instance *BC-bc*, implies that the relevance of some of them lies in their being instances of *B-b* and that the relevance of others of them lies in their being instances of *C-c*. It follows that a consultation of a plurality of positive instances is not here indispensable. Mill's supposition, that "we have, by the one proposition, *ABC*, *abc*" (*viz.*, by the proposition "that whenever *A* is present *a* is present"), is gratuitous. We may have consulted the single positive instance *ABC-abc* to which he earlier refers.

In representing the new Method as "a double employment of the Method of Agreement" Mill thinks of the consultation of the negative instances as, by itself, establishing "the same connexion between the absence of *A* and the absence of *a*" as the consultation of the positive instances establishes "between their presence", "each proof being independent of the other, and corroborating it". Each proof is, he thinks, defective. "For the requisitions of the Method of Difference [Agreement, surely?] are not satisfied, unless we can be quite sure either that the instances affirmative of *a*,

<sup>1</sup> "*A*" and "*a*" should be interchanged.

agree in no antecedent whatever but A, or that the instances negative of *a* agree in nothing but the negation of A." There follows the faultless sentence: "Now if it were possible, which it never is, to have this assurance, we should not need the joint method; for either of the two sets of instances separately, would then be sufficient to prove causation". [Surely not by the Method of Difference but by the Method of Agreement?] But there can be no application, not even a defective application, of the Method of Agreement to negative instances. For any set of negative instances must agree in the absence of innumerable circumstances. Each instance will be not a cucumber, not the Milky Way, and so on. Nor will it do to reply that we may lighten our burden, as we do when we apply the Method of Agreement to positive instances, by drawing upon the stock of generalisations already made available by crude induction. Our burden, being infinite, remains infinite, however many circumstances be, on the strength of crude induction, judged irrelevant. Of course, if we are ready to represent crude induction as deputising for the consultation of a positive instance by yielding a conclusion of the form "No circumstances but these are relevant," then we can indeed argue that, since our negative instances have in common the absence of only one of these possibly relevant circumstances, this one circumstance must be the cause (or effect). And we might as well contend for the recognition of a Method requiring only one negative instance, from which only one of the possibly relevant circumstances is absent. But, if we are ready to allow crude induction to perform so ambitious a part, we ought to define the Method of Agreement as proceeding not "by comparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs" but by comparing together either exclusively positive, or exclusively negative, instances or even by consulting a single positive, or a single negative, instance. The Method of Agreement must be defined in such a way that "a double employment of the Method of Agreement" doubly employs it.

The sequel is astounding. Despite the wildness of the conception of a set of negative instances agreeing in only one negation, despite the fact that he has just disowned the conception, Mill at once proceeds to embody the demand for such a set of negative instances in the canon of the new Method. The two demands, that the positive instances "have only one circumstance in common" and that the negative instances "have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance", are precisely those the impossibility of whose satisfaction Mill has just declared indispensable to the utility of the Method.



What can sympathetic reconstruction make of this canon? Mill must be supposed to be failing to symbolise some qualification distinguishing the one circumstance whose common absence he recognises from the innumerable circumstances whose common absence he ignores. This qualification can be nothing but the being known to be present in all, or at least the not being known to be absent from any, known positive instances, and the qualification must be supposed to be shared only by circumstances all of which are known to be present in various negative instances. The relevance of the negative instances lies in their being instances of circumstances not otherwise known to be irrelevant. Instead, then, of "have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance" we must say "have in common the absence of only one of the circumstances not known to be absent from some positive instance".<sup>1</sup> That this circumstance be further known to be the only circumstance in which a set of positive instances agree, is not indispensable to the validity of a categorical conclusion. It is indispensable only that it be known that only one circumstance is both present in one or more positive, and absent from one or more negative, instances. By describing the circumstance, at the end of the canon, as "the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ", Mill by implication acknowledges the need for this reconstruction, as he also does by saying that the Joint Method "like the Method of Difference properly so called, . . . proceeds by ascertaining how and in what the cases where the phenomenon is present, differ from those in which it is absent".<sup>2</sup>

NOTE ON PROFESSOR BROAD'S ARTICLE, "THE PRINCIPLES OF  
DEMONSTRATIVE INDUCTION".<sup>3</sup>

Prof. Broad appears to me to misrepresent Mill's Joint Method by saying that it "is suggested as a method by which we may find the 'cause' of *a* in cases where the Method of Difference cannot be used, and where the Method of Agreement is rendered untrustworthy by the possibility of Plurality of Causes".<sup>4</sup> I have already tried to show that the part here assigned to the possibility of Plurality of Causes is assigned by Mill to our not knowing that the antecedents (of the consequents which agree in *a*) agree in nothing but *A*. But I further object against Prof. Broad's contention, that it would put Mill's Joint Method beyond the scope of Chapter VIII. For the plan (acknowledged at the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Venn, *Empirical Logic*, xvii.

<sup>3</sup> MIND, N.S., vol. xxxix.

<sup>2</sup> III, x, § 2.

<sup>4</sup> p. 315.



beginning of Chapter X) of the exposition of the Methods which is the business of Chapter VIII would be wrecked by the introduction of devices for coping with the possibility of either Plurality of Causes or Intermixture of Effects. The appearance of the Joint Method in Chapter VIII is consistent with this plan only if the differentia of the Method is found in its instantial premises. So far the objection is not formidable. The knot can easily be cut by the reply that the appearance of the Joint Method in Chapter VIII is *not* consistent with the plan. But the conjecture that the discussion of the Joint Method is a premature attempt to cope with the possibility of Plurality of Causes will hardly survive an examination of the language in which Mill brings that discussion to a close: "We shall *presently* see that the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference constitutes, in *another* respect *not yet adverted to*, an improvement upon the common Method of Agreement, namely, in being unaffected by a characteristic imperfection of that method, the nature of which *still remains to be pointed out*".<sup>1</sup> Mill goes on to postpone the topic "to a subsequent Chapter". And nobody who compares § 2 of Chapter X will dispute that the "characteristic imperfection" to which Mill here alludes is the being rendered uncertain by the possibility of Plurality of Causes.

These considerations do not touch Prof. Broad's claim that Mill's Joint Method is "useless". That claim must be upheld, though, in the argument advanced to support it, "Any pair of instances that we could possibly find would agree in innumerable *negative* characteristics beside the absence of A and the absence of *a*";<sup>2</sup> we must, in fairness to Mill, substitute, for the word "pair", the word "set". But these considerations do touch Prof. Broad's further claim that Mill's Joint Method is "invalid".<sup>3</sup> For they require that, if we undertake to refute Mill's allegation "that, if we find such a pair of instances, we can conclude with certainty that the 'cause' of *a* is A",<sup>4</sup> we must concede to Mill not only, as Prof. Broad does, that instantial "premises of the required kind could be found,"<sup>5</sup> but also, as Prof. Broad does not, that postulates, ruling out *inter alia* the possibility of Plurality of Causes, are available to supplement the instantial premises. Now this further concession Prof. Broad cannot make because he conceives its independence of such postulates to be part of the differentia of Mill's Joint Method. If we do make the concession we see that Mill's allegation is true. The real difficulty for the Joint Method, presented by the premise that a set of negative

<sup>1</sup> III, viii, § 4. My italics.

<sup>3</sup> p. 317.

<sup>4</sup> p. 315.

<sup>2</sup> p. 315.

<sup>5</sup> p. 315.

instances agree in only the absence of *A* and the absence of *a*, is that it would, as Mill sometimes recognises, remove the need for the consultation of any positive instance.

But of course Mill does hold that the Joint Method, like the Method of Difference, and unlike the Method of Agreement, is free from the imperfection of being rendered uncertain by the possibility of Plurality of Causes. And here I find myself compelled to dissent even more extensively than Prof. Broad does. For I hold that whether a method of elimination requires a postulate about indispensability depends solely on whether it aims at a conclusion about indispensability. Not only Mill's answering but also his asking the question, which of the Methods are affected and which unaffected by this imperfection, is conditioned by an insufficient regard both for the limitations of methods of elimination as such and for what he has called "the twofold character of inquiries into the laws of phenomena".<sup>1</sup>

Before examining those of the claims of Mill and of Prof. Broad which I cannot admit, I present what to me seem the right answers to the right questions.

The conclusion *A* is indispensable to *a* is validly inferrible from the premise (1) *Both (a) nothing but A is indispensable to a and (b) something is indispensable to a*. The same conclusion is validly inferrible from the premise (2) *Both (a) A is indispensable to nothing but a and (b) A is indispensable to something*. The conclusion *A* is sufficient to *a* is validly inferrible from the premise (3) *Both (a) nothing but A is sufficient to a and (b) something is sufficient to a*. The same conclusion is validly inferrible from the premise (4) *Both (a) A is sufficient to nothing but a and (b) A is sufficient to something*.

The (b) propositions are respectively subsumable under the postulates (1) *Everything has an indispensable condition* : (2) *Everything is an indispensable condition* : (3) *Everything has a sufficient condition* : (4) *Everything is a sufficient condition*.

Of the (a) propositions, (1a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but A is absent from some instance of a*, and (4a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but a is absent from some instance of A*. And we may observe both that several, as distinguished from collective, absence suffices, and that premises of the required kind can be plausibly deemed attainable. It must, however, be admitted that, unless it is granted that *A* and *a* are not relevantly complex, the premises justify only, instead of (1a), *Nothing but A or some factor of A is*

<sup>1</sup> III, viii, § 1.

*indispensable to a* and, instead of (4a), *A is sufficient to nothing but a or some factor of a*.

It might seem that (2a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but a is present in some instance of the absence of A*, and that (3a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but A is present in some instance of the absence of a*. But here we must observe both that, without further postulates, several, as distinguished from collective, presence does not suffice, and that not even premises predicating several presence can be plausibly deemed attainable.

The instantial premises required by (1a) and (4a) are those of the Method of Agreement applied to positive instances. The instantial premises required by (2a) and (3a) are those of the Method of Agreement applied to negative instances.

The conclusion *A is both sufficient and indispensable to a* is validly inferrible from the premise (5) *Both (a) A is both sufficient and indispensable to nothing but a and (b) A is both sufficient and indispensable to something*. The same conclusion is validly inferrible from the premise (6) *Both (a) nothing but A is both sufficient and indispensable to a and (b) something is both sufficient and indispensable to a*.

The (b) propositions are respectively subsumable under the postulates (5) *Everything is a both sufficient and indispensable condition*, (6) *Everything has a both sufficient and indispensable condition*.

Of the (a) propositions, (5a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but a is either absent from some instance of A or present in some instance of the absence of A*, and (6a) is validly inferrible from the instantial premise *Everything but A is either absent from some instance of a or present in some instance of the absence of a*. And here we may observe that, while, as before, several, as distinguished from collective, presence does not suffice, premises predicating even collective presence thus alternatively can be plausibly deemed attainable.

The instantial premises required by (5a) and (6a) are those of the Method of Difference, including what in the Joint Method survives criticism. It is a defect of those applications of the Joint Method which demand a plurality of negative instances that only several presence can be alternatively predicated in their instantial premises.

How does Mill defend the contention that the Method of Difference is free from the "characteristic imperfection" of the Method of Agreement? His claim, that "it is certain that in this instance at least, A was either the cause of a, or an indispensable portion of its cause, even though the cause which produces

it in other instances may be altogether different",<sup>1</sup> amounts only to this: *it is certain that ABC is, but that BC is not, sufficient to a*. Now this conclusion may well require no postulate about indispensability; but only because, like the conclusion, *A is sufficient to nothing but a or some factor of a*, obtainable by the Method of Agreement, it is not a conclusion about indispensability. But the conclusion extracted by Prof. Broad is more ambitious: "In the presence of BC, A is necessary to produce a".<sup>2</sup> This conclusion I take to claim not merely that BC is not sufficient to *a* but that no complex in which BC is present but from which A is absent is sufficient to *a*, e.g., that BCD is not sufficient to *a*. Now Prof. Broad's conclusion is not invalid. But what he calls "premises" of the Methods are not instantial premises but conclusions from conjunctions of instantial premises with postulates. And the premise from which he extracts the conclusion in question is: "All (non-A) BC is (non-a) bc",<sup>3</sup> i.e., on his definitions,<sup>4</sup> (non-A) BC is a sufficient condition of (non-a) bc. This premise postulates the measure of indispensability which the conclusion ascribes to A. Mill's second premise, on the other hand, "BC gives bc", unsupported, yields no more information about A than about D.

How does Mill defend the same contention about the Joint Method? He almost admits "that the advantage does not belong so much to the joint method, as to one of its two premises, (if they may be so called,) the negative premise",<sup>5</sup> i.e., as I should put it, that the advantage belongs to the application of the Method of Agreement to negative instances. And he ought to admit this. For the instantial premise used is "that the instances in which *a* is not, agree only in not containing A". [The instantial premise required by (3a) above]. It is from this premise that Mill argues that "A must be not only the cause of *a*, but the only possible cause: for if there were another, as for example B, then in the instances in which *a* is not, B must have been absent as well as A, and it would not be true that these instances agree *only* in not containing A". This conclusion I take to claim not that A is indispensable, which is clearly not validly inferrible, but that nothing but A is sufficient [(3a) above]. Once more we have a conclusion, requiring no postulate about indispensability, because not a conclusion about indispensability. But not even this conclusion is validly inferrible unless the premise predicates collective presence. For several presence fails to show that no complex from which A is absent is sufficient to *a*.

<sup>1</sup> III, x, § 2.<sup>2</sup> p. 314.<sup>3</sup> p. 314.<sup>4</sup> p. 306.<sup>5</sup> III, x, § 2.

This must be the point of Prof. Broad's objection, "It remains quite possible that there is another S.S.C. of *a*, e.g., XYZ, which does not contain A at all".<sup>1</sup> For the instances do show that neither X nor Y nor Z is sufficient to *a*. Ought Prof. Broad then to allow the conclusion "that, in presence of BC or DE, A is a N.C. of *a*" ?<sup>2</sup> Why should not BCDE, or even BD or CE, be sufficient to *a* ?

From his account of Mill Prof. Broad passes to the formulation of "a perfectly sensible method of argument, which is not Mill's, but which might fairly be called the *Joint Method*".<sup>3</sup> Why it might fairly be so called, Prof. Broad does not say. But what disturbs me is that the method of argument, so far as I can see, is Mill's. It is exactly that "double employment of the Method of Agreement" which Prof. Broad intends it to supersede. I have already remarked that, in Prof. Broad's argument against Mill, "Any pair of instances that we could possibly find would agree in innumerable *negative* characteristics beside the absence of A and the absence of *a*", we must, in fairness to Mill, substitute, for the word "pair", the word "set". To the argument, even when thus modified, there can be no reply. Yet, in selecting the negative instances of Prof. Broad's method, "One would try to arrange that non-A should be the only characteristic common to all of them, though it might be impossible to arrange that any two of them had only non-A in common". But surely it not only "might be impossible to arrange that any two of them had only non-A in common", but also *would* be impossible to arrange that any number of them had only non-A in common or even that non-A was related to the instances any differently from *innumerable* other negative characteristics. If so, then the discovery "that every occurrence of each of these sets was also characterised by the *absence* of *a*" would afford no presumption whatever that non-A, rather than any of the innumerable other negative characteristics, "was a S.C. of non-*a*." The only alternative would not be, as Prof. Broad rightly says in the corresponding stage of the argument from his positive instances, "an enormous number of alternative S.S.C's". Instead, then, of saying that the argument is "greatly strengthened if the characteristics other than A and *a* which occur among the sets of the first series are, as nearly as may be, the same as the characteristics other than non-A and non-*a* which occur among the sets of the second series", we must insist that, unless this condition is fulfilled, the second series is worthless. But if this condition is fulfilled, what we have is a piecemeal satisfaction of the demands of the Method of Difference.

<sup>1</sup> pp. 315-316.<sup>2</sup> p. 315.<sup>3</sup> p. 316.

## II.—SOME OBSERVATIONS ON NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE GENERAL WILL (II.).

BY H. D. LEWIS.

### 1.

IN my previous article the attempt to provide a justification for rights in terms of a theory of the 'general will' was considered. The attempt was seen to have three main forms. Two of these, it was contended, were far from achieving their purpose, their plausibility being due to confusion with the remaining view which identifies the 'general will' with 'rational desire'. And the viciousness of such a confusion was emphasised by reference to Green's *Principles of Political Obligation*. The present article will be concerned for the most part with the notion of rational desire, in its bearing on the problem of rights.

The distinctive function of reason is unification. In the sphere of knowledge it enables us to transcend the present and have awareness of an objective order or 'world' of things instead of meaningless impressions. As it is now commonplace to note, this is the suggestive truth upon which Kant's impressive achievements for the most part rest. But the significance of the Kantian principle for an understanding of character and will was overlooked for a considerable period in consequence of Kant's own partitioning of personality in the doctrines of noumenal and phenomenal self, a consequence of logical and metaphysical difficulties which hindered very seriously the development of ethical ideas which are themselves as original and penetrating as anything else in Kantian philosophy. The corrective to this tendency was supplied, in English philosophy, by T. H. Green. Instead of a knowing self distinguished sharply from the self which feels and desires and which is determined in a purely mechanical way, he offers us a self which is identical in all its activities. And his account of the interpenetration of reason and desire, at a time when the grossest mechanistic accounts of human conduct were rampant, amply justifies the position as one of the classical philosophers accorded to him by later idealists. As a result of his teaching it was realized that reason permeates our desires, which acquire in consequence a living unity. What

I desire respecting a particular situation is modified by my desire respecting other situations which, as a rational being, I am able to anticipate. I do not therefore respond to each desire as it occurs. The desire has to find its place in a system or scheme, and we frequently forego the fulfilment of intense desires because they conflict with a system of desires, or with what we desire 'on the whole'. And, probably, every desire has its nature altered slightly to bring it into conformity with others. Neither can we escape such systematising. Short of insanity we cannot literally live for the moment. It is true that we speak of acting on impulse, and there are notable instances of improvident conduct. But unless we have in mind those cases where some overwhelming passion, anger, terror, or lust, deprives men of that which is distinctive of them and, by common consent, as implied in the epithet 'bestial' which is normally used in referring to those states, equates them with animals, the distinction between impulsive and rational conduct is a relative one. While the conduct of some is more systematised than that of others, no actions which may properly be called human are utterly unco-ordinated. Some purposing is exhibited in the life of the most licentious person. The satisfaction of even the most trivial and transitory desires involves some discomfort which would otherwise be shunned. And, furthermore, even when we allow trivial but immediate ends to triumph over richer and more comprehensive aims, the very comparison and choice which we are bound to make as knowing beings is itself an instance of rational systematising. And for both these reasons the conduct of all who are not insane is seen to be essentially rational. In consequence the ideal of what it would be most reasonable to desire can be presented as the fulfilment of the principle which governs our conduct throughout.

This ideal includes what we should desire if our interest in some end were never affected by its remoteness. How far this is actually attained depends, of course, on the strength and comprehensiveness of our IMAGINATION. If we could present the probable future situations sufficiently vividly to ourselves, the time pending their occurrence would not influence our consideration of their importance in comparison with other and nearer contingencies. Prodigality is the result of an imagination with a narrow reach.<sup>1</sup> And a similar account must be given of selfish-

<sup>1</sup> Especially interesting in this connection is the story by Ambrose Bierce entitled "Parker Addison, Philosopher". See his collection of stories, *In the Midst of Life*, p. 107. A striking instance on a wide scale is found in the perils of the modern world which are due so largely to a diseased imagination.



ness. Reason tells us not only that remote events will be as real when their turn comes as immediate ones but, also, that the experience of others is as real as our own and that, therefore, there is no 'reason' for giving especial consideration to ourselves.<sup>1</sup> Here also the extent to which we shall conform in actual fact depends on the vividness of our imagination. We do not favour ourselves when other persons are 'real' to us, to use a popular expression. Thus it is that appeals for charity consist essentially in attempts to stir in us a lively consciousness of the privations of others. Much of our knowledge is of a vague indeterminate kind. To adopt a Platonic distinction of which the originator unfortunately did not make much use, we 'have' it but we don't 'possess' it.<sup>2</sup> It does not occupy the focus of our attention because it is only of a general kind. If the details are supplied, if the determinable is made determinate, then it holds our attention and has a corresponding effect on our feelings. And thus it is that we are so often tempted to neglect remote situations out of concern for some immediate aim. The former can only be conceived in outline whereas the latter, owing to its close connection with the present situation, is presented to our imagination in all its colours and details. And the details of our own experiences and of those of persons intimately connected with us are normally anticipated in a much fuller and more vivid way than those of others. Imagination respecting others can rarely compete with our unique consciousness of ourselves, but, according as it succeeds, the less pre-occupied with ourselves we become. To read newspaper reports of the sufferings and privation entailed by the present war in Spain in terms of 'casualties' and 'food-shortages' and the numbers of refugees does not move us nearly so deeply as a few poignant details. It is in these latter that the reports become alive to us, and, although we knew after a fashion previously, we now know in a way that compels our sympathy. We put ourselves in other people's boots. And if our thought of the experiences of others could be made as full and vivid as the thought which bears on our own probable lot in future, our desires would embrace ends to be fulfilled in the lives of others in a way that would not

<sup>1</sup> I take it that this presupposes some interest of every man in others, as one of the basic elements in the constitution of human nature. But I do not wish to deal exhaustively with this, or any other, implication of the views affirmed in this passage, where I am merely outlining the concessions which I am very ready to make to idealism, and which I should be prepared to defend at more length, did it not fall outside the scope of my present purpose.

<sup>2</sup> Theaetetus 197.



be affected by the distinctness of persons. While remaining distinct persons we should desire, and co-ordinate our desires, as a society, in the same way as a particular individual now organises his desires, in so far as he is rational. This gives us the famous conception of a *common good*. This term has had many meanings but the view outlined here provides, I think, the interpretation actually given of the term by the more recent writers of that school. For the purpose of rational desire another person is to me that which I am to myself, my 'alter ego'. This, of course, suggests that the distinctness of persons is itself something artificial which is transcended in the ideal of rational or common good. And passages in Green and Bosanquet seem to favour that view, especially when we con them in the light of the more metaphysical contentions of those thinkers. But the argument does not necessarily entail such a conclusion. The statement that I *identify* myself with others, when I desire rationally, may only be a forcible metaphorical way of asserting that the distinctness of persons is irrelevant to desires on the rational plane. This is all that the theory needs; and here again idealist writers of late, in strictly ethical references at least, have refrained from giving the argument a metaphysical twist, whose attractiveness to them is easily understood, but which complicates and confuses the issue unnecessarily. We are left, then, for the purpose of our moral ideal, with 'that which would be desired' by a society of rational persons—eventually of course an all-inclusive society, since rationality obviously admits of no limitation with regard to the number of persons to be considered. This is still, of course, an ideal compatible with self-regarding interests. Indeed in the absence of such interests we should tend to take in one another's washing. For the most part, indeed, we shall probably serve the whole best by attending primarily to our own affairs and those of our friends and neighbours. The opposition of self-regarding tendencies and altruistic tendencies is not so much eliminated as perfectly adjusted. Neither is it implied, as Green sometimes supposed,<sup>1</sup> that each is to count for one and no one for more than one. This latter supposition is an encumbrance retained from the individualists of Green's day, and is particularly incompatible with the fundamental tenets of idealist ethics. Reason may require the complete sacrifice of certain persons in the interest of the whole, just as certain desires have to be suppressed entirely

<sup>1</sup> "In the estimate of that well-being which is to form the true good, everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one." *Prolegomena to Ethics*, paragraph 217.

when they conflict with the system of an individual's desires. What is required is a co-ordinating of our desires with those of others in a way that involves no favouring of desires because they are desired by us independently of such co-ordination.

Some difficulties, however, remain, and it would be well for idealist writers to deal with them and clarify their position correspondingly, instead of indulging in eloquent restatements of a position whose main outlines are now familiar enough. Such, in particular, are the following. Even in the absence of any selfish prejudice, what is desired respecting others may yet conflict with what they themselves want, *i.e.* variations in our initial interests and dispositions have still to be reckoned with. This is evidenced especially in the relation of parents to children. But we also frequently presume to 'know better' than our adult friends, and there is a class of persons in whom the tendency is sufficiently pronounced for them to acquire special epithets, opinionated, autocratic, etc. That tendency is partly, but by no means entirely, the result of selfishness. It would also be minimised considerably with the attainment of the comprehensive knowledge, and consequent sympathetic interest, presupposed in the rational ideal as expounded here. If we knew others as we know ourselves, and had immediate insight into their feelings, we should obviously be more tolerant. But would the intolerance be eliminated entirely? Short of our becoming literally identical, that does not seem to me probable. And, assuming such disparity, should we include in the final rational ideal what others desire for themselves on the whole (or rationally), or what we ourselves want for them? In the present essay I shall not pursue the point further, but I wish to suggest that we have here an aspect of idealist ethics which is not sufficiently discussed. Another similar, but not so neglected, difficulty arises from the attempt to transform the remote rational ideal into a guiding principle in the present imperfect state of affairs. Assuming that we recognise the ideal ourselves, what is to be its application to our treatment of those who do not conduct their lives in a reasonable way and who have little disinterested concern for others? We may, indeed, endeavour to improve them in that regard, but success will hardly be complete and immediate. In the meantime, should we seek to promote what they actually desire or what they would desire if they were perfectly rational? The former alternative can hardly be put forward as an invariable moral requirement, but the second suggestion seems to strain the idealist view almost to breaking point. Presumably some compromise is to be sought in practice,

and this is hinted at in the frequent insistence that the moral ideal is a developing one. But a clear formulation of the position, and the means of deciding the suggested compromise, would clarify considerably the position of those who base their ethics on such an ideal.

However, these difficulties are mainly by the way in the present essay. A point to be stressed more emphatically is the following. It has already been shown that the rational desire is related to actual fact in two connected ways: (A) It is an ideal obtained by applying in a more complete or consistent way the principle which is essentially operative in all conduct properly called human. (B) We actually conform to this ideal to the extent that we are able to think of, or anticipate, in a vivid and detailed way, the future lot of ourselves and others. But these admissions are compatible with the recognition of a very wide gulf between the way in which we actually desire and the ideal of complete co-ordination set before us by our reason. It remains a fact that our interests are frequently narrow and that selfish ends usually predominate. This stubborn fact cannot be rendered insignificant by dwelling on the ultimate inconsistency of such an attitude. And we must be careful not to confuse the rational ideal where no special consideration is given to our own ends, at any point, with either the actual or the ideal systematizing of desires we actually experience and which do, in fact, include other-regarding tendencies. Writers sometimes pass from the latter to the former, emphasising at the same time especially the altruistic inclinations which, in some proportion, the majority of human beings normally experience, *i.e.*, they confuse the present form of the theory of the common good with that form of it considered secondly in the first of these articles.<sup>1</sup> And it is thereby implied that the rational end or the common good is something in which we already acquiesce. If that were the case the terms duty and right would become, in practice, otiose as applied in connection with that end, unless they were reserved for the mere means to its attainment, ultimately a very subordinate function. And the conclusion is, furthermore, easily confuted by any observation of ourselves and our fellows. Nothing but confusion comes from fusing the ideal and the actual.

<sup>1</sup> I suspect T. H. Green of such confusion in chap. III, book III, of the *Prolegomena to Ethics* (paragraphs 199-205 in particular). But it is not easy to bring forward a definite charge against him, since his main concern at any rate is with an ideal, 'an absolute good gradually defining itself'. A writer who is particularly careful to avoid such confusion is H. J. Paton. See *The Good Will*, pp. 303-310.

And even the connections with fact, admitted in this passage, seem to me to be incidental to a consideration of the ideal in itself. But idealist writers still cling to their curious attitude on this point. They insist that conformity in some measure, or, more fairly perhaps, under certain conditions, *i.e.*, those indicated above, is presupposed in the recognition of the ideal as such. This is bound up with the belief that the ideal, in spite of conflicting with our actual desires, is yet *really* desired by human beings. This seems to be Green's view, in spite of the confusion between claims and interests, in the passage where he insists that a 'conception must be somebody's conception'.<sup>1</sup> And with this we may compare Bradley's view in the chapter on 'My Station And Its Duties', especially the remarks, "The good will is meaningless if it be not the will of living human beings".<sup>2</sup> "It is not an unreal form of the mind but a living soul that penetrates and stands fast in the detail of actual existence. It is real and real for me."<sup>3</sup> Now it has been pointed out<sup>4</sup> that the term real, in this connection, must be carefully distinguished from actual. Neither is the term 'will' used in the same way "as in ordinary language".<sup>4</sup> And if these terms are employed merely to emphasise the fact that the ideal is objective, as contrasted with the particular reactions of individuals, and is real in the sense in which all abstract principles are real, though not existents, no particular objection can be raised, provided that usage of the term be clearly indicated. But that has not been the case with idealist writers in general. Indeed, I think we can very confidently affirm that these writers have meant much more than is implied here. Although they admit a distinction between the actual and the real will, some definite identity in the meaning of the two conceptions is intended. And it is this that one finds particularly hard to discover. One may say that the ideal is logically entailed in the actual will, in as much as the latter would have the ideal as its content if it were consistent. But unless we accept the metaphysical view that the logically prior is also the more real (an unwarranted encroachment of metaphysics on a strictly ethical or psychological discussion, whatever our final view may be), that logical connection does not justify the assertion that there is a real will or desire directed towards the ideal, notwithstanding its conflicting with what we actually desire or will on the whole. The introduction of the qualifications

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 120 of *Principles of Political Obligation*. Cf. my first article, pp. 447-450.

<sup>2</sup> p. 147, *Ethical Studies*.

<sup>3</sup> p. 148, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> By Muirhead, *MIND*, 1924. See especially p. 235.

'deeper', 'more ultimate', etc., avails nothing. Our quarrel is with the use of the same term for our actual will and for a relation between us and the ideal to which, *ex hypothesi*, we do not direct ourselves. These have nothing sufficiently in common to justify the same terms 'will', 'desire', etc. And if it is supposed that this criticism can be met, my argument at least points to an ambiguity in the idealist contention. It should be explained where *precisely* they pass beyond the connection between the actual and the ideal admitted in the opening of this passage.

This criticism of the idealist doctrine of the 'general will' is not very novel. And I dwell upon it merely to indicate, as I have attempted to do in the above passage, where, in my opinion, the issue between the idealist and his critics in this regard lies. But the main point I wish to stress with regard to the conception of 'rational desire' will be clarified by turning this criticism more directly upon the original of the theory, and drawing attention to one significant aspect of it that is widely neglected.

## 2.

Although anticipated in certain features of the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, its first formulation in modern philosophy and its first appearance as a clearly defined theory is found in Rousseau's famous claim that the doctrine of the 'general will', propounded by him, provided a means of forcing men to be free. This paradox is, without question, an impressive one, and it brings together two ideas which make an especial appeal to our feelings and imagination. It is not surprising, then, that its influence on theory and practice has been particularly extensive. Kant owed much to it in his doctrine of the 'Autonomous Will' and consequently in his final philosophical views. And it has become increasingly the text of idealist writers on ethics and political philosophy. Bosanquet, in particular, harks back to Rousseau when he makes his entire argument in the *Metaphysical Theory of the State* revolve about the paradox of self-government. And the influence of the theory on practice, from the French Revolution to recent and contemporary social reform, is a commonplace of history. And yet, in itself, this famous paradox, like many of its kind, seems to me little better than elegant nonsense, its influence and the abiding achievements, practical and theoretical, which, admittedly, came in its train, being really due to its being fused with another and supremely important principle, and in the circumstances becoming the only

medium for the propagation of that principle—the principle, namely, that morality is unlimited in its claim, is objective and independent of the reactions of individuals, determining accordingly, in the final analysis, the nature and limits of the authority of the State as of every other association. And that principle would have fared better, would have received wider recognition and a saner and more sustained application, if it had been allowed to shine forth from the first in its own simplicity and integrity. The vices, and not inconsiderable ones, which have also come in the train of the theory of the ‘general will’, the assertive and militant nationalism for which it was often made the excuse, would have been avoided, to the extent at least that they were sheltered by theory.

In one sense, indeed, it is meaningful to speak of forcing a man to be free. If he is the slave of some vicious habit, it may be that some discipline to which we subject him may mean his emancipation. That would be the case if a drunkard were cured by forced abstinence. We should be compelling him to do something with a view to his doing it of his own accord eventually. Compulsory education, albeit the compulsion should be minimised so far as compatible with effective teaching, obviously comes under this description. And in like manner we may induce in ourselves certain habits or tastes or, it may be, aversions, by conduct of a special kind. A dull subject may capture our interest after proper study, and the unmusical, assuming certain latent talent, may become musical by due application to that art. But in these, and all similar cases, we are only forcing ourselves and others to do something which will render us subsequently free in that or, it may be, some other regard. We are not in respect of the same conduct exercising both force and freedom. And it is this latter combination of the two ideas that is required in Rousseau’s paradox as it works itself out in his thought and that of his followers. It is implied that in being forced, whatever the effect of such measures on the subject of it, even when he is being executed and all possibility of subsequent approval is eliminated, an individual may yet be said to acquiesce in the very treatment which, *ex hypothesi*, he resists. This it is that I suggest is obstructive nonsense. No subterfuge can render the ideas of force and freedom other than opposites, and we do not rise above them to some more ultimate truth by straining them into an unnatural combination.

But declamations, especially along lines already familiar, will not help my contention very substantially. And my main concern is to emphasise the way Rousseau came to formulate

this paradox and to show what accounts for the popularity of the theories it initiated. That will, I believe, bring out its defects in a more definite way, as well as the manner of its fusion with an important truth.

Rousseau began as a vigorous individualist and retained a strong element of individualism in his more mature period. This has been well brought out by C. E. Vaughan, who traces very clearly the two strands in Rousseau's thought, his individualism and his socialism or collectivism, as they appear in his various writings.<sup>1</sup>

In the early writings, which deal with morals rather than politics, Rousseau appears as pre-eminently the champion of individual freedom, and, incidentally, in many quarters this impression of him remains unmodified in view of the greater popularity of these earlier writings. It is in these that the noble savage, so dear to the eighteenth century, is exalted and the old plea for a return to the state of nature is repeated. The vices and miseries of the race are due to the State, and man must be liberated from its shackles. Indeed, Rousseau carries his individualism to a much more extreme degree than Locke, and is more consistent in his acceptance of it. He realises how primitive the inhabitants of a state of nature would be,<sup>2</sup> and this renders his account much more plausible than Locke's conception of a highly developed community supposedly prior to definite social organization. And the ideal which we are urged to restore is that of man, if not in his most primitive condition, at least but little removed from it and lacking all the qualities which distinguish him especially in civil society.<sup>3</sup> But in the later and more political works Rousseau advocated a total subordination of the individual to the State. His absolutism, while differing in all other respects from that of Hobbes, is, at any rate, as thorough and comprehensive. And the State is elevated as the means of rendering man intelligent and moral whereas, independently of it, he remained a stupid and limited animal.

But even in the *Contrat Social* some contradiction is evident. The famous opening sentence, and the first chapters, raise again the protest against the encroachment of the State upon the rights of men. Tyranny is the butt of attack, and rarely have the

<sup>1</sup> See *The Political Writings of Rousseau*, vol. i, by C. E. Vaughan, Introduction (in particular p. 4).

<sup>2</sup> This is especially evidenced in the first draft of the *Contrat Social* known as the *Geneva Manuscript*.

<sup>3</sup> A fairly precise account of Rousseau's early ideal appears in the opening passage of the second part of the *Discours sur l'inégalité*.



fallacies with which tyranny arms itself been so trenchantly exposed. But this, most unexpectedly, is the prelude to an equally impressive glorification of the State. And it is significant that, while the *Contrat Social* remained the Bible of the French Revolution throughout, it was the first chapters that were mainly consulted and quoted in its earlier period where freedom from oppression was the prevalent note, while later, in the need to consolidate the achievements of the Revolution and organise the community against foreign attack, reference is made to the more central theme of the book and the doctrine of absolutism comes to its own. This testifies in a striking way to the presence of both individualistic and socialistic elements within the *Contrat Social* itself. The contradiction is indeed minimised when we reflect that the first chapters of the *Contrat Social*, like the early writings, were directed against the particular states of Rousseau's day, communities which, in the light of his mature views, he would hardly call states, while, in the substance of the book, as of the *Political Economy*, it is the rightful state, the embodiment of the 'general will', that Rousseau has in mind.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the presence of two such distinct tendencies in the same book is notable.

Furthermore, even in the exposition of the doctrine of the 'general will', where Rousseau cancels, in effect, many of his earlier contentions, pronounced individualistic elements remain. Witness, in particular, the conditions suggested to ensure the purity of the 'general will'. In the first instance, it is only on matters of a thoroughly general interest that it can be consulted. No issue which may affect one man or society more closely than others can be directly decided by it. Apparently, it is only in this way that each voter will ask himself the question which ensures a public-spirited vote, namely, 'Is this for the public good?' Whenever there is a clash of interests persons will only consider what is for their own good. But this clearly implies that no one is ever really disinterested.<sup>2</sup> The concern

<sup>1</sup> This was first pointed out to me by Mr. A. K. Stout.

<sup>2</sup> The chapter on the Legislator, chap. 7, Book 2, *Contrat Social*, is very instructive in this connection. Notwithstanding his 'great soul' and 'superhuman intelligence' the Legislator cannot be trusted with an official position. "His private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work." Cf. also the chapter on Democracy, chap. 4, Book 3, where we are told that democracy is not 'a government for men', but for 'a people of gods'. Human beings, apparently, could not resist the temptation, in formulating laws, of taking thought of the possibility of applying these laws subsequently for their private benefit, as soon as the circumstances permitted it. Rousseau seems to have had little real faith in the possibility of genuine disinterestedness.



for the public good exhibited when interests do not conflict is accidental. It is a semblance since it will not bear any strain. And this is a reversion to something far more vicious than Locke, namely, the thoroughgoing selfishness of Hobbes. The aims of human beings may not be so vicious or narrow as in Hobbes's interpretation, but there is apparently no deliberate surrendering of private ends. There is no co-operation for a common good to which private good is sacrificed where necessary. Thus, although, explicitly, the notion of contract plays a particularly subordinate part in the theory of the 'general will' itself, there is a subtle reversion to the principle of consent which it expresses, in this first precaution against an impure 'general will'. A scheme advocated to guard against having a mere 'Will of All' has actually the implication that only 'the Will of All' is possible. As a further consequence, the rightful use of force is confined to cases where there is no need for it. At best it could only be extended to those who challenge the opinion of the majority concerning what is good for all alike, and not where it is most needed, namely, to those who put their own interest before the good of the whole. And the former contingency, moreover, would be most unlikely, on the view under discussion. This is obviously the most rampant individualism. And a no less acute inconsistency appears in the second precaution, which advocates the abolition of minor associations within the State, or, failing this, the multiplication of them to such a degree that their conflicting influences will balance one another. Besides depriving us of something we cherish especially, and being redundant if the first principle is properly applied, this scheme also carries with it very clearly the implication that societies cannot co-operate for a common end or resolve their conflicts in a disinterested manner. In fact it is only by keeping men apart that proper government is possible. But the unity so achieved is obviously shallow and artificial. It is far removed from the 'corporate self' of which each individual is an inseparable part.

These inconsistencies have often been noted, and as eagerly by those in sympathy with Rousseau as by his less tolerant critics. Neither are they very surprising when we allow for the revolutionary character of the conception with which Rousseau was struggling. And the theory has, moreover, been purged in this regard by thinkers who were able to lay firmer hold on Rousseau's vision than he himself. But the inconsistencies are, I think, instructive since they testify to the ineradicable nature of Rousseau's individualism. It flaunts itself, as it were, in the heart of the enemy camp.

And this has to be borne in mind especially when we consider the strict terms of the doctrine of the 'general will'. As I have already remarked, it was Rousseau's special achievement to realise and emphasise the unlimited nature of the claims of morality. We cannot fence ourselves round and say, 'Thus far and no further'. It is absurd to say that we have the right to go the way we please, in any regard, independently of morality; that no duty on our own part or that of others can deprive us of our title to freedom in certain respects. Clearly every right or title is itself derived from, is in fact of the very substance of, morality, if such conceptions are considered at all consistently. And in the welter of confused and contradictory thinking which preceded and followed him, throughout a period when the 'rights of man' were bandied about unreflectingly to suit everybody's prejudice, Rousseau stands almost alone in his grasp of the relation of morality to our lives. And, in this regard, he marks an advance, not merely on Hobbes who denied morality, but also on Locke who, while he realised with special clearness the ultimacy of morality, would yet circumscribe it in certain ways. And along with this went, naturally, the recognition of a real union of men in society, something which affected their lives fundamentally and to which, in turn, they made a unique contribution. The State is an indivisible whole. Outside of it man is nothing; within it he fulfils himself. Man owes all that is distinctive of him to social co-operation, and it is in so far as he identifies himself with a social whole that he attains in his own life, and furthers in others, that which is supremely good. The social whole is the medium of an absolute morality. This was the lesson Rousseau learnt from his study of Greek philosophy and handed down, deepened in meaning, to his idealist successors, whose terminology I have deliberately reproduced in this passage to emphasise my extensive agreement with their view on those points. But, having come, in his mature period, by these important truths, Rousseau should have repudiated his earlier individualism without reservation. This he was loath to do. He could still have raised a cry for freedom and the rights of man, but it would have to be an essentially different cry. And his heart was too completely given to the old campaign to abandon it entirely. Hence he sought to have it both ways, to reconcile the irreconcilable. Man was 'to alienate himself' completely, 'to throw himself' under the complete control of the 'general will'; yet he was to 'obey no one but himself and remain as free as before'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Contrat Social*, Book I, chap. 6.

Had Rousseau meant merely that man's powers are considerably increased within an ordered society, that they are clearly defined and guaranteed instead of depending, as they would in a state of nature, on the balancing of individual powers and those such as are given little encouragement to develop into something more than brute force, his contention would undoubtedly be true. But Hobbes, also, could have admitted that the State made men free in this sense. And it is clear that Rousseau means much more. The member is to obey himself alone. And so, while it would have been a simple matter merely to assert that it is right for the community to enforce conformity to its laws, since that is essential to the fulfilment of moral ends, Rousseau has to introduce his elaborate conception of a 'general will'. Due tribute is paid to morality in the insistence that the ends of the 'general will' must be moral. It is the will of all when they are being thoroughly disinterested, each asking, 'Is this for the common or public good?', although it is not clear what is to happen when we err in discovering this good, in so far as Rousseau recognises the possibility of such error. But, apparently, it is only within a community of such disinterested persons, and on matters they can approach in a disinterested manner, that enforcement is justified. This is the old phantom of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the idea of consent. And we are left with a principle which admits of no application in the present imperfect state of affairs; in fact, to repeat what I said earlier, the use of force is confined to conditions that render it unnecessary. And this curious conclusion, I maintain, is the result of trying to combine the idea of freedom in a sense ultimately individualistic with a moral absolutism; to bring together, in the same reference, the contradictory ideas of force and freedom.

Rousseau's conception has been rendered less obviously inconsistent by the emphasis on the distinction between the actual and the real will. And the development of that distinction owes much to certain aspects of Rousseau's own writings. In particular, use has been made of the idea of the 'corporate self', a living social whole within which, as Rousseau especially understood, the individual moves and has his being. Now that conception is supremely important. And I have no reluctance to admit that the social whole, upon which a man is dependent for all that is distinctive of him and to which, in turn, he has obligations, would become the centre of his interests *under certain conditions*. But that this relationship is implied in all a man's thoughts and activities, does not, to my mind, provide a reason for

saying that he authorises the punishment or enforcement of himself, since, in fact, he disregards such claims to the extent that he needs to be punished.<sup>1</sup> Something more than ordinary inconsistency (Bosanquet's favourite explanation, it will be remembered), is involved when we act unsocially. The change of conditions noted above would be so drastic as to make of a man another person. But these points have already been made earlier (pp. 23 and 24). And my present concern is to contend that the aspect of idealist ethics I am discussing at the moment is largely the result of something incidental to the development of that theory, namely, Rousseau's early individualism and its persistence in his mature views, combined with a curious undercurrent of individualism in the thought of some of his most influential successors in ethics and political philosophy.<sup>2</sup> Hegel's 'free unity of self with others' found a significant response in the English Idealists whose vigorous attacks on individualism, in spite of themselves, have a strangely apologetic tone. The tendency, from some motive or other, to represent duty as something one ultimately desires is as old as Plato,<sup>3</sup> but nowhere does it take a more interesting form than in these writers. They steadily refuse to recognise duty for what it is, something unique, something set over against us, and, in a sense, foreign to us. On the contrary, so little will they tolerate any intrusion upon the sanctity of the individual that they represent both duty and justifiable force as something emanating in a superior way from the individual himself. Thus Bradley writes:<sup>4</sup> "Unless the member realises the whole by and in himself, he fails to reach his own individuality". And, presumably, the latter is the only

<sup>1</sup> I am aware that many idealists (see, in particular, Bradley in *My Station and its Duties*) regard the self as deriving its reality solely from the social whole and as being in consequence unreal in so far as it opposes itself to that whole. With this metaphysical denial both of the final reality of evil and the distinctness of persons I cannot treat within the scope of this paper. But it would be well for idealists generally to indicate more clearly how far they rely on such considerations and how far, if at all, the problem posed here can be met independently of such metaphysics.

<sup>2</sup> This latter reinforces, and is in turn reinforced by, the metaphysics referred to in footnote (1).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Prof. Prichard, *Duty and Interest*. It may be that Mr. Foster (*Philosophy*, July, 1936) has indicated a genuine exception; but that does not disprove Plato's tendency, in most of the relevant references in the *Republic*, to identify duty and interest.

<sup>4</sup> *Ethical Studies, My Station and its Duties*, p. 170. In illustrating my criticism from these quotations, I retain my agreement with a great deal of the substance of this famous chapter. My objection is really that the break from individualism has not been complete and clear enough.

reason for 'realising the whole'. Self-realisation is for Bradley, as for Green, the fundamental principle of morals and, accordingly, our obligations to society need to be justified in terms of the insistence that "to be himself he must go beyond himself, to live his life he must live a life which is not merely his own but which, none the less, but on the contrary, all the more, is intensely and emphatically his own individuality".<sup>1</sup> In the same chapter the antipathy to "alien necessity" is expressly voiced.<sup>2</sup> And, as for Green, he is especially at pains to save the dignity of the individual. The claims of the 'common good' are justified because, in some sense, it 'coincides', or is 'identified', with the well-being of the agent himself.<sup>3</sup> And it is interesting to note in Green, as in Rousseau, a reforming passion for liberty. Furthermore, although Green was never himself avowedly an individualist, he wrote at a time when that doctrine was rampant in England, and, while he set himself especially to oppose it, he succumbed to it, without question, in some regards.<sup>4</sup> And this compromise with individualism, an attempt to refute it while retaining that which is, albeit in a superficial way, initially attractive about it, a false conception of what the dignity of the individual demands, seems to me to be the core of the idealist attempt to reconcile force and freedom, to identify duty and inclination, which was introduced primarily into British philosophy through the instrumentality of Bradley and Green. Writing of the problem which led to the formulation of that theory, Muirhead, in his advocacy of it, remarks, "the problem of the age was how to conceive of society so as to reconcile the order and discipline of law and institutions with the claim for liberty".<sup>5</sup> And instead of boldly subordinating liberty to morality, instead of affirming that liberty has no justification beyond its being necessary to the fulfilment of ends presented by morality, the idealists have throughout expended a prodigious amount of ingenuity on the attempt to reconcile the claims of duty with the utterly false view of liberty as the right to do what we please. Taken in its context, where the reference is to the liberty of individualism, Muirhead's statement seems to me very damaging to his view.

Finally, this interpretation may be extended to that more ultimate tenet of idealism, namely, the supposition that the basis of morality lies in desire.

<sup>1</sup> Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> See *Prolegomena to Ethics*, paragraphs 201, 216, 232.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote to p. 21, 'each to count for one', etc.

<sup>5</sup> MIND, 1924, p. 167.

And this sentence brings me back from a long but not, I hope, irrelevant digression. The idealist position as a whole, in ethics, has the same psychological explanation as the special contention I have just been considering. Indeed the latter throws the motives behind idealism into specially clear light. But it is not strictly entailed by idealism. It is possible to repudiate the assertion of the identification of the real and the ideal while retaining the view of the latter as the end of a rational desire, in the fashion expounded above. And it is this latter that is fundamental to idealist ethics. Hitherto my direct references to that claim have been by way of noting certain ambiguities in the presentation of it, and more particularly to throw into prominence the individualism it ultimately involves. It remains to make a more direct criticism.

## 3.

And, firstly, note an ambiguity in the idealist view of the bearing of the conception of 'rational end' upon the problem of rights. On the most plausible view, we may claim as our right the treatment that is involved in the fulfilment of that end. This would conform to the true view of the relations between 'a right' and 'the right', namely, that the one is simply the obverse of the other. But in idealist writings we have sometimes one account of rights, another of duties, and, as this attitude penetrates into ordinary thought, considerable confusion is engendered. Rights appear as constituting a kind of secondary morality, pale shadows of duties. This was instanced in the first article,<sup>1</sup> where a reference was made to Green's contention that rights are merely 'relative' to the sphere of moral duty. But for the purpose of my remarks in this section, I do not propose to take further account of this ambiguity. My contention will be that the 'rational end' does not represent what is valuable in itself. It will follow that any attempt to find in that 'end' a ground for either rights or duties is doomed to failure.

And here one is reduced in the last analysis to mere counter-assertion. The view to which I would adhere, in preference to idealism, is that associated primarily with the writings of G. E. Moore, the view, namely, that the ultimate conceptions of ethics, right, duty and good, are unique and indefinable. And in so far as the advocates of this theory have endeavoured strictly to prove their view they violate its essential nature and render themselves open to the criticisms of H. J. Paton,<sup>2</sup> G. C. Field<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> p. 451.<sup>2</sup> *The Good Will*, chap. 2.<sup>3</sup> *Moral Theory*, pp. 52-55.

and others. Proof is neither possible nor necessary. But we can go a long way by defining the issues as clearly as possible. And we can ask the idealist to reflect again in the light of certain considerations.

Few, I think, will contend that our beliefs about what is right or what is good are adequately accounted for on the supposition that the end of every and any desire is good and the fulfilment of it obligatory. The more important distinctions we make involve the assumption that certain ends are overwhelmingly more valuable than others and have a stronger claim on our will. Reading poetry is better than eating chocolate. How is this to be accounted for? And here the idealist emphasises the notion of rationality. Desires need to be organised and it is in terms of what is desired on the whole, in the sense discussed above, that we distinguish between various ends in connection with the content of our duty.

Now such organisation means subordination of certain ends to others. And the selection presupposes some principle. What is this to be? There are the following possibilities. (A) The intensity of desires. This does not mean that we do what we desire most intensely at the moment, but what we should desire most intensely if we had an equally fair insight into the nature of the competing ends. Now given such insight, the intensity of our desires would conform very closely, I think, to our judgements of value. A person who has the same insight into the nature of a fine poem as the poetically-minded person has when he reads it, would prefer such experience to eating chocolate. But I doubt whether the intensity of our desires, so understood, would tally throughout with our judgements of value. Is it not possible, owing to differences of disposition and training, for two persons to prefer different ends although they have both the same insight into the nature of those ends in the relevant respects? This problem is, I admit, a hard one. What complicates it especially is the obvious connection between interest and insight. The poem means something different for the poet, and for him when he is enjoying the poem, from its meaning for ordinary persons or the poet himself in prosaic moods. It is hard then to get the conditions postulated. But even if the instance is purely hypothetical it is not un instructive. It can at least be regarded as a kind of limit, which shows forcibly how the variation in our desires is not accounted for entirely by the variation in sympathetic interest. And it becomes clear accordingly that mere intensity will not give us uniformity. Indeed some would suspect us already of torturing a theory to cover the facts in so



far as the attempt to treat idealism sympathetically leads us to minimise the extensive discrepancies in our likes and dislikes. At any rate the explanatory value of the present principle becomes highly questionable when we are reduced to saying that knowledge or artistic pursuits have a high value because they would be preferred by the person now passionately devoted to hunting and drinking if both his capacities and habits were different, if, in short, he were a very different person.

But the idealist will probably go with us here. And we shall be told that intensity has to be supplemented in the idealist account of value by (B) coherence, suitability, co-operativeness, whatever the precise term. Now this must mean that we are to differentiate between desires according as their fulfilment does not hinder the fulfilment of other desires or, preferably, positively promotes it. And we are reminded of Green's distinction between competitive and non-competitive goods. Within limits this is a valid distinction. The enjoyment of material things in the way of eating and drinking, physical comfort, etc., admits of competition. Material things have to be literally shared. By contrast with this, knowledge or the enjoyment of beauty is usually deepened and extended when 'communicated' to others. When we share spiritual things we do not really give anything away. And within the experience of the individual the present pursuit of knowledge, etc., does not deplete his stock as with the satisfaction of physical appetites but, rather, enhances his future prospects. The more 'spiritual' activities, then, have this superiority. Of course there is a conflict in so far as the pursuit of them depends on the possession of material things, books, theatres, art-galleries, colleges, a modicum of physical comfort, etc. But these conflicts are incidental and, in principle, capable of being resolved to a large extent. The idealist then is entitled to disregard them in his insistence on a vital distinction between, *e.g.*, knowledge and eating, in this regard. We may concede also that the pursuit of knowledge increases our power of satisfying desires generally in diverse ways, whether we have in mind some artistic or some physical pursuit. That art, which must be ranged along with knowledge as a pursuit of especial value, has this merit, is not so obvious. Art does indeed bring together kindred spirits in a specially intimate way. Artists, I am aware, are notoriously jealous and distrustful. But that does not originate directly in their art,<sup>1</sup> and must be resolved when actually sharing in an artistic experience. But the relation of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the essay by Max Beerbohm entitled *Actors*. See *Works and More*, p. 168.

artists to those whose sensibilities are different, and often to the world generally, is one of complete impatience and, frequently, irritability. An artist simply does not understand those who do not share his feelings, or his enthusiasm for his art, and usually relegates them to the outer darkness. They are monsters with whom he cannot, in respect of his art at least, have any communion. Furthermore, the very intensity of artistic concentration gives it an aspect of exclusiveness. And it is certainly not readily apparent that art contributes directly to the pursuit of other activities. For the individuals who themselves live an intense artistic life the reverse seems to be true. Their art absorbs them and renders them often unpractical. On the other hand, certain forms of art may inspire and integrate a whole society, while its tendency to exclusiveness may only be an incident of our present imperfection. And, in the service of religion or some social movement, provided its intrinsic nature is not impaired, art may prove a powerful integrating force. Considerations of this kind,<sup>1</sup> along with our at-one-ness with others when we share some artistic experience with them, may have more force than the difficulties I raised. Provided the difficulties are recognised and dealt with in a thorough way I have no serious quarrel with the idealist argument at this point. Whether art has the same degree of co-operativeness as knowledge gives occasion for graver doubts. And if my misgivings are justified, there is here a serious difficulty for the idealist, since art is universally accorded as high a position in the scale of valuable things as knowledge, while some, rightly I think, give priority to art. But on this point also I am ready to capitulate. And similar concessions may be made in respect of the *abidingness* which idealists also detect in ends deemed generally of most value, and in terms of which they seek to fortify their position. Beyond noting that this conception is a much more obscure one than appears at first sight, and requires to be stated with greater precision than is usual before it can be profitably discussed, I will not comment on it here. Neither, finally, is it claimed that my list is exhaustive, although I think I have referred to the main points. Any considerations which I have overlooked will hardly avail if this type of theory of value is seen to fail in principle in respect of the forms of it examined.

And now for my serious objection. Assuming that the ends deemed of most value have the characteristics ascribed to them by idealists *that is not what we mean when we call them good*. The

<sup>1</sup> Incidentally here is another case where we have to put the case for our opponents.

truth of this contention can only be decided finally by reflecting on our use of the term, bearing in mind that we are not concerned with instrumental value. But the issue can be presented in an especially acute form if, by a permissible abstraction, we strip the higher ends of co-operative and similar characteristics, or preferably, equate the lower ends with them in that regard. The latter experiment does not at least tax our imagination unduly. We can think away many of the hindrances to physical enjoyments, and we can suppose ourselves to be participating in them with cumulative intensity and mutual reinforcement, as when the first glass of wine improves the second and whets other sensuous appetites. We can also suppose the indulgence to be continued indefinitely and to have no undesirable after-effects for ourselves or others, a supposition very common in the fantasies of the East. And when the sensuous ends are rendered on all fours with art and knowledge in these, as they seem to me, incidental respects, do not the latter remain strikingly superior in value? In that case neither the meaning of goodness nor even the conditions of its application coincide with the features of ends of desire emphasised in idealist theory. In short, to use a popular expression, the superiority of art and knowledge 'strikes us in the face' from consideration of their intrinsic nature and quite independently of any integrating functions they reveal. This is where the idealist and the realist definitely part company.

And we may clinch the point by asking, 'Would not knowledge and art retain their superior value if we ceased to desire them altogether, if men were so constituted as to give them no place in what they desire on the whole or "the ends of man as such"?' Here the idealist will be confident that we have delivered ourselves to him. He will pounce upon us with the question, 'But can you really believe that something has value if nobody wants it?' And at first it goes hard with us to meet this challenge. Would things which consistently bored us have value? Now I think that a point of special importance is overlooked in the implication that this question settles the issue conclusively on the side of the idealist. Clearly, a condition of having an experience which has any pretensions to value is that it should make some appeal to us. No one who is not interested in poetry can have the true experience of reading a poem. Interest is a condition of artistic sympathy and concentration. Likewise those to whom music makes no appeal cannot have a truly musical experience. And where enthusiasm is lacking, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake cannot properly be undertaken or even understood. As for social intercourse and friendship, mutual interest belongs

to the very essence of it. And, finally, religious experience, which I have excluded from the discussion hitherto on account of difficulties peculiar to it alone, depends on the eager outpouring of the spirit. This is especially the case with religions which find their supreme conceptions in love and adoration. Love with no element of desire is a contradiction. And thus the experiences we prize the most depend, in a vital way, on interest or, to use Prof. C. A. Campbell's term,<sup>1</sup> 'liking'. And it is absurd to devote ourselves to any end in which our interest cannot be stimulated. In this sense nothing has value unless we want it. But it does not follow that the value itself varies with the nature of our desires. On the contrary, liking is a factor common to good and bad (or at least inferior) experiences. And even when we do not desire certain pursuits, and are therefore debarred from indulging profitably in them, it can still be insisted that this is most regrettable since these pursuits, could they be ours, would have much more value than those to which we can, in the circumstances, rise. If the constitution of men precluded an interest in art, knowledge or religion, the life of the race would be sadly impoverished. We might not be sensitive to such loss in the circumstances, since interest is a condition of entering sufficiently into these experiences to appreciate them.<sup>2</sup> But it would still be the case, even if no one were in a position to judge so, that the experiences of which we should be deprived because our natures were not conformable to them would have been supremely valuable. And this not merely turns the point of the criticism considered in this passage but constitutes an especially formidable argument against the idealist. It is hard to see how the regret and pity contemplated here can be admitted in terms of his theory. To say that we should desire these experiences in a special way, if at all, is to strain the theory unfairly since, *ex hypothesi*, they are excluded *in toto* from our desires. On the other hand, I submit that no one can deny such loss, or the propriety of the regret to which I referred (apart from the irrelevant difficulty that there would be no one to experience it), except in the interest of a special theory.

That there should be a connection between our natures and the realisation of value on our part is inevitable; but that does not prove that our natures affect the meaning of value. The idealists exploit that connection, and, in particular, they make capital out

<sup>1</sup> See MIND, 1935, p. 282.

<sup>2</sup> Incidentally have we not here a way of meeting the objection which consists in noting the variations in the list of valuable things or types of things given by those who affirm that value is apprehended intuitively?

of the further fact that there happens to be some correspondence between our desires and our judgements of value, especially in respect of the most consistent and comprehensive desiring within our power. But even if their formula fits, that does nothing to establish the position. It only tells us an important and welcome truth about the constitution of men and the nature of 'spiritual' pursuits. The connection does not seem to me sufficiently odd<sup>1</sup> to strengthen the idealist position in any measure.

H. J. Paton puts the case for idealism strikingly in the phrase, 'We cannot quarrel with the choice of a soul',<sup>2</sup> but this, I maintain, is what we may, and often must, do. It is at least quite meaningful to doubt whether the soul of an individual or a society or even the race is directed to what is best.

And there, I think, I must leave the matter for the present. But before resuming the main thread of my argument, it will not be out of place to adduce a further, though somewhat less direct, difficulty with which the idealist is confronted. In common with other points in this paper, justification is claimed for referring to this difficulty in the neglect of it. It concerns moral freedom. Now by far the greater number of those who favour the idealist approach to ethics accept the tenets of idealism generally and believe accordingly in the rationality of the real. For them the most plausible view of freedom will consist in the insistence on degrees of freedom according to the rationality or coherence of our conduct. And of this I do not wish to treat here, beyond recording my utter inability to reconcile it with the nature of responsibility. But it is pertinent to comment on the peculiar position of those who share my conviction that freedom of genuinely open possibilities is presupposed in morality but adhere, in other respects, to the idealist view in ethics. An account of the moral end which is ultimately *relative* goes strangely with the insistence on *absolute* moral freedom. And this is particularly the case in so far as idealism is true to its motive, as I have analysed it, namely, reluctance to claim from the individual something which he does not himself want in some sense. The account of the content of our obligation as the end of a rational desire does not, as I noted,<sup>3</sup> strictly involve this assumption. Considered in itself it might be reconciled with

<sup>1</sup> Contrast Prof. C. A. Campbell's remark (*MIND*, vol. xlv, p. 291), "Now this applicability of our formula to the so-called intrinsic goods is not, indeed, conclusive *proof* that our formula expresses what is really meant in these contexts by goodness. Nevertheless, I think we may say that if this is *not* what is meant by goodness, then the applicability of the formula is a very odd coincidence indeed."

<sup>2</sup> *The Good Will*, p. 377.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 19-20.

freedom thus. What an individual desires, as a whole, at a particular time, may conflict with what he believes he would desire as a whole if he were more reasonable.<sup>1</sup> And there is here scope for a free effort of will. But it is doubtful whether the reasonable end can present itself with the full force of an obligation unless we substitute for desire in the constitution of it an objective standard of value, especially with respect to ends realised in the life of the individual himself. But without pressing this point, we may record a difficulty, not so easily evaded, in the attempt to combine belief in absolute free will with the view of will which normally accompanies the idealist account of the moral end, namely, as essentially directed to 'self-realisation' or 'personal good' in the idealist sense of those terms. An instance is provided in *Scepticism and Construction*, by C. A. Campbell. He is especially resolute in his advocacy of freedom of genuine alternatives<sup>2</sup> but he contends equally emphatically in another chapter<sup>3</sup> that nothing can represent itself to us as a duty unless it appears as something which will satisfy our own desires more completely. Thus he writes: "From Socrates onwards the characteristic method of the moral reformer has been to show the pupil, by inducing a more vivid and accurate insight into the nature of his self and his world, that this and not that is what he really wants. . . . Is it not just by leading them to see, by enlargement of their vision of the factors involved, that what they really want will be better achieved in the new way than the old? Only through this appeal to real, as against apparent, *personal* good, can moral persuasion, so far as I can see, have any effect at all."<sup>4</sup> Now the author may rightly contend that this does not commit him to egoism, but can it be reconciled with action "not in the line of least resistance"?<sup>5</sup> And even if the reconciliation were achieved one would still be puzzled by the limitation to things that appear under the form of 'personal good' where the effort to triumph over the whole system of our desires is concerned. While we fail to a great extent to be impartial in the system of our desires, which, in the last analysis, we cannot help, and even if, as I take to be the case, we cannot hope to be under any circumstances perfect in that regard, what is to prevent us from being impartial in our conduct if that is not determined at all points by character, by what we *want*?

<sup>1</sup> Compare my account above on the degrees of vividness with which we anticipate future situations, etc., pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> *Scepticism and Construction*, chaps. 4 and 5.

<sup>3</sup> Chap. 6.

<sup>4</sup> p. 226, *op. cit.*

<sup>5</sup> p. 143, *op. cit.*

## 4.

I move now to the last stage of my argument. My concern has been with the attempt to provide a justification for rights. That attempt is itself essentially individualistic, and it is thus not surprising that its advocates find their clue to their problem in the idea of consent or agreement as involved, in particular, in legal rights. Three ways in which this suggestion may be developed have been distinguished. The most plausible theory identifies the 'general will', as the final basis of authority, with 'rational desire'. Commenting on this view in the present article my concern has been, primarily, to emphasise the individualism which it also involves but which is obscured by its apparently objective character. In the preceding section a more direct refutation of the position was briefly attempted. The alternative embraced in the same section is itself, in turn, exposed to serious difficulties. But my present purpose does not require me to do more than acknowledge these. It remains therefore to show how the theory of Locke, whose inadequacies, as indicated early in these articles, largely prompted the idealist search for a justification of rights, may be corrected without repudiating the belief that rights are absolute and underived.

The mistake of Locke, as of his followers, and that which justifies the title individualist, seems to me to be threefold.

(a) He took a highly abstract view of man and, accordingly, of rights. As already intimated, he represented man as clothed with rights independently of his social relations. It was the case that man had certain rights and nothing more could be said. In the completest sense rights were absolute and imprescriptible, having no connection with particular circumstances.

This criticism may perhaps be made more specific in the assertion that individualism denied, or, at least, ignored, the rationality and organisation which rights and duties involve. Rights were asserted blindly, no connecting principle being admitted. There was no realisation that certain rights are subordinate to others, that what is absolutely right is what is right on the whole. A particularly vicious feature of this inadvertence was neglect of the fact that many powers are claimable as rights, not for their own sake, but in virtue of some further experience or activity which their exercise conditions, and are limited thereby. And it is this principle, together with the general need for organisation, that constitutes the important truth which is misleadingly conceived in the assertion of counter-individualists that rights are relative to a 'moral end', or require 'justification'. No justi-



fication is required in the sense of justifying rights by reference to, or deriving them from, something other than rights. And this gives us a sense in which rights are absolute. But we may, however, distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic rights,<sup>1</sup> and between a particular right and what is right on the whole. In this respect rights are relative and not absolute. Individualists were justified in asserting that rights are absolute in the former sense, but they were at fault in so far as their view involved the further belief that rights are absolute in the second sense. And, unfortunately, this latter was the most distinctive feature of their theories.

A practical consequence of the neglect criticised here was to introduce an especially baffling confusion into particular controversies. Ritchie observes<sup>2</sup> that slave owners, at the time of the American civil war, rested their claim on the right of a man to his property, while the liberators, in turn, justified themselves on the grounds of the slave's inalienable right to life and property in himself. The blind assertion of an absolute right to property leaves us no principle whereby we can decide such issues.

My own view of the way in which rights are relative is compatible with either the so-called Intuitionist or the Utilitarian theory of morals. I have avoided this issue in the present paper, but my view would be that it is always our duty to produce the greatest good possible in the circumstances, and that rights are determined accordingly. Like our particular judgements of value this principle is determined intuitively. It is important to note that the relation asserted here between value and rights has no affinity with the attempt to justify rights deplored in my own arguments. *Intuitionists sometimes score an unfair victory through the confusion of those two attitudes.*

(b) Locke was not fully aware that rights are essentially moral. Although he did not derive them from something non-moral, he did not quite realise the type of question he was asking and thus failed to put it honestly to his moral consciousness. This, it seems to me, accounts for the negative nature of the claims which he thinks we may make on one another. And that is especially the case with his followers. Some of them were barely aware that they were dealing with a moral concept.

If my contention in this article is sound, it is of interest to note that idealists likewise are occasionally prone to overlook, or, at least, misconceive, the full moral character of rights, as when

<sup>1</sup> It is surprising that this distinction has been restricted, for the most part, to discussions of value.

<sup>2</sup> See *Darwin and Hegel*, essay on *Property*.

they hold them to be merely 'relative to the sphere of moral duty'.

(c) Finally, Locke failed to realise the substantial modification of rights which the existence of the State involves. In the first place we have obligations to fulfil through the State certain projects which could not otherwise be fulfilled and which would not therefore be duties. Then, as regards the rights which the State maintains without their depending so directly upon it, we must admit that the State can only be an effective instrument for their maintenance if these rights are subordinated to its authority, and that we therefore enjoy them, actually, as modified and co-ordinated for us by the State. And thus rights which are important in themselves may have to be foregone in the interest of others which are not nearly so important, or which have no reality apart from the State's order, simply because the State orders that it should be so, maintaining itself in the meantime as a sufficiently effective sustainer of rights generally, to justify adherence to itself.

Similar in principle is the justification of the compromise we must make, in respect of rights, with the feelings and convictions of the community within which they are to be exercised. There are undoubtedly rights which the public conscience does not appreciate, but it is not always right to insist upon them.

Fraught with these faults, it is not surprising that individualism proved a particularly obstructive doctrine and that considerable ingenuity was wasted in the attempt to circumvent it. And it will be clear from my criticisms that we may accept a great deal that was affirmed by idealists in their reaction against it. The alternative to a full acceptance of idealism is not a barren individualism.<sup>1</sup> And although we accuse the idealist of abusing the notion of system, unity, rationality, however designated, by seeking to solve every problem in terms of this alone, we must none-the-less acknowledge its importance. But to render it a really useful and significant conception we must breathe into the contentions of idealist philosophers the further ideas of duty, right and value in their uniqueness and integrity.

<sup>1</sup> The only alternative contemplated, for instance, by Bradley in *Ethical Studies*.

### III.—ETHICAL JUDGMENTS AND AVOIDABILITY.

BY CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON.

#### I.

In a paper entitled "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" <sup>1</sup> I have pointed out that ethical statements are used to influence people, that they change or intensify people's attitudes, rather than describe what these attitudes already are. The influence is mediated not by some occult property which the ethical terms mean, but simply by their *emotive* meaning, which fits them for use in suggestion.

In the present paper we must put this analysis to an important test. We must see whether it permits us to make intelligible the relationship between ethical judgments and the "freedom" of the will.

Our question arises from such commonplace instances as the following: A. "You ought not to have done that." B. "But I simply couldn't help it!" It is clear that if A believes B, he will immediately withdraw his ethical judgment. No one judges a man for actions which he "couldn't help", or which, in other words, he was not "free" to alter. But why? What relation is there between "You ought not to have done it" and "I couldn't help it" which permits the one to be a generally accepted *reason* for rejecting the other? This is our central question. A great part of our attention, however, will be devoted to a preliminary question: What does "I couldn't help it" mean, when used to oppose ethical judgments?

#### II.

Instead of the awkward expressions, "I couldn't help it", and "I was not free to do otherwise", it will be more convenient

<sup>1</sup> MIND, vol. xlv, no. 181, Jan. 1937.

to use the expression, "My action was not avoidable". Our preliminary task, then, will be to define the word "avoidable".

Since the main difficulties about avoidability arise when we speak of actions which occurred in the past, we can simplify matters by defining the word for such contexts only. The definition is as follows :

"A's action was avoidable" means *If A had made a certain choice, which in fact he did not make, then his action would not have occurred.*

We shall see that this definition is acceptable, at least in general outline. It is by no means surprising or novel. Hobbes<sup>1</sup> gave the same definition, and was partly anticipated by Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> But modern theorists, even though well acquainted with the definition, frequently reject it. It is thought to be relevant and important elsewhere, of course, but of no importance in making clear what sort of avoidability is presupposed by an ethical judgment. Since we shall accept a definition which is often deliberately rejected, we must carefully test it, for the ethical contexts here in question, to make sure that our departure from current trends of thought is not mistaken.

For example : An army officer has failed to win a battle. His commander tells him that he ought not to have failed. He replies that his failure was unavoidable. We must determine whether the circumstances under which the commander would accept this reply would be the same, regardless of whether he understood "avoidable" in a common-sense way, or in accordance with the definition.

Suppose that the officer had been confronted with overwhelming odds. The commander would then acknowledge, in common-sense fashion, that the officer's failure was not avoidable. Nor would it be, according to the definition. It is not true, as "avoidability" in the defined sense would require, that if the officer had chosen differently, the failure would have been prevented. It would have occurred no matter what the officer had chosen.

Suppose that the failure was due not to overwhelming odds, but only to the officer's leading his men into a needlessly exposed position. The commander would then say that the failure was avoidable. And so it would be, according to the definition.

<sup>1</sup> *Leviathan*, pt. 2, ch. xxi. A more detailed discussion will be found in Hobbes' *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*.

<sup>2</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 3, ch. i.

For if the officer had chosen differently—if he had chosen to keep his men in a less exposed position—the failure would have been prevented.

Suppose, as before, that the failure was due to the officer's leading his men to a needlessly exposed position. And suppose that the officer insisted, contrary to the commander's contention, that the failure was *not* avoidable, giving the following argument: "I acknowledge that if I had chosen to keep my men away from the exposed position, I should have prevented the failure. But I *couldn't choose* to do so. There were causes operating which made me choose just as I did. My choice, my actions, and the resulting failure were an inevitable outcome of natural law. Hence the failure was unavoidable." The commander would not listen for a moment, but would dismiss the argument as ridiculous. And so he would be entitled to do, if he used "avoidable" in the defined sense. An "avoidable" action, according to the definition, is one which would not have resulted *if* (contrary to fact) a different choice had been made. Now clearly, what would have resulted if a man had chosen differently has nothing to do with whether or not his actual choice was determined. Similarly, the fact that rivers would have been lower if there had been less rain has nothing to do with whether or not the actual amount of rainfall was determined. According to the definition, then, arguments which seek to prove unavoidability by reference to determinism are to be dismissed as ridiculous, just as the commander would dismiss them.

In these three cases the proposed definition has proved consonant with common usage. There are other examples which will require us to revise the definition, but since these bring in nothing which will invalidate what is immediately to follow, they can be neglected until later on (section V).

A more important point now arises. The definition must do more than retain the customary denotation of "avoidable". It must also permit us to answer our central question. It must enable us to explain why avoidable acts alone are open to ethical judgment.

We shall soon see that the definition permits an extremely simple answer to this question. And yet this is generally denied. Theorists have repeatedly objected to the definition on the ground that it makes impossible any answer whatsoever. The objection has in part been anticipated by our army officer, in the last of the above cases; but in order to be safely rid of it, let us summarize it more fully:

"It is utterly beside the point", the objection proceeds, "to

deterministic  
speculate about impossibilities. The proposed definition leads us to do this; but if avoidability is to be related to ethical judgments, it must deal only with the results of choices which were *possible*, granted the actual laws and causes that were operating. Suppose that a man's choice and his consequent actions were rigidly determined. He would then be a victim of circumstances, a victim of whatever hereditary and environmental factors produced the choice. It would be absurd to hold him responsible. It would be doubly absurd to 'prove' him responsible by pointing out that his action was 'avoidable' in the defined sense—by pointing out, in effect, that *if* his heredity and environment had yielded a different choice, his action would not have occurred. This conditional assertion, however true, leaves him no less a victim of circumstances in the *actual* case, hence not responsible, not open to judgment. The definition fails to make the relationship between avoidability and ethical judgments in any way intelligible. Indeed, no definition will succeed in this respect unless it refers to indeterminism; for only acts proceeding from choices which were not causally inevitable can sanely be considered open to judgment."

The last part of this objection is easily refuted. Reference to indeterminism, which the objection considers salutary, will throw no light on the difficulty. If a man's choice was not determined, it was theoretically unpredictable. The man himself could not have foreseen his choice, nor taken any steps to prevent it. It would not have sprung from his personality, but from nothing at all. He would still be a victim, not of natural forces, but of chance. What room is there here for an ethical judgment? <sup>1</sup>

The more destructive part of the objection is equally at fault. The contrary to fact conditions which occur in the definition of "avoidable" are by no means irrelevant. If they seem to be, it is because of the confusion which my preceding paper <sup>2</sup> sought to correct—a confusion about the meaning of ethical terms. The paradox which the objection attributes to the definition of "avoidable" is in fact due to a faulty analysis, tacitly presupposed, of the meaning of "right", "wrong", and "ought". If we dispel this confusion, the plausibility of the objection will vanish.

<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary to develop this point, since it has been made time and again by others. For a particularly clear treatment, see C. D. Broad's booklet entitled *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1934).

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*

## III.

Let us recall, then, that ethical judgments have a quasi-imperative force, because of their emotive meaning. They influence people's attitudes, rather than describe what these attitudes already are.

Our chief purpose in influencing people's attitudes, obviously enough, is to lead them to act in a way which they otherwise would not. We tell a boy that he ought not to eat a green apple, in order to keep him from eating it. Our purpose is much the same when we make ethical judgments of something which has already been done. If the boy has eaten the green apple, we tell him that he ought not have done so. We are not, to be sure, trying to do anything about that particular action, which is past and gone. But we are trying to prevent similar actions in the future. The emotive meaning of "ought" greatly assists us. It enables us to build up in the boy an adverse attitude to his act, making him recall it, say, with an unpleasant feeling of guilt. The feeling becomes associated not with the past act alone, but with all others like it. It deters the boy from eating any more green apples. (We usually add to our ethical judgment the remark, "See that you don't do it again", and repeat our ethical judgment after the apple has made the boy ill, when his pain makes it easier to build up unpleasant associations with the action. These subsidiary devices, to say nothing of all forms of punishment, serve the same purpose as ethical judgments, although they operate in a different way.)

Other cases are only slightly more complicated. We often make ethical judgments of characters from a novel. By building up in the hearer, through ethical judgments, an adverse attitude to an imaginary character, we prevent the hearer from taking this character as a model for his own subsequent conduct.

When the purpose of modifying actions is not consciously present, it is latent. In other words, if a person is reminded that such a purpose will not be served by the ethical judgment he is making, he will acknowledge that he is wasting his time in making it. (This is not true for certain senses of the ethical terms; but since these have no relation to avoidability, we need not consider them.)

It will be clear, then, that ethical judgments look mainly to the future. Even when they are made of past or imaginary acts, they still serve a dynamic purpose—that of discouraging (or encouraging) similar acts later on.

It is precisely here that ethical judgments become related to



avoidability. Ethical judgments are used to modify actions of the kind judged. But the kind of action which can be modified in this way is limited. Judgments often induce men to give money to charity, but never make men add a cubit to their stature. If we tell a man that he ought to give to charity, our judgment may serve its purpose. If we tell him that he ought to add to his stature, our judgment will not serve its purpose. Since we are unwilling to talk aimlessly we confine our ethical judgments to actions of the first sort, to those which ethical judgments are likely to modify. But only avoidable acts, in the sense defined, are likely to be modified by ethical judgment. Hence only they are judged. Such, in brief, is the answer to our central question.

We must consider more carefully, however, why ethical judgments control avoidable acts alone. Let us return to the example about the army officer :

Suppose that the officer's failure was avoidable—that a different choice of his would have prevented it. From this it follows, granted uniformity of nature, that failure will in fact be prevented, in any future cases of the same sort, if the officer then makes the requisite choice. Of course no future cases will be of exactly the same sort as the past one, but some may be roughly so. It is *probable* that the officer will not fail if he is led to choose differently in these cases. The officer will be led to choose differently, quite possibly, by the quasi-imperative force of the commander's ethical judgment. A judgment of his past failure will make him ashamed of himself, and induce him to choose differently in any roughly similar case that may arise. In this way the ethical judgment will diminish the probability of future failures. To generalize: a judgment of an avoidable act is likely to control actions of the kind judged.

Suppose, however, that the failure was unavoidable. By steps of reasoning like those above, it follows that failure will probably occur, in future cases of roughly the same sort, even if the officer chooses differently. An ethical judgment will not serve, therefore, to prevent failures. It will exert its influence only through the mediating step of controlling the officer's choice, and this will not be enough. To generalize: a judgment of an unavoidable act will not control actions of the kind judged.

The relation between "You ought not to have done that" and "It was unavoidable" now loses its aura of mystery. The latter statement is recognized as a *reason* for giving up the former because it shows, if true, that the former will not serve its purpose. The relationship is not logical, but psychological. It is

a psychological fact that people are unwilling to make purposeless ethical judgments.

The following analogy may be helpful: A says, "Please open the window". B replies, "I can't; it is built into the window frame". B's statement may properly be called a "reason" which is psychologically related to A's imperative. It leads A to withdraw the imperative as useless in serving any purpose. In a similar way the statement, "It was unavoidable", leads a person to stop making an ethical judgment.

These considerations introduce no unusual features into ethical methodology. In my previous paper we saw that empirically verifiable reasons, when used to support or oppose an ethical judgment, are always related to the judgment psychologically.<sup>1</sup> This is to be expected. A man uses an ethical judgment in order to exert an influence. He can be "refuted" only by being led to exert a different kind of influence, or else to exert no influence at all. Empirical reasons change his beliefs about the consequences or effectiveness of his influence, and in this manner may change the kind of influence which he afterwards exerts. Whether or not the reasons will effect this change depends upon the man's temperament. It so happens that men are temperamentally much alike in being unwilling to judge unavoidable actions. The close relationship between avoidability and ethical judgments depends upon this psychological fact.)

The answer to our central question has now been given, at least in outline. Very little of it is new. The definition of "avoidable" is a familiar one, and even the explanation of how avoidability is related to ethical judgments is familiar, not in connection with the present problem, but in analogous cases presented by theories of punishment. Preventive and reformatory theories have long made clear that punishment of unavoidable acts serves no purpose. All that has been overlooked is that ethical judgments, being used dynamically, have also a preventive and reformatory function. Theorists have been blinded to this obvious fact by their neglect of emotive meanings.

<sup>1</sup>This generalization may at first seem too broad. If a man said "Go away and stay here" we should object to his imperative for a logical reason. May we not object to ethical judgments, then, for a logical reason? Yes, but our reason *would* be logical, not an *empirically verifiable* one logically related to the judgment. It would therefore constitute no exception to the generalization.

There are exceptions, but quite trivial ones. Should a man make some very curious ethical judgment, we might reply, "Come, you don't feel so yourself". According to my previous paper, this would be an empirical reason logically related to the judgment.

## IV.

Let us now digress a little and decide whether ethics need concern itself about the indeterminism of the will.

It is clear that ethical judgments do not presuppose indeterminism. They presuppose only avoidability, which depends solely upon the results of choice, not upon the absence of its causes.

It would seem, rather, that ethics presupposes determinism. Ethical judgments must control actions through the mediating step of controlling a man's choice. If the man's choice were not determined, it would not be controlled in this manner, or in any manner. Ethical judgments would be powerless to influence people's conduct. Isn't determinism necessary to provide ethical judgments with any function?

A moment's reflection will show that this is not strictly the case. We must presuppose at least a "partial" determinism, but need not necessarily presuppose a "complete" determinism. The meaning of these terms will be clear from the following example: The motion of the sun would be called "partially" determined if, from an exhaustive knowledge of laws and circumstances, we could predict that it would rise tomorrow at some time between five and six o'clock, say, but could not predict more specifically than this. It would be "completely" determined, if we could predict that it would rise, say, at exactly five-fifteen. Now ethics presupposes only the partial determination of a man's choice, for this still permits his choice to be influenced by an ethical judgment. Our judgment could not lead him to do exactly what we wanted, but it could lead him roughly in that direction.

Partial determinism is a trivial assumption, too obvious to deserve proof. The only point of dispute has been about whether choice is completely determined, or only partially so. Since either alternative is compatible with our explanation of how ethical judgments are related to avoidability, we may conclude that the dispute about determinism is irrelevant to ethics, so far as it deals with general presuppositions.

Why have so many theorists *thought* that ethics presupposed indeterminism? One reason, as has been intimated, is that they overlooked the quasi-imperative force of ethical judgments. They did not see that ethical judgments look to the future. Instead, then, of placing the connection between avoidability and ethical judgments in the future—instead of seeing that avoidable acts alone will subsequently be controlled by judgment—they looked to the past for a connection. Quite naturally,

they could find an explanation only by making *choice* a mystery, as if it were somehow alterable even when it was irrevocably in the past. Some began to talk of indeterminism, and others, seeing that this really didn't help, became unintelligibly metaphysical.

Perhaps an equally important reason for the confusion lies in the emotional state of mind from which ethical judgments proceed. The purpose of modifying actions, which attends an ethical judgment, is usually latent. Our introspectable state of mind may at times be one of indignation, fear, or even blind hatred. These emotions often help us to attain our latent purpose by giving our ethical judgment a forceful spontaneity. If we pause to consider the causes of the act judged, our feelings become stultified. Our ethical judgment becomes less convincing. What we are inclined to do, instead of finding causes, is to invent fictions, which strengthen our feelings by giving them semi-poetic expression. We pretend that the action came, without more remote causal antecedents, from the man we are judging himself. He is "just naturally mean". His conduct has nothing to do with social pressure, or an unfortunate childhood. He dimly reminds us of the villain in an old-fashioned melodrama. Fictions of indeterminism, which give our feelings a more ready point of focus, are sometimes indispensable to the effectiveness of our ethical judgment. This may be an important source of error. How easy it would be to confuse these fictions, so prominent in consciousness, with the propositional meaning of the judgment. One might readily be tempted to say that the presupposition of indeterminism is found in the very "meaning" of ethical statements themselves. Perhaps theorists have been led in this way to give indeterminism an entirely unwarranted importance.

## V.

Several deliberate over-simplifications were made in sections II and III which must now be corrected.

The main simplification occurs in the definition of "avoidable". Let us see, by example, how the definition must be changed.

Suppose that our army officer would have prevented the failure only if he had given his men vigorous encouragement. He would not have had sufficient energy to encourage them unless he had had an extremely strong desire to do so. He would not, at the time, have had so strong a desire. Under these circumstances we should have to acknowledge, according to the definition, that the failure was "unavoidable". The officer would

not have prevented it merely by *choosing* to encourage his men. He would have needed, as well, a strong desire to succeed in doing so, which he would not have had. A different choice alone would have been unavailing. And yet, although the failure was "unavoidable" according to our definition, it would not be called so by the commander, who would find no occasion for withholding ethical judgment.

In order to be more conventional the definition must be given as follows: "A's action was avoidable" has the same meaning as "If A had chosen a certain different alternative, and if he had had a sufficiently intense interest in bringing about what he chose, then his action would have been prevented". ("Interest" is here used, following Mr. R. B. Perry, to mean any kind of desire, aversion, etc.)

This new definition leaves the relationship between avoidability and ethical judgments essentially the same. In the above example the commander sees that failure may not occur in the future, other circumstances being roughly similar, if he can make the officer have a more vigorous desire to encourage his men. The commander's ethical judgment will serve to build up such a desire. It is likely to serve its purpose of preventing future failures.

We may now correct an unsound assumption made in section III. The main contention there, to repeat, was that avoidable acts alone are judged because they alone may be controlled by judgment. This required the assumption that ethical judgments control actions only through the mediating step of controlling a man's choice; for "avoidable" was then defined in terms of choice only. But at present "avoidable" is defined with reference to interests, as well as choice. Hence we may replace the unsound assumption by the correct one: Ethical judgments control actions not only by modifying a man's choice, but in a more general way by intensifying his interests.

The definition of "avoidable" is still too simple, however, as may be seen from the following example:

A man is progressively becoming addicted to opium. At first we say that his taking it is "avoidable", but as he grows more and more addicted to it, we say that it is "less and less avoidable", until at last we say that it is "unavoidable". Our definition fails to provide a meaning for "less avoidable". It fails further in requiring us to say that the man's taking opium never becomes "unavoidable"; for at any time it remains the case that if he chose to stop, and desired to with *enough* vigour, he would stop.

The definition is easily qualified : The stronger a man's interest must be, in order to prevent the action, the "less avoidable" his action becomes. When it must be extremely strong, the action ceases to be called "avoidable". These qualifications complicate our problem only very slightly. The less avoidable a man's action is, the more difficult it is for us to build up his interest in a way that would modify the action. Hence we parallel the decreasing avoidability by becoming increasingly more hesitant to make an ethical judgment. A low degree of avoidability becomes unavailability when the intensity of the required interest becomes greater than any which our ethical judgment can build up. Judgment of avoidable acts still depends upon the probability of controlling the acts by judgment.

The example of the opium eater raises a further question : If his action was avoidable, just when must the choice and interest have had to occur, in order to have prevented it ? Immediately before the action, or at *any previous* time ? If we place no restriction on the time (and the definition does not) then his taking opium *was* avoidable even when he was in the last stages of the habit ; for if he had chosen to stop taking it from the very beginning, even with a very slight interest in stopping, he would not have taken it thereafter.

The following qualification will suffice : When the conditions which existed at the time when the choice and interest would have prevented the action, and which were essential, no less than the choice and interest, in preventing the action, were of a sort that will not even roughly occur again, then the action is not called "avoidable". This obviously takes care of the above case. The opium eater will never again be at the beginning stages of his habit, if he is now in the last stages. The reasons for suspending judgment are equally obvious. If the beginning stages will not recur, and if they, no less than the effects of ethical judgment, will be essential to prevent his action, then his action cannot be controlled by ethical judgment.

We must next consider some more complicated cases. A man is sometimes excused from ethical judgment, though by no means always, because of his ignorance. If the failure of our army officer, for instance, would have been prevented by a certain choice, but if he had no reason to foresee that it would, even on the basis of excellent knowledge of the circumstances confronting him, his commander would probably make no adverse ethical judgment.

We need not trouble to decide whether this case requires us to revise the definition. It will be sufficient to see why the officer

would not be judged. This is clear enough. A judgment would spur the officer on to make some change in his later procedure. The only significant change that he could make would be to acquire more knowledge thereafter. A judgment of the failure, then, would be tantamount, so far as its effective imperative force is concerned, to the judgment, "You ought not to have been so ignorant". By hypothesis, however, the officer had taken great care in acquiring knowledge. Perhaps a certain amount of ignorance was unavoidable (in the sense as above qualified). Perhaps it was avoidable only to a low degree. Perhaps it was "avoidable only at too great a cost". (In other words, if the officer had taken steps to acquire more knowledge, he would have had to neglect something else, and hence would have brought on even greater disaster.) For any of these reasons the commander might suspend judgment of the failure. Judgment would make no desired change.

*agreement  
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We have been assuming throughout that ethical judgments have no other purpose than to control actions of the kind judged. It is important to note that there are many exceptions to this. For example: A, whose social position is rivalled by that of B, makes many adverse ethical judgments of B's actions whenever he is talking to B's friends. His purpose is not to control these actions, but rather to increase his own prestige by decreasing that of his rival. In general, an ethical judgment of a man's actions may be used to alter the man's social position. As in the preceding cases, however, such judgments usually serve no purpose when the actions judged are unavoidable. A will not induce B's friends to give B's social position to someone else unless someone else would have acted in a way more to their liking. If B's actions were unavoidable, this would *usually* not be the case.

Yet the matter is not always so simple. Suppose B has become so strongly addicted to alcohol that his taking it is now unavoidable. A might then judge B's conduct, and with effect, even though the conduct was unavoidable. The reason is clear. A's judgment will be tantamount, in its imperative force, to the combined judgment and reason, "We ought not to give B a pre-eminent social position, because he is a drunkard". In this form the judgment is of an avoidable act (our giving B a pre-eminent social position) and has the purpose of controlling actions of the kind judged. The latter judgment is not strictly identical with the former; hence the former constitutes a genuine exception to our previous account. But the reader will doubtless see for himself how a perfectly accurate account would have to proceed.



A final remark is pertinent, to summarize and extend what has been in question throughout the paper. We have asked the question, "Why, as a matter of fact, are ethical judgments commonly limited to avoidable acts?" We have found that this is because ethical judgments of unavoidable acts would serve no purpose. Apart from definitions, our inquiry has been psychological. We have not asked the question, "*Ought* ethical judgments to be limited to avoidable acts?" This is an entirely different question. It is an ethical question, not a psychological question relevant to ethics.

In order to distinguish the latter question from the former, it may be well briefly to answer it. I answer, without hesitation, that ethical judgments *ought* to be so limited. It must be understood that this statement is essentially persuasive. I use it in order to influence people to disapprove of judging unavoidable acts. My purpose is to induce people to *continue* to judge avoidable acts alone, as they now usually do. In order to make my influence permanent, I shall have to support it by reasons. The main reason is this: judgments of unavoidable acts do not serve their purpose. It so happens, in this case, that the causal explanation of why people now do restrict their judgments to avoidable acts, and the reason why they ought to, coincide. Perhaps this reason will be insufficient to make permanent my influence. Perhaps the reader has very curious purposes, or approves of acting in a purposeless fashion. I should then have to point out other matters of fact, which might more successfully direct his approval in the way I wish. In the end I might have to resort to persuasive oratory. But I trust that in the present case this will not be necessary.

disagree -  
psych

## IV.—DISCUSSION.

### “PENUMBRA” FUNCTIONS.

IN his review<sup>1</sup> of my paper on “Tautologies and the Matrix Method,”<sup>2</sup> Prof. Henle makes a statement to which several interesting considerations attach. In my paper I discuss what for convenience may here be called “compound” functions, namely propositional functions all the variables of which are propositional variables, *i.e.* functions of the general form  $f(p)$ . I try to show that in *no* senses of the words “true” and “false” in which it is significant to say that *contingent* propositions are true or false can tautologies be significantly said to be true or contradictions to be false. From this, together with the way the term “truth-function” is defined in *Principia Mathematica*,<sup>3</sup> I conclude that it denotes only a *proper* sub-set of the class of compound functions, from which tautologous and contradictory functions are excluded; and furthermore, that tautologous and contradictory functions cannot be treated logically *as if* they were truth-functions in the *Principia* sense.<sup>4</sup> And this, Prof. Henle suggests, apparently “creates a penumbra of functions (*e.g.*  $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$ ) which are neither tautologies nor contradictions nor truth-functions.”<sup>5</sup>

At first sight one might feel inclined to disagree with him as to whether, *e.g.*

$$(1) p \cdot q \vee \sim q, (2) p \cdot (q \cdot \sim q), (3) p \vee (q \vee \sim q)$$

are “penumbral” functions. One might feel inclined to say that (1) is a truth function, (2) is a contradictory function, and (3) is a tautologous one; and applications of the usual matrix procedure to (1), (2), and (3) would seem to substantiate this:

	$p$	$q$	$p \cdot q \vee \sim q$		$p$	$q$	$p \cdot (q \cdot \sim q)$		$p$	$q$	$p \vee (q \vee \sim q)$
	T	T	T		T	T	F		T	T	T
(1)	T	F	T	(2)	T	F	F	(3)	T	F	T
	F	T	F		F	T	F		F	T	T
	F	F	F		F	F	F		F	F	T

<sup>1</sup> *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 141-142.

<sup>2</sup> *MIND*, vol. xlv, N.S., No. 182 (April, 1937), pp. 191-205.

<sup>3</sup> “We may call a function  $f(p)$  a ‘truth-function’ when its argument  $p$  is a proposition and the truth-value of  $f(p)$  depends only upon the truth-value of  $p$ .” Russell and Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica* (second edition), p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> For a view to the contrary, see F. P. Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics*, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 2, No. 3, p. 142.

If, however, the results in my paper are correct, it does not make sense to suppose, for example, that  $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$  either is or is not a truth-function; and one would only be led into supposing something like this because Prof. Henle's statement is worded in a misleading manner. The language he uses is such that he seems to be talking about *functions* of a peculiar and unclassifiable sort, rather than about *expressions* which are constructable in the language of *Principia*, and are such that in that language they may *seem* to express unorthodox compound functions. That is to say, the language he uses is such that he seems to be talking about the *function*  $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$  with regard to which he says that it is "penumbral", rather than about the *expression* " $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$ ". And if the results in my paper are correct, such expressions as (1) " $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$ ", (2) " $p \cdot (q \cdot \sim q)$ ", (3) " $p \vee (q \vee \sim q)$ " will express no sort of functions whatever because they have no meaning in the language of *Principia*. Consequently it will not make sense to talk about the *functions*  $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$ ,  $p \cdot (q \cdot \sim q)$ ,  $p \vee (q \vee \sim q)$ .

Prof. Henle's statement, however, indicates the importance of investigating such *expressions* as (1)–(3). Let us consider the expression " $p \cdot q \vee \sim q$ ". The symbol " $\cdot$ " is defined contextually in *Principia* as follows: " $p \cdot q$  means both  $p$  and  $q$  are true".<sup>1</sup> And, according to my paper, it will be obvious that the word "true" in a sentence of the general form "Both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are true" will have entirely different senses according as both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are sentences expressing tautologies or are sentences expressing contingent propositions. In a sentence of the form

(a) "Both ( $s_1 \vee \sim s_1$ ) and ( $s_2 \cdot \supset \cdot s_2 \vee s_3$ ) are true"

"true" will mean "necessarily, or intrinsically, true", whatever that may mean (I shall designate this sense of "true" by N). In a sentence of the form

(b) "Both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are true"

in which the  $s$ 's express contingent propositions, "true" will have an entirely different sense, which I shall designate by T. In such an *unmixed* case as (a) or (b) "true" will have an unambiguous, although perhaps not an analytically clear, sense. Consider now, however, a *mixed* sentence of the kind to which Prof. Henle's statement calls attention, e.g. a sentence of the form

(c) " $s_1 \cdot s_2 \vee \sim s_2$ ",

in which " $s_1$ " expresses a contingent proposition and " $s_2 \vee \sim s_2$ " expresses a tautology. By definition (c) translates into

(c') "Both  $s_1$  and  $s_2 \vee \sim s_2$  are true",

and it will be clear that the word "true" in (c') has no sense whatever. For if we suppose it does have a sense, we must suppose it to have either the sense N or the sense T; and consequently we must suppose that the contingent proposition expressed by " $s_1$ " and the

<sup>1</sup> Second edition, p. 6.

tautology expressed by " $s_2 \mathbf{V} \sim s_2$ " are true in the *same* sense of "true", namely either that both are true in the sense N or that both are true in the sense T. And this is nonsense if T is not significantly predicable of tautologies nor N of contingent propositions, *i.e.* if there is no single sense of "true" in which both tautologies and contingent propositions can significantly be said to be true. If we attempt to construct a matrix, in the extended form described in my paper, for the compound proposition supposedly expressed by (c), this becomes obvious:

$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_1$	$s_2 \mathbf{V} \sim s_2$
T	T	T	
T	F	T	
F	T	F	$\sim \diamond \sim$
F	F	F	

We can see that no value, *i.e.* that neither a modal value nor a truth-value, can significantly be written into the column-space for " $\sim$ ". And it is obvious that we actually have *two* matrices

$s_1$	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_2 \mathbf{V} \sim s_2$
T	T	T	
F	F	F	$\sim \diamond \sim$

which are not capable of being formed into a single matrix for a compound function in which the logical connective of widest scope is logical conjunction.

It might be supposed that " $s_1 . s_2 \mathbf{V} \sim s_2$ " translates into " $s_1$  is true in sense T and  $s_2 \mathbf{V} \sim s_2$  is true in sense N".<sup>1</sup> But such a translation will not do because it violates the definition for logical conjunction, which is to the effect that a sentence of the form " $s_1 . s_2$ " translates into a sentence of the form "Both  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are true", and therefore, of course, into " $s_1$  and  $s_2$  are jointly true", in which the scope of "true" is plainly *both*  $s_1$  and  $s_2$ . Hence if such a translation is insisted upon, then although we obtain a single sentence, that sentence will express no *single proposition* in which the proposition expressed by " $s_1$ " is combined by logical conjunction with the proposition expressed by " $s_2$ "; *i.e.* the sentence " $s_1 . s_2$ " will express no logically conjunctive proposition. Rather, it will express two logically *unconnected* propositions, however they may be juxtaposed for our attention by the sentence.

Similar considerations hold for (2) and (3) and for all such mixed expressions. It will be clear, thus, that although such expressions as (1)–(3) are constructable in the language of *Principia*, they will nevertheless be senseless in that language and will fail to express any kind of compound function.

MORRIS LAZEROWITZ.

<sup>1</sup> This was suggested to me by Dr. W. V. Quine.

## V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Creative Morality.* By L. A. REID. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937. Pp. 270. 10s. 6d.

For two reasons I find it a little difficult to attempt a review of Prof. Reid's very interesting book. For one thing, I am so much at one with Mr. Reid in most of his principal positions that, to avoid the vain repetition of exclamations of *Euge! optime dictum*, I must run the risk of producing a false impression of disagreement by dwelling mainly on lesser matters where I think the author open to criticism. For another, though there is a real unity of thought pervading the book, it is not always easy to seize the precise links of connection between successive divisions of it, or, at any rate, to exhibit them in a necessarily brief survey, and any remarks I may proceed to make must therefore seem unduly desultory. An unsympathetic reader might perhaps complain that the book falls into two main divisions, largely independent of one another, one which is strictly ethical and discusses the notions of *good, right, obligation, intention, motive* with special reference to the recent revival of 'deontological' ethics by Prichard, Ross, and Carritt, and a second which belongs properly to the philosophy of religion; and that though the central chapters on 'creative morality' and 'duty and expressiveness' are meant to make the connection between these two themes, they still remain insufficiently 'integrated'. I do not think this would be a just criticism, but I think it is perhaps true that Mr. Reid has given so much space in the earlier half of his book to minor polemics against the new 'deontologists' that the developments of his later chapters are not quite sufficiently foreshadowed and prepared for; even with the Preface as a guide, they may take the less attentive reader a little by surprise.

I would begin any comments I have to make by expressing my whole-hearted agreement with Mr. Reid on the fundamental points that the method of abstraction and initial definition is wholly inapplicable in ethics, and that our real moral verdicts are always concerned neither with 'actions' nor with 'acts' (in the sense of *e.g.*, Ross), but with concrete pieces of 'living' in which the acting, the act, and the actor cannot be separated. I agree also with his view that this single consideration puts the 'logical positivist' wholly out of court when he pretends to apply his 'analysis' to an ethical subject-matter, and that it is also fatal to the 'deontological' attempts to sever the notions of *right* and *good*. The argument for this severance

reproduced from Mr. Carritt seems to me even weaker than Mr. Reid admits. For Carritt assumes as obvious that, though it would be wrong that a debt of £50 should be withheld by a poor debtor from a rich creditor, it is *better* that there should be a poor man *plus* £50 than that there should be a rich (and bad) man *plus* £50. Here, it seems to me, the question which ought to have been faced is distorted by a false abstraction which makes all the difference. What Carritt's argument really requires him to maintain is that it is better that there should be a poor man *with* £50 *which does not belong to him and does belong to the rich creditor* than that there should be a rich man *with* £50 *which does belong to him*, and, so stated, the proposition is far from being the manifest truth Carritt assumes it to be. All that an argument of this kind shows is that obligation is indispensable in morality, not that obligation is intelligible without reference to the notion of *good*. Ultimately, I take it, the question reduces to this: Is the obligatoriness of particular duties and rules of duty intelligible without reference to a transcendental ideal of Duty which is embodied in all of them and yet identical with none of them—being, in fact, as Prof. Guzzo has said, a genuine *χωριστὸν εἶδος*—and draws its hold upon us simply from its absolute *goodness*?

I am not sure that this remark has not an important bearing on the opposition of love and duty as rival motives to action which runs through a great deal of Mr. Reid's own book, though he repeatedly shows himself dissatisfied with the traditional sharp opposition of the two. When we talk of 'love' as a motive, we need always to be on our guard against the possibilities of fallacy of ambiguity hidden in a word with so ill-defined a range of meanings. No sane man would dream, I suppose, of maintaining that anything and everything which may be called in some sense 'love' is a 'superior motive' of right action to duty. It is, for example, certainly not more virtuous in a judge to deal honestly with a case on its merits because his *chère amie*, on whom he doats, has an interest in the accused than to do the same thing from a sense of the duty of being just. The only 'love' about which the question whether it is not the 'superior motive' could intelligently be asked is one which the Middle Ages would have called an *amor ordinatus* or *amor debitus*, a love which is the *due* of the object loved. And that very expression suggests that in the end there is no irreducible opposition between the 'motive' of love and that of duty.

I think also that, not merely in the introductory Ch. 2, Mr. Reid concedes too much to the 'new deontology' in his tendency to disparage the notion of end, or purpose. It is true, as he says, and it is not a particularly new discovery of the last years, that the industrial conception of end and means which are purely external to one another is as much out of place in morals as in aesthetics. But what serious teacher ever supposed either morally right or aesthetically right performance to be a mere indifferent "means", deriving all its value from the end it furthers, as the builder's scaffolding does from

the value of the building to be erected ? The mastery of Milton over the rhythms of his verse is, of course, not a 'mere' means to the production of beautiful poetry ; it is a constituent of the poem's beauty. But, for all that, a great poem is a typical example of the actualisation of conscious coherent purpose. It is not merely that the poem, when contemplated as a whole, is felt to form a unity in which every part but the *finale* has a forward-looking reference to that which is to follow, but further that the poet himself, to do the best work, must be profoundly conscious of this reference and controlled by it throughout his procedure ; if he loses sight of it, as he sometimes does, he falls into the fault of over-elaboration of parts in the poem on their own account, and his work becomes 'episodic'. It seems to me, then, that a really well-wrought poem is, from first to last, an embodiment of conscious purpose and that the same thing is true of a really well-lived life. It is a life in which every interval "looks before and after" ; its unity lies in the fact that the man who leads it "keeps the law in calmness made, and sees what he foresaw". I am sure that Mr. Reid is quite alive to this, as would be expected of the author of a valuable essay on Aesthetics, and as there is plenty in the present volume to prove. I think it a pity, therefore, that he should have been led, by what seems to me exaggerated deference to 'deontologist' criticism, both in Ch. 2 and in Ch. 5, where he is discussing the views of the late Prof. Stocks, to depreciate the significance of the notion of 'end' for both art and morals. It seems to me that the criticism, in which he closely agrees with Stocks, is only valid against opponents who interpret purpose strictly on the lines of technical industrial practice ; and though the old utilitarians are fairly open to the charge of this superficial misunderstanding, I do not think it can be laid to the charge of even the so-called 'utilitarians' of to-day. It would certainly be mistaken to read any such conception into the 'teleology' of Plato or Aristotle. As Burnet wrote long ago, we ought to connect 'teleology' in the Aristotelian sense rather with *τέλειος* than with *τέλος* itself. A great work of art, or a nobly lived life, has a sort of forward-looking unity of purpose which is more analogous to the functioning of a living organism than to the construction of a dwelling-house or an aeroplane.

I need hardly say that I wholly concur with Mr. Reid in regarding it as indispensable to ethics to include intention, as well as the embodiment of intention in the course of events, in its purview as the real object of all moral judgements, and that for this reason, I agree with him in deploring Ross's distinction of *act* from *action*. An 'act' in Ross's sense, I should say, is no genuine act at all, but only the *caput mortuum* of one, a mere *event*, and what Ross calls the *action* is not action, if it is artificially dis severed from its embodiment in 'act'. I think Mr. Reid also clearly right in insisting that intention must include motive, in any sense of that ambiguous word in which motive has any moral significance. Mill's unhappy attempt to exclude motive from intention arose, I conceive, from an unhappy confusion



of a motive with what he calls in his *Logic* a *physical* cause. Apparently he thought of motives as mental events which regularly precede certain other events and are their stimuli, and as nothing more. When he talks of a man's motive as the 'feeling' which leads him to do a certain act, he seems to be thinking of this feeling as a momentary occurrence on the part of the agent, which is over and gone before the intentional act which it 'causes' is there, and therefore, of course, forms no part of that act and is irrelevant to our verdict on the quality of the act. It should be obvious that any such assimilation of motivation to physical causation, understood in the fashion of the Positivism of the last century, distorts the facts of moral experience out of recognition. By turning my motive into an event antecedent to another event called my intentional act, it ignores, as completely as it can, the *conative* character of concrete 'emotion' and the conative unity of moral living. As Kant saw so clearly, it is precisely because motivation is a unique kind of causality that there is room for moral as well as for natural science.

I do not propose to say much about Mr. Reid's *Auseinandersetzung* with Prichard and Ross in Ch. 3, where he is discussing the relations between *right*, *good*, *duty* and *motive*. I could wish the suggestion of pp. 55-56 that "*right* extends as a bridge . . . between *morality*, the praise- and blame-worthy, and the *objects* of morality, which are indispensable to morality and always relevant to it, and yet lie *outside* morality's sphere" (the italics are Mr. Reid's) had been explained rather more fully; I own to finding its meaning something obscure. If the object of morality is, as Mr. Reid holds, and as I fully agree with him, itself a certain type of living, can it be true to say that *this* object lies "outside the sphere of morality"? It half appears from p. 57 that what is in Mr. Reid's mind is that I cannot always be morally condemned for not having done 'what is right'. For I may, as we say, honestly have acted up to 'such light as I have', and if so, I am not to be blamed for the imperfection of that light. This seems to be why it was suggested that *right* is inseparably connected with something which lies 'outside the sphere' of morality. But is there not here a tacit assumption that I have always 'done my duty' if I have acted up to my lights, and is this assumption true? Is there not also a *duty* always to do what lies in me to attain fuller light, and is not our common neglect of that *duty* one chief reason why the best of us are such 'unprofitable servants'? (This seems, in fact, to be admitted *en passant* on p. 57, n. 2.) The real question is, I think, as I have already suggested, whether *duty* itself is not something more than a common character of this and that dutiful act, whether it is not always, like the *καλόν* of Plato's *Symposium*, always a strictly transcendent 'separate Form', beyond and above all its particular embodiments. (Prof. Guzzo's insistence on the distinction between *i doveri*, and *Il Dovere*, the 'wholly other' principle which is their inspiration and their sanction seems in point here.)

I am inclined to think that the whole argument which Mr. Reid

goes on to develop, against Prichard and Ross, on the question whether we have not merely a duty to do certain things but a duty to do them from the highest motive, is obscured by confusion on both sides between *Il Dovere* and *i doveri*, and also by a way of thinking about motives as though they were 'things' or 'objects' to be 'summoned up' when wanted, as one can attend to this or that object in the "visual field". I should be inclined to say, as against Mr. Reid's opponents, that the man who 'does the right thing' but from what they recognise to be not the highest motive may have accomplished his *doveri*, but by their own admission is falling very far short of due devotion to *Il Dovere*. Thus I find myself on Mr. Reid's side in holding that our service of the moral ideal demands not merely that we shall do certain things, but that we shall do them in the right spirit, that we shall *be* in heart and mind the right sort of persons. But when he goes on to oppose 'duty' to 'love' as a motive, and to talk about the duty of doing things "from a motive of love", I begin to feel difficulties.

For one thing, the whole discussion about the possibility or impossibility of "summoning up" a given 'motive' at will seems to me to involve thinking of what is really a conative attitude of the subject-agent as though it were an *object* "presented for our notice"; and this kind of "objectivism", I should say, is only intruded into ethics through the really fatal influence of a naturalism which makes nonsense of the moral life. And again, to make an antithesis between *duty* and *love* and to ask which is the 'higher motive' of the two lands us at once in difficulties which Mr. Reid himself seems to recognise more and more fully as his argument proceeds. It is clear, I think, that the 'love' of which it can even be suggested that it has a higher moral worth than duty as a 'motive' cannot possibly be what Kant meant by "pathological love", a non-moral attraction towards a particular person in preference to others. Kant was quite right when he said that there could be no specifically *moral* worth in the conduct of a tradesman who avoided 'taking advantage' merely because he happened to have a liking for the particular persons who dealt with him. Nor is there *moral* worth in the unscrupulousness with which a woman will often intrigue, lie, or cheat in the interests of the person who happens to be *her* husband or son. (Mr. H. C. Bailey has a suggestive story intended to make the point that this sort of maternal devotion can be one of the most vicious things in the world.)

But if we grant, as I think we must, that the only love which deserves the high estimate Mr. Reid puts upon it is a 'practical' love, a conative attitude which the agent would adopt towards *any* other person who had the same need of his service and the same claim on it, no matter how little attractive he might be (like the 'practical love' of the good Samaritan for a wounded man who was a personal stranger to him, and of whom he probably knew nothing except that he belonged to an 'enemy nation'), there is no longer any

opposition between such a principle of action and the reverence for duty of which Kant speaks, and which is, as we know, the same thing as reverence for the personality of all with whom we have to do. If we are to criticise Kant's description of the 'spring of practical reason' at all, we shall have nothing much to say except that Kant's language is a little deficient in emotional warmth and depth. But this is due simply to the personal temperament of the writer; there is nothing in the attitude of reverence for duty as Kant conceives it incompatible with very warm and deep feeling, as I believe Kant himself was aware, for all his characteristic eighteenth-century dislike of emotional 'gush' on paper. I suggest, that is, that Kant was right in principle about reverence for duty as the distinctive moral motive, and that this reverence genuinely felt is a specifically moral love; what may be contrasted with it, and what perhaps Mr. Reid really has in his mind, is love further qualified by reference to God as the "ultimate intention" in all our acts. But where this reference to God comes in, we have passed from morality proper to religion.

On the interesting discussion (Ch. 4) of the connexion between *motive* and *intention* I feel moved to make only one remark, that I think the writer has partly obscured his own meaning by falling into the very fault of undue abstraction against which he began by warning us. Every description of the motive as "that which drives" an agent seems to me to imply just that naturalistic falsification of the facts on which I have commented in speaking of Mill. It is the emptiest of all abstractions to talk, for example, of such an abstraction as 'jealousy' as being *the* motive for a specific crime. It would be truer to say, if we are trying to distinguish, for example, between Othello's intention and his motive, that his intention was to kill Desdemona, his motive was not bare jealousy, but jealousy—if it can be called that at all—of Desdemona in respect of her relations with Cassio. And even that statement is too much of an abstraction to do justice to the situation. It leaves out of consideration the morally important point that what, more than anything else, moved Othello—or what he believed to be moving him—was a horror at the supposed moral pollution hidden under Desdemona's appearance of purity, which an 'injured husband' has to be a man of Othello's stamp to feel. His thought was not merely that "she has defiled my bed with Cassio" but that "she is a foul blot on God's creation". If we take care to avoid false abstraction in thinking about motives, we shall find, I believe, that when we take the whole of a concrete intention into account, what we mean by the underlying motive is the "ultimate intention", and that this must be thought of, not as the force which 'drives' the proximate intention, but as the "form" embodied in it. And Mr. Reid will therefore be entirely justified in his refusal to exclude the *motive* from the sphere of the moral judgement on the act.

I have already made in principle such observations as I wish to make about that depreciation of the moral significance of the

notion of purpose in which Mr. Reid closely agrees with Prof. Stocks. I will merely add that Stocks seems to me to have been ill-advised in the use he makes, as Mr. Reid does after him, of the example of a game. A game, I should say, is a very purposive activity; every stroke or move, if the game is well played, is definitely forward-looking (think of the playing of a good game of chess!) And if you say—and this was Stocks's point—"but the game as a whole has no purpose; we do not play it as a means to anything", is not that just because it is *only* a game, and is it certain that to regard life as one great game is the moral way of looking at life? The soundness of the analogy calls for testing.

With Ch. 6 we are at last face to face with Mr. Reid's central thought about the 'creative' character of morality. What he means is explained very well by his own analogies from artistic 'creation'. The great work of art always embodies a *form* in a matter, and there is always something unique and irreplaceable about each such embodiment of form. There are, of course, rules of all sorts in the various arts which have generally (not always) to be followed if the embodiment of the form is to be adequate. But the man who follows the rules slavishly because they are rules, never produces, *e.g.*, true poetry. (He turns out what Verlaine called *littérature*.) So a well-lived moral life is no business of mechanically following a set of rules; it is always the embodiment in actual living of a certain pattern or form, and the morally patterned life is always, in its degree, unique and original. All this seems to be excellent, but, in view of some of the things said about 'rules', and the superiority of the artist and the man of moral inspiration to them, I think it might have been timely to guard against an 'antinomian' interpretation which Mr. Reid would pretty certainly disavow. It is not true, for example, that to be morally creative or original, you must make ducks and drakes of the Decalogue, or that if you do not, your life is merely 'conventional'. You may be doing the most original things all your life long, like, *e.g.*, St. Paul, without ever flinging out against one of the "ten words", and you may break them all by a life of the dullest conventional viciousness. I would, in particular, offer two suggestions. (1) We need to revive the often forgotten distinction of the schoolmen between the prohibitions of the moral law, which *obligant ad semper*, and the positive commands which *obligant semper* (but not *ad semper*). (The meaning is, *e.g.*, that to be a virtuous man I must not steal, and also I must give to the poor. But whereas it is my duty to embody refraining from stealing in every act of every moment of my life, it is not my duty to be at every moment giving to the poor. While the world stands, it will *always* be every man's duty to give to the poor, but not to be *always* giving to them, though it is every man's duty *never* to steal.) It seems to me at least probable that there are *some* 'rules' which *obligant ad semper*, just as, I take it, there are *some* rules in art which the most original artist would spoil his

work by breaking. (2) In any case, it must be remembered that the preference of duty—rooted as it is in the universal nature of rational personality—before “inclination” is absolute. “Duty before inclination” is, in fact, not a rule, but a fundamental principle, and, therefore, is not affected by anything which can be said with truth about the danger of falling into servile subjection to ‘rules’. Perhaps I might add, with reference to some remarks on page 110, that when Aristotle wrote the sentence quoted by Mr. Reid, about ‘perception’, and not ‘rule’, as being decisive of the ‘right mean’ in the concrete case, he did not mean to deny that there are some ways of acting which can never be perceived to be ‘in the right mean’. (He himself mentions adultery as one of the things which *always* involve disregard of the ‘mean’.)

I believe I have already said by anticipation most of what I might otherwise feel like saying by way of comment on the two chapters (7 and 8) in which Mr. Reid discusses the connection of duty with creative expressiveness and with ‘love’. In substance I should naturally agree with what he says about the danger that a morality of ‘duty’ may come to be in practice no more than a routine of sullen conformity to an accepted body of rules. But it would, I think, be a great injustice to a moralist like Kant to suppose that he would regard a life of that kind as a genuine expression of the principle of duty for duty’s sake. And if the ‘life of rule’ has its dangers so also has the life of impulse and emotion. It may be that (p. 136) the man who ‘has only duty’ for his motive is an “unprofitable servant”, as compared with the man who is moved by warm sentiments of devotion to persons. Yet, I am not quite sure. R. L. S.’s Attwater, who describes himself as “disliking men and hating women”, though a repellent personage, does not strike me as by any means the most “unprofitable” of servants. And I believe one might even borrow Mr. Reid’s own language, used on page 132 of the man who acts only from cold ‘duty’, and apply it to the contrasted more warmly emotional type of men with an insufficient sense of duty. Put him among thoroughly unsympathetic or repulsive companions, and *his* ‘wells of supply’ will ‘easily dry up’; when that happens, for want of a sufficient sense of duty, is he not left with a mere *sic volo, sic iubeo*, which may actually be extremely immoral, for his sole principle? The most serious weakness of a morality of rules, to my mind, is not that the rules have exceptions; in the main, common intelligence will indicate to us what kind of cases must be regarded as exceptions. The real trouble is that the rules remain so hopelessly abstract. Kant would have seen this, if, when he was considering the case of the man who is hesitating about his duty, he had taken examples where the uncertainty is genuine, like that of a man anxious to know whether he ought, at this juncture, to make an offer of marriage to a particular woman, or to accept a position with certain specific responsibilities attached to it. Even if we agree to confine ourselves entirely

within the limits of a morality of 'duty', and have also satisfied ourselves that there are general rules about duties which admit of no exception, no such rule will tell a man just what is his duty in either of the cases we have suggested; and therefore a morality of genuine devotion to duty cannot be reduced to any mere abstention from violating a set of rules. Unfortunately the only cases of uncertainty Kant allows himself to consider are cases where the uncertainty is not genuine, cases in which a man is merely looking for some plausible 'colour' to put upon an act which he really knows already to be wrong.

It is part of what seems to me Mr. Reid's exaggerated distrust of a morality of duty that he insists very strongly on the point that (p. 135) really "creative" morality is "significant" because it is charged with such intense interest in persons, whereas the "impersonal" morality of duty tends to become conventional and devoid of significance. That all morality whatever, except the part of it which concerns our behaviour towards the lower animals and our natural environment in general is, in the end, concerned with 'persons' is, indeed, obvious. But they need not be persons with whom the agent has any individual acquaintance; "his interest in them need not be interest in their *personalities* (as distinct from their *personality*). Mr. Reid says (p. 136), that to die for one's country is morally more *significant* than to pay a tradesman's bill. Perhaps so, but is that not simply because it costs me so much more to do the former? If the paying of the debt means, as it did in the case of Walter Scott, slowly working one's mind and body to death, does Mr. Reid's contrast still hold good? Was Scott's struggle with the burden of debt he undertook to write off, less morally significant than it would have been to get killed in the Napoleonic wars? And is not the action of a man of science who, like some of the investigators of radio-activity, incurs a slow and painful death in the attempt to add to our knowledge of physics as morally significant as either, though devotion to the discovery of truth is as nearly 'impersonal' an end as a man can set before him? I think, then, that the 'impersonality' of the end set before himself by a man who really follows duty for duty's sake need not deprive his life of the highest moral significance.

Indeed, there is a curious question suggested to me by what Mr. Reid goes on to say, with such general truth, about the contrasted Christian morality of *Agape*. "Love of the brethren" cannot, of course, be practised without deep interest in individual persons. At least, that is one way in which it must show itself, though, as far as I can see, the construction of a *Summa theologica*, though not intended to meet the needs of any known 'brother' in particular, may be inspired throughout by "love of the brethren". But the curious point is that the ideally good Christian seems to find himself ready, unlike most of us, to take this interest in *any* 'brothers' with whom he is brought into contact; it is not necessary that they should be

'personally' congenial to him. The members of an Order which makes it a fundamental rule *pas d'amitiés particulières* may be all the more untiring in their interest in whatever 'brother' Providence throws in their way, precisely because they are trained in this kind of detachment. It is partly for this reason that I feel very doubtful about the truth of Mr. Reid's suggestion that *Agape*—the principle of Bergson's 'open' morality, can be developed by a simple extension of the *φιλία*, the *amitié particulière*, which finds expression in 'closed' morality. I should not like to be dogmatic on the point, but I cannot help thinking that there is a problem here which calls for careful consideration.

When Mr. Reid comes, in his ninth chapter and the two which follow it, to deal with the notion of value, once more I find myself in general agreement with him, but own to doubts about some of his positions. I fancy he has been perhaps a little unduly influenced by certain rather paradoxical views of Mr. Ross, even while he refuses his complete assent to them. I am thinking particularly of the attempt to distinguish *goodness* from *rightness*, and the formula adopted at p. 53 that "*rightness is not itself a value, but is the character of a fact possessing value*" (whereas *goodness*, I understand, *is a value*). I wonder whether it is either desirable or possible to distinguish *moral goodness* from *rightness* in this way. Can we make any real distinction between the two, except perhaps by saying that when we speak of an act as *right* we are thinking primarily of it as *fitting* the situation in a unique way, whereas when we call it *good* we are more or less consciously thinking of it as *approved* by a real or imagined omniscient "practical reason"? It seems to me that the very employment of the word *good* introduces this reference to the unerring *judge*, and so has concealed theological implications. Perhaps, indeed, this may be the real meaning of Mr. Reid's own language, which I find a little obscure.

Also I feel some misgivings about Mr. Reid's acquiescence in the current view that "ought-to-be" is meaningless without reference to "ought-to-do". The statement that the *world* ought to be so-and-so, I should say, is often meant to express the dissatisfaction of intelligence with the world as it looks to be, apart from any question of my being able to do anything to effect a change. There is an 'exigence' of the speculative reason itself on the strength of which we assert that the world ought to respond, and therefore presumably does respond, to our demand for intelligibility, and therefore, if it looks not to do so, appearances must be misleading. It is, for example, 'exigences' of reason, partly speculative, partly practical, which Voltaire had in mind when he wrote that *si Dieu n'existait pas il faudrait l'inventer*.

Mr. Reid's twelfth chapter prepares the way for his closing discussion of the relations between religion and morality by an important, though, I think, rather obscurely expressed, distinction between three levels at which the moral life can be lived, the secular, the



sacred (but still non-religious), and the religious. Secular morality is apparently that of the man, who, in general, behaves decently and honourably, but is ready on occasion to sacrifice morality to non-moral considerations; the sacred level is that of the man who has some object to which he is prepared to sacrifice everything else without reserve, though this object may be something altogether belonging to "this world", a wife, a mistress, a native country; the sacred becomes religious when the object of supreme devotion is envisaged as definitely beyond and above "this world". The obvious criticism which at once occurs to a reader is that, in so far as a man is living, as we all too often do, at the 'secular' level, his action could hardly be said by a serious moralist like Kant to be marked by *moral* value at all. If there is no man whose life is wholly without specific *moral* worth, it is because none of us is, at all times, consistently 'secular'. Genuine morality, whenever attained, is at least on the level of what Mr. Reid calls the 'sacred'. And at the other end, the exact difference between the merely sacred and the religious is none too clearly laid down, perhaps because Mr. Reid does not want to hamper himself by an arbitrary initial definition of religion. When does an object which a man regards as the pearl of great price for which everything else must be given up cease to be merely "this-worldly"? Or can such an incommensurable good *ever* be properly called merely "this-worldly"? I suspect, without being sure, that Mr. Reid's meaning is that both the sacred and the religious have, in the eyes of their devotee, the quality of being, in Otto's phraseology, "wholly other", "not of this world", but that the merely sacred is thought of only as "other", while the religious is thought of as an "wholly other" which is also the *ground* of the being of the familiar and "this-worldly".

I do not propose to say much of the closing three chapters, in which Mr. Reid is treating, with deep insight and sympathy, of the specifically religious attitude towards the problems of morality as seen in the Christian religious ideal. The distinctive quality of the specifically Christian moral life is a subject far too much neglected in most of our current works on ethics, and I have little but unqualified commendation for Mr. Reid's attempt to fill the gap. But I think the uncertainty about the precise line of demarcation between the religious and the merely sacred has led to a certain amount of arguing at cross-purposes where Mr. Reid is concerned (quite rightly in my opinion) to counteract Dr. Osman's unqualified depreciation of all "non-religious morality". Dr. Osman's argument, reproduced at page 198, amounts to a condemnation of any morality which remains morality and does not become religious as self-worship, because it sets up as its first principle "respect for our moral worth". But the conclusion is only reached by smuggling into the Kantian formula which the writer evidently has in mind the word *our*. This is to forget that it is not *my* particular personality, but *rational personality* as such (an ideal only realised very

imperfectly in my own doings,) for which Kant demands reverence, and to ignore his emphatic observation that while regard for the moral law merely regulates 'self-love', it 'absolutely annihilates' self-conceit. The real question, to my mind, is whether the attitude to life which Mr. Reid calls that of a morality which is sacred but not religious is not already *unconsciously* religious; and oddly enough this is apparently what Dr. Osman holds at heart, in spite of his unfortunate onslaught on 'morality'.

Among many things which Mr. Reid goes on to say excellently well about the nature of religious 'faith' there are just two of his statements which, perhaps, need some qualification. It is true that faith is of the nature of *insight* and that a man cannot and ought not to try to "force himself to believe" (p. 210); yet, for all this, faith is, for all men at some times and for many men at most times, a state of 'tension'; one may be quite unable to meet the sceptic's attacks on it, and yet have to say, with Kant's simple man of virtue, that one *darf nicht* abandon it. And I think that the statement of page 216 that such faith is 'involuntary' needs to be made with some reservation. It does, to some extent, rest with me whether I will leave my mind open to the 'supernatural solicitings' or close it against them.

With reference to the question raised at page 225 and treated as perhaps unanswerable, how 'Nature' can "go her own way" if God is omnipotent, I would call Mr. Reid's attention to a suggestive argument of Guzzo, in his recent essay *Idealismo è Cristianesimo*, to the effect that the Berkeleyan attempt to eliminate 'second causes' would actually be fatal to belief in the *divine* omnipotence, since its logical conclusion would be the false one that I myself am the omnipotent universal cause.

I am a little perturbed by some of the author's interesting *obiter dicta*. E.g. (p. 238) "the lover of humanity is not happy for long away from the city". What, then, of Shelley or Wordsworth? Or were they not lovers of humanity? Cannot a man have a real love of humanity along with an equally real distaste for the "madding crowd"? It is still more doubtful to me whether it is possible (p. 261-262) to include 'pride', in any sense of the word, among *Christian* virtues. Is it ever permissible for a Christian to shout over his own work, like Ben Jonson, "By God, 'tis good, and if you'll like't you may"? And are the attitudes spoken of by Mr. Reid (gladness in having done a piece of work well, and 'elation' in the sharing of something "not myself and greater than myself") really the same thing as 'pride'? (I grant that both are dangerously near to pride, but can they not, and ought they not, to be kept clear of it?)

The volume is remarkably free from serious errors of the press, but I note that on page 45, l. 10, from below, a 'not' has apparently fallen out before the words 'violate utilitarian principles', that the reference to Aristotle on page 96 is wrongly given—it should be

*E.N.* II. 6, 11—and that on page 241 *morale* (in italics) is wrongly written for *moral*. (The “quality of a man’s spirit” is, in French, his *moral*; his *morale* means his professed ethical theory.)

A. E. TAYLOR.

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*Plato's Cosmology*: the *Timaeus* of Plato translated, with a running commentary. By F. M. CORNFORD. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) London: Kegan Paul, 1937. Pp. xviii + 376. 16s.

It will be remembered by what a roundabout process the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* creates the World-Soul. He compounds two kinds of Being into an intermediate Being, two kinds of Sameness into an intermediate Sameness, and so forth. Then he creates the Soul itself from a compound of these compounds. I recall this in order to draw from it a Homeric simile; the dialogue itself is, in Prof. Taylor’s analysis, the product of such a twice complicated mixture. For Plato did not simply pour forth his own views, but adopted the pose of an Italian Pythagorean of the fifth century, who was also a medical man. “We might say that the formula for the physics and physiology of the dialogue is that it is an attempt to graft Empedoclean biology on the stock of Pythagorean mathematics.” As if this were not enough, Prof. Taylor, in expounding the dialogue, lets in a quantity of later philosophy and science, including a stiff dose of Whitehead from which the whole mixture takes its flavour. This procedure imposed extra obligations on a future interpreter, and Prof. Cornford, wishing to offer us the draught as prepared by Plato, has first to go to work like a patient research chemist in order to discover it. His thesis is that Plato was simply saying what he believed in the language of his own time. No argument is necessary, I think, in order to show that he is in the right; Taylor’s view, even if it were otherwise unassailable, would break down on his own failure to maintain it with anything like consistency; for example, he treats any animadversion by Aristotle on the *Timaeus* with the bitterest resentment, and hammers at him as though the central mystery of the Platonic philosophy were being defended.

It must not be thought that the recovery of the essence of Plato by this process of analysis is the whole of Prof. Cornford’s work, or even a large part of it. There are a vast number of particular points on which he obviously has the better of Prof. Taylor in argument. But it will give a truer impression of his work if we here leave these aside, and consider how Prof. Cornford has met some of the main problems of the dialogue. And now to deal first with two questions vital to the dialogue, whether the Demiurge is a real figure distinct from the World-Soul and the subordinate ‘visible’ deities; and whether he has entire power over his material.

Plato says that the Demiurge was moved to create a world because he was good ; he had no jealousy, and therefore wished all things to be good as far as possible. That is to say, he wished to impose order upon chaos, supposed as pre-existing, in the fullest possible measure. Prof. Cornford interprets this correctly as an apology for the disorder and evil which are nevertheless found, and a statement, perhaps necessary in that age, that these are not due to divine envy. There is thus no parallel to the Christian idea that "it is of the very nature of love and goodness to 'overflow'" (Taylor). The Demiurge is not a religious figure, nor is it suggested that he be made an object of worship.

Not only is this so, but he is a mere symbol. Plato separates in his exposition two causes which operate and have always operated together ; the world as we know it is the product, partly of Reason, and partly of Necessity, and in order to show this it is convenient to represent the Demiurge as forming a cosmos out of pre-existing chaos. There are thus these differences from Christian theology : (1) In Platonism the Ideas are independent of the Demiurge. (2) The Demiurge is not a creator, but an informer of pre-existing material which is not entirely tractable. (3) As there was never a real time of creation, both the Demiurge and the chaos he informs are symbols, though they symbolise serious and permanent factors existing in the world we know. In the third part of the *Timaeus*, Plato allows the distinction between the Demiurge and the created gods who continue his work to disappear ; "the evidences of design in the human frame are there attributed sometimes to the god, sometimes to the celestial gods who are the stars, planets and Earth." The really important thing to Plato is that there is in the world a divine Reason working for ends that are good ; but he seldom states dogmatically where and how it works, whether, for example, as an indwelling soul of the cosmos or not. Just at the point where he seems to have asserted that the visible cosmos is an eternal god, Plato refers to it as an image, ἀδίδων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα, 37 c. This is usually translated 'a created image of the everlasting gods,' as though forms and gods were the same. Prof. Cornford, after an interesting discussion, translates 'a shrine brought into being for the everlasting gods.' Ἀγαλμα, he says, with examples from Plato, contains no implication of likeness, and is not a synonym of εἰκών. If we think of a statue not so much as a likeness of the god, but as a residence to which he may delight (ἀγάλλεται) to come, that is what ἄγαλμα meant to a Greek. Hence Plato, here and in *Epinomis* 983 E, scarcely bothers whether the world and the separate heavenly bodies within it are divine living beings, or are mere images made by the gods.

Before examining this a little more closely, we must see what Prof. Cornford says of the power of the Demiurge over "necessity." Here again he finds reason for divergence from Prof. Taylor. In explaining how Plato comes to describe Ἀνάγκη as a "wandering

cause," Taylor identifies it with the element of "brute fact" which we cannot comprehend in our account of Nature because we cannot see its purpose. "If we should have complete knowledge, we should find that ἀνάγκη had vanished from our account of the world." Necessity can therefore have no place in the world as completely known by God; to him the universe is rational through and through; ἀνάγκη is no real drag on his formative power. Prof. Cornford thinks that this interpretation is not in the spirit of Plato, and proceeds from a latent desire to make the Demiurge omnipotent. It would make nonsense if, where Plato says that Reason persuades Necessity to give assistance, we substitute for this "persuades a residuum of hitherto unexplained fact."

Thus the interpretation offered is this: the world had no beginning in time: both the Demiurge and ἀνάγκη are symbols, though symbols of serious and present facts: as regards the *manner* in which Reason governs the visible cosmos, Plato's position is one of agnosticism. Sometimes he describes the world as a living being, sometimes as a shrine to which the god or gods come, and through which they make visible signs to men. How far is this interpretation valid? I can find only one feature in it which might provoke dispute, or at least hesitation, and this is the alleged agnosticism. Do the other late Dialogues and the *Letters* really not help towards making Plato's answer more precise? But one can only say that they do not. On one side, we have these indications that the world-soul view is dominant: the reasoning in *Philebus* 28 ff., which is not valid unless Noûs is an indwelling world-soul: the fact that a common proof is given for the immortality of the human soul and for the existence of God, *Laws*, Book X: the occurrence of such a phrase as θεοὶ ὄρατοί, and the language of the *Timaeus* itself, which conveys its astronomy through a description of the genesis of the *soul* of the world. On the other hand, there is the distinct recognition in *Epinomis* 983-4 that the visible heavenly bodies may be ἀγάλματα, there is the agnostic attitude of *Laws*, X, 899 b, where by the example of the Sun, Plato shows that it cannot be decided *how* ψυχὴ governs the heavenly bodies. It seems to me to be only in the *Letters*, especially at 323 d, that Plato expresses his belief in a deity who has no visible counterpart. He seems to think that on this matter, though not on the general issue of belief against atheism, each man must follow his personal faith.

Let us next consider Plato's allusion to the motion of the Earth. It is necessary to recall some of the main features of this puzzle. Plato introduces the earth as γῆν δὲ τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, ἰλλομένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας. The word ἰλλομένην is the reading of the best MSS. both here and in two allusions made by Aristotle in the *de Caelo*. It is known that Heraclides Ponticus reversed the view of his contemporaries by teaching that the heaven stood still, whilst the earth revolved on its axis; also that the Pythagoreans had

at least one non-geocentric system, and (on the authority of Theophrastus) that Plato in old age repented of having given the central position in the universe to the earth.

When considering the earth in relation to the stars in *de Caelo*, II, 13, Aristotle mentions the doctrine of the *Timaeus*. Most people, he says, consider the earth to be at rest at the centre. Some remove it from the centre (and he discusses the varieties of this view, with some criticisms). Finally, some say that though situated at the centre, it revolves about the axis of the universe, "as is written in the *Timaeus*." He interprets ἄλλεσθαι as a movement; and he makes no allusion to Heraclides Ponticus by name, which is singular unless he is identified with the doctrine of which the *Timaeus* is taken as an example.

Apart from the evidence of Aristotle, it is clear that Plato does not, in the *Timaeus*, assign planetary movement to the earth. Most of the astronomy of the dialogue was expounded earlier in describing the composition of the World-Soul, and this clearly followed a geocentric plan. And Prof. Cornford makes the observation that if Plato had removed the earth from the centre—if, e.g., as Burnet suggested, he thought of it as bouncing up and down, and thus constantly passing through the centre—either the centre was left vacant, or another body was placed there, and comment would have been required in either case.


But if it seems impossible that the earth in the *Timaeus* should have planetary movement, it seems unnecessary that it should have axial rotation; for a sufficient explanation of day and night had been given in the revolution of the outermost sphere or circle, "the Same," which carries with it the inner circles of the sun, moon and planets.

It is therefore suggested that ἰλλομένην, possibly with a slight alteration in spelling, be taken to mean 'packed' or 'compressed,' and that Aristotle may have led the way in a mistaken interpretation of it. This might be excusable if still later than this time Plato eventually had come over to the Pythagorean view. Or, as Simplicius suggests, καὶ κενεῖσθαι in Aristotle might be an interpolation; but this would help singularly little, as the whole context shows that the doctrine of the *Timaeus* is understood to assert a movement of the earth. These remedies are rather desperate.

Prof. Cornford asks the right questions. Why should Plato have added an unnecessary movement? Can he have had some motive for attributing rotation both to the outermost circle and to the earth—one which allows him to speak of the latter as the creator of day and night? And this question can be answered. Plato had emphasised that the World-Soul extends right through from the circumference to the centre of the Universe, which, in non-symbolical language, means that the outermost sphere carries round in its rotation all those within it, not excluding the earth. Now the earth "must rotate on her axis relatively to the stars, in order to preserve the

effect of that daily revolution." Without this "there would be no change in the relative positions of any parts of the world's body, and there would be no day and night." A sphere rotating in complete void with no change in the relative position of the bodies it contains, might as well be at rest. The context indicates that it must surely be axial rotation which is ascribed to the earth. It has just been said that each individual fixed star rotates on its axis, because it has a self-moving soul. And the earth too is a divine being, "first and eldest of the gods which are within the heaven," a phrase which makes it seem paradoxical that it should be excluded from all movement. What we must assign to the earth is, then, a rotation in a reverse sense to the sphere of the fixed stars. "In relation to absolute space she stands still, while in relation to the other makers of day and night, the fixed stars, she rotates every twenty-four hours in the reverse sense."

I feel sure that this is quite the most satisfactory suggestion that has been made. Prof. Cornford mentions that Martin really advanced the principle of it, for he saw that the earth must be involved in the revolution of the whole. But, as he is convinced that the earth is not meant to move, he translates *ἠλομένην κ.τ.λ.* as 'clinging,' the idea being, not that she actually rotates in an opposite sense to the heaven, but that she exerts a kind of vital force by refusing to be carried round by it. There is scarcely more than the meaning of a word to separate this from Prof. Cornford's version, as a diagram will show:





Here  $AA_1$  is the outermost sphere and  $BB_1$  that of the earth, seen from above, the former rotating towards A and the latter towards  $B_1$ ; F is a fixed star, E a point on the surface of the earth, and C its centre. (It must be remembered that the movement  $BB_1$  is in the same plane as  $AA_1$ ; the sphere of the earth does not, like the planetary spheres, rotate in the plane of the ecliptic. If it did, the path of the point F as seen from the earth would be a spiral. Prof. Cornford points this out, page 133, and suggests that Aristotle may have been misled by it.) Now it does not make much difference whether the earth is said to 'cling' to the axis passing vertically through C, or to 'rotate' in the direction of  $B_1$ ; what happens in either case is that the outer sphere seems to rotate round the inner one, and this to remain stationary with reference to absolute space. But one may readily admit that the *ideas* of clinging and rotation are, after all, different!



One improvement I may perhaps venture to suggest. The translation 'guardian', for φύλαξ, is too vague. Plato surely has in his mind the image of a sentinel or watchman "going his rounds." The earth is a watchman "of day and night" stationed at the centre, and never released from duty. We are told that the Pythagoreans' expression for the Central Fire was Διὸς φυλακή, "the guardhouse of Zeus"—perhaps the whole image comes from them, and the Central Fire is a night-watchman's brazier. But I should certainly not wish to dispute Prof. Cornford's main interpretation. He points out rightly (p. 265) that not only the astronomy, but the physics of the dialogue seems to assume a central earth. It is implied that in the ordered world the elemental bodies are arranged not merely like with like, but in ordered concentric spheres, earth at the centre and fire round the circumference.

When we reach the section dealing with the composition of the four elements and their transformation into one another, Prof. Cornford brings to the front with great lucidity certain difficulties either not seen or brushed aside as unimportant by other scholars. Plato's position is that the four elements are represented by four regular solids; three of them have equilateral triangles for their faces, the fourth has squares. The common στοιχείον of the first three solids is the 'half-equilateral' triangle, whose sides are in the ratio  $1:2:\sqrt{3}$ . The other στοιχείον is the isosceles right-angled triangle, which is half a square, and this is destined for the cube, the earth-atom. As this triangle cannot be broken down and converted into the other, it is decided that earth cannot participate in the general transformation of elements—which, as Aristotle says with some justice, is groundless *a priori* reasoning. The difficulty might have been overcome if the analysis had been carried back beyond triangles to lines and points, and ultimately to numerical units, but Plato has declined to do this in the dialogue (κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου, 48 c). Now, if he does not wish to do this, but to stop his analysis at the most convenient point, why does he carry it as far back as he does? If, e.g., he had named as elements the equilateral triangle (for the three transformable solids) and the square (for the cube), the whole theory of elemental change could have been worked out. Moreover, when at 54 D Plato describes how the faces of the solids are composed from triangles, he again seems to shun the simplest way: the face for the cube is made of *four* half-isosceles triangles, the face for the other solids of *six* half-equilaterals, where in either case two would have done:



Nothing is said at first of the size of the elementary triangles, except that they are all microscopic; later, in order to account for the fact that Fire, Air, etc., assume different forms, Plato says that the elementary triangles exist in different sizes, "the number of these differences being the same as that of the varieties in the kinds," 57 c. But it is not said how exactly these differences in size affect the process of transformation, or whether any numerical ratio exists between them.

As the theory is generally understood, the primary triangles are supposed to be created by the Demiurge in a certain number of grades of size (say three), with no specific ratio between them. Prof. Cornford points out the following objections to this. (1) The function of the Demiurge is to implant number and proportion wherever possible, and he would not leave this important point to chance. (2) Only the solids within each grade of size will be capable of transformation into each other—a coarse, plebeian pyramid into a similarly rough icosahedron, and so forth. Yet there is no mention in the text of such a restriction. (3) It still does not explain why more triangles than is necessary go to the making of the faces of the solids.

Prof. Cornford gives a combined solution to objections (2) and (3). The larger scalene triangles must be some definite multiple of the smaller. Supposing that there are three grades of size, A, B and C, the triangle of the smallest grade will be the highest common measure of the others, and will be the irreducible element, the στοιχείον proper. Transformation will be possible from any grade to any other. The two triangles selected as elements have the property that each can be split up indefinitely into parts similar to itself, by a perpendicular from the apex to the base. The equilateral has not this property, and was therefore not eligible as the element. Prof. Cornford shows how easily the figures for some of the propositions in *Euclid*, Book XIII, might have suggested this to Plato.

I feel that this must be accepted as a welcome piece of elucidation, but I am not sure that Prof. Cornford has faced all its consequences. Firstly, why does Plato not begin with a description of the synthesis of solids of the smallest grade, and then explain that they can be dissolved, and their triangles used for the faces of a larger grade? Why does he begin with an intermediate grade, in which the face is composed of six triangles? It would be easier if Plato had pointed out that there are, all the time, simpler or smaller solids than the ones he is describing. Secondly, does not the difference in grades, treated in this way, imply some kind of matter and individual substance in the triangles? Is it compatible with the belief, which so many interpreters hold, that Plato is speaking of strictly mathematical planes? Prof. Cornford is not very lucid in his own answer to this. He says (p. 205) that the particles "cannot be, as it were, empty boxes—geometrical planes enclosing vacancy. . . . Plato's description throughout implies that the particles are filled with

those changes or powers which are sensible qualities; and that they are penetrated or animated by soul." If we bring this into relation with the analysis of the triangles, we get a rather curious view: each half-equilateral triangle of the smallest grade will be a primary soul-unit, six of these units will compose a larger soul-unit, and so forth. Is Prof. Cornford aware of this consequence? The subject is highly obscure, and I find a curious example of ancient division of opinion about it. Aristotle argues throughout *de Caelo*, III, IV as though each elementary plane had weight, and superior weight were due to a greater number of like parts. He is at least able to refer to *Timaeus* 56 B, but he forgets that later in the dialogue Plato explains weight in a different way, by the attraction of like for like, without any mention of the atomic planes. Simplicius at first takes his usual stand on such questions; if the Platonic theory referred to purely mathematical elements, the absurdities mentioned by Aristotle would follow; actually this is not so, therefore Aristotle does not really disagree with Plato! Later, he becomes much more alarmed at Aristotle's criticisms, and claims, quoting 63 E, that Plato had never intended to explain weight by the number of elementary triangles. Now whatever may be the real answer to this question, it seems to me that Prof. Cornford makes it more difficult than ever to hold that purely mathematical parts are meant.

If one point may be singled out in a work which is uniformly admirable, I would mention the reticence which enables the author to cover so much ground, and with such deep attention, in 370 pages. Much erudition is shown; but still more is modestly concealed, and the reader given the benefit of its results.

D. J. ALLAN.

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*The Philosophical Bases of Theism.* By G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., Fellow of the British Academy and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. (Hibbert Lectures, 1931.) George Allen & Unwin, 1937. Pp. 272. 8s. 6d. net.

It is a relief, in these days of irrationalist Rationalism on the one side and irrationalist anti-Rationalism on the other, to turn to this volume of Hibbert Lectures and to find the delicate and thorny problems of religious experience handled with penetrative understanding balanced by a measured sobriety of judgement. Of course, this is what we, all of us, expect from Prof. Hicks. He is out for the rigour of the game and will allow no place in the philosophy of religion for what lies either below or above the bounds of reason. He takes throughout the broad view of reason, as an activity "involved in all our experiences, and as at the root of all intelligent

belief" (159). "Intellectual activity," he tells us, "may, it is true, degenerate into a cold and merely logical process of ratiocination, that seeks to pass all things in heaven and earth through the sieve of its narrow formulæ of elimination or excision; but to suffer this logic-chopping faculty, as Carlyle called it, to usurp the name of reason, is simply to trifle with ordinary linguistic usage" (129); and he appeals to the Platonic distinction between *voûs* and *diavola* and to that of modern German thinkers between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*. If, and only if, reason be thus viewed, can philosophy justify its claim to judge the deliverances of religious experience, "to explicate and examine them, to ascertain whether they will stand the test of critical examination" (163). For Philosophy would suffer violence in its attempt to interpret experience in its totality, were religion to be excluded from its survey. "Though a religious mind may leave philosophy alone, the philosophic inquirer cannot leave religion alone" (18). The Barthian school, in short, receive no quarter from Prof. Hicks. But he is equally strong in his conviction that Theism—for he is not concerned in this book with Christianity or any other specific revelation—can be based on rational foundations. The argument to this conclusion is continuous and close-knit, and should appeal alike to the philosopher by its precision and coherence and to the public by the clarity of its exposition and the wisdom of the author's reflections upon life. He has specially in mind "the large number of persons who find themselves unable to accept the creeds of Christendom as they are familiarly presented, and who yet are persuaded that the spiritual life is a reality, and that they largely owe their sense of its reality to the teaching of Christ and the Christian Church" (10-11). Not only such as these, but professed philosophers and theologians also, have much to gain from this most able and impressive work.

Of the eight lectures, the first four are devoted to an exposition of the nature and significance of religious experience, including (Lecture II.) a measured and (to the present reviewer) unanswerable criticism of the Naturalistic and Positivist positions incompatible with its validity. Religion is interpreted, not as a jejune extract of what is common to all cults, primitive or advanced, but as a germinating principle in the human mind, which culminates in "a belief in God as one and not as many, manifesting Himself both in nature and to the mind of man, yet revealing Himself most completely to souls of large spiritual compass and of strenuous moral power" (36). "The central affirmation of the religious consciousness is the proposition 'God exists'. . . . Religious conviction, in its purest form, is the assurance of a conscious relation, on our part, to a higher mind than ours; and, on the part of human beings at large, to a higher than all, or, in other words, to a supreme Mind transcending the whole family of dependent minds" (49). (The distinction here drawn between 'our' assurance of a 'higher mind' and that in 'human beings at large' of a 'supreme Mind' is hardly clear.)

The meaning of the term 'experience' is carefully discussed in the first Lecture, and further, in connection with religion, in Lectures III. and IV. ; in the present context, it is taken in its widest sense as "the experience of what is external no less than of what is internal, the experience of moral ideals no less than of the aspiration to 'realise' them, the experience commonly called 'spiritual' no less than that which pertains to sense" (23). The author lays particular stress on two features of experience, (i) on its duality in unity, as including both the *experiencing* and the *experienced* (89-90), and (ii) on the presence and primacy of the cognitive moment in the indivisible trinity of knowing, acting and feeling (96 ff.). It is the first of these which forms the nerve of Prof. Hicks' critique of Naturalism, *i.e.*, its treatment of "*the knowledge of an object* as if it too were an *object* to be known," whereas "conscious minds . . . stand to nature" (understood as "the sum-total of objects") "in a relation absolutely other than that in which one object in nature stands to another object in nature" (66). As regards the second feature, Prof. Hicks, while resolutely opposing the doctrines of the priority of either conation or feeling to cognition, maintains that the three terms "indicate broad differences that become manifest in the gradual development of mental life" (99), all being present in an embryonic form in a primitive 'activity' (with no suggestion of the putting forth of energy), "an act of apprehension" (here the germ of cognition is emphasised), "— crude, chaotic, though it may be", and he adds : "and every act of apprehending, even the crudest, implies . . . the elementary functions of discriminating and comparing" (100). Consciousness of self, as arising historically in the course of mental development, is "secondary and derivative" (98) ; but, when once it has arisen, it is of primary importance. Prof. Hicks' meaning is, I think, unambiguous ; but his language in places is apt to confuse the unwary reader, as when he tells us, in a different connection be it understood, that the historical genesis of the human mind "settles in no way its place in the scheme of things as a secondary or accidental product" (57). He holds, on the contrary, "that the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is by far the greatest, by far the most momentous, advance ever made in the history of mind ; or, indeed, for the matter of that, in the whole course of organic evolution" (100).

It follows that Prof. Hicks has little patience with the analysis of religious experience in terms of feeling, even though the anti-intellectualist position is disguised by reference to 'immediacy' and 'intuition'. We cannot dwell upon the masterly criticism of such writers as Schleiermacher, Bergson and Otto in Lectures III. and IV., nor on the sympathetic criticism of Cook Wilson's well-known reconstruction of the Ontological argument by appeal to the religious emotion of reverence (133-135). But there are two points in these chapters that provoke critical comment. (1) Prof. Hicks seems to us to be over severe in his remarks on mysticism. He charges the mystics

with ignoring "the vital difference" between the higher and the lower immediacy (109). Now he is wholly justified in his criticism of Bergson's identification of 'dynamic religion' with mysticism, as also in his refusal to tie religion down to rare and privileged experiences. "Why," he asks (122), "should the normal rational intelligence of man be judged to be incapable of discerning spiritual verities?" Why indeed? "There is," as he says, "no radical antithesis between faith and knowledge" (158). But he is too prone to interpret the admittedly privileged experiences of the mystic as if they were infected with the 'lower' immediacy. The great mystics—and only such deserve the name—are, *pace* Prof. Hicks (119-120), profoundly distrustful of the sensuous imagery which may or may not (more likely not) accompany the contemplative vision. The negative language they employ does not, as Prof. Hicks supposes (116-117, 121), imply that God is conceived "as that which has least content", as "removed from the region of concrete reality", nor does their notion of His 'pure Being' involve an antithesis to "the living, personal Deity of the Christian faith". A study of Aquinas' doctrine of God as Being would serve to show that nothing was further from their intention, while the error of interpreting the terms *nihil* and darkness as sheer negations is brought out clearly, if we remember right, in Dr. Inge's *Christian Mysticism*. Prof. Hicks' gravest objection is to the contradiction involved in their claim to oneness with the wholly Other, as an assertion in one breath of their self-hood in awareness and of its annihilation in absorption. He quotes with approval Dr. Tennant's stricture that "the mystic cannot have it both ways" (118). But this is just what the mystic must and does have. There is paradox, if you like; but if the transcending of "the either—or of the abstract understanding" is held to be an ultimate contradiction, what becomes of the poet's

"I am the eye wherewith the universe  
Beholds itself and knows itself divine."

What, indeed, becomes of all the higher experiences for which Prof. Hicks has unlocked the door by his wider view of Reason?

(2) True, the mystics have at times, though only at times, dallied precariously with language suggestive of a doctrine of pure Immanence. Perhaps this is why, more than others among the devout, they have felt so strongly the need of control by orthodox theological directors. Certainly the tradition of Christian theology is entirely with Prof. Hicks when he insists on Divine transcendence and denies the possibility, at least *in hoc statu*, of direct vision of God. God communes with us, he says, as do other minds. Leaving the difficult question of direct knowledge of other human minds on one side, we may agree that "communion" and not "union" is the correct word to apply to the relation between even the mystic and God. Where, in our opinion, Prof. Hicks goes too far in the opposite

direction is in his view as to the relation of ideal values to the Divine Mind. Values subsist timelessly *per se* ; though known perfectly by God, they cannot be said to exist simply as His thoughts. To use Dr. Whitehead's terminology, they are 'ingredient' in God's mind just as they are 'ingredient' in nature or in human minds. The subject, here broached in the fourth Lecture, is developed in fuller detail in connection with the Moral Argument in Lecture VII. There the difficulty in accepting Prof. Hicks' view becomes apparent in the following sentences (238). "I do not say, as some have said, that the moral ideal must exist in the mind of God, because as an ideal it does not seem to me to be an existent, either in a mind or elsewhere. I would, however, submit that only on the assumption of the existence of a Mind by whom it is known in its entirety and on whom its reality is dependent can we rationally think of this ideal as subsisting at all." How, we would rather ask, if its reality is thus dependent, can it be conceived at all as subsisting, apart from its actuality as the thought of an existent God ? Or, to raise a wider issue untouched in this volume, does not Prof. Hicks' position on this matter logically presuppose the priority (metaphysical) of possibility to actuality, and therewith a breach with what is a cardinal tenet alike of sound metaphysics and of sound theology ?

We have already trespassed on the ground of the last four Lectures, which present the three steps in Prof. Hicks' constructive argument to Theism. In the first place (Lecture V.) the Cosmological argument can be reconstructed so as to warrant inference from nature as fragmentary (no real whole) and contingent to a necessary Being beyond nature. The point of interest in Prof. Hicks' discussion lies in his uncompromising rejection of the traditional form of the argument, to a first or free cause. Causality holds only between events in time, and it is meaningless to speak of a cause that is not also an effect. To regard human will (and *a fortiori* the will of God) as a power to produce certain results is analogous to treating consciousness of an object as though it were an object, and to construe mental activity after the fashion of material mechanism. The criticism is specially directed against Martineau. It follows that God is not, in the strict sense, a Creator ; "if the notion of 'creation' is to be sustained at all it can only be in the sense of continuous creation, of a constant dependence of the world on the supreme Being" (176). Creation, in short, must be interpreted as equivalent to emanation (177). The second step is considered in connection with the Teleological Argument (Lecture VI.), which enables us to pass from the concept of a necessary transcendent Being to that of self-conscious Mind. The passage, being concerned with 'matters of fact' is, of course, not demonstrative ; but Prof. Hicks claims that a study of the adaptations of nature to the needs of living organisms and of the structure of those organisms renders the inference highly probable. We cannot here follow out



his guarded discussion of the question, with reference *inter alia* to Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism. There is, however, one outstanding difficulty that seems to call for fuller notice. Prof. Hicks concludes somewhat swiftly to the fact of a single all-pervasive purpose in the universe. "We have to conceive . . . not only of a vast hierarchy of subordinate patterns, but in the long run of one pervasive 'pattern of patterns', of one coherent 'pattern', as constituting the course of nature, far as we may be from being able to formulate the scheme of this pattern" (218-219). How is this thorough-going teleology to be reconciled with the real individuality and freedom of finite human minds? Is it not as fatal to their (relative) independence as any naturalistic doctrine of mechanism? The third and final step, to the goodness of the transcendent spirit, is mediated by the Moral Argument (Lecture VII.). Prof. Hicks' views on the Moral Ideal as timelessly subsistent have been already referred to; we need only note how here, as in the earlier critique of Positivism (78 ff.), the unconditionality of the moral imperative is thrown into strong relief. The Lecture closes with an eloquent vindication of the disinterestedness of the great exponents of 'dynamic' morality, illustrated by quotation from Fichte's *Characteristics of the Present Age*.

In the concluding Lecture (VIII.) entitled 'Pantheism and Theism', Prof. Hicks presses home the doctrine of God's transcendence in opposition to immanentist philosophies, such as those of Spinoza or Hegel. It is arguable, of course, that neither of these philosophies excludes transcendence; in particular, that Spinoza's Infinite Substance stands to the modal systems that flow from it timelessly rather as the Neo-Platonic One stands to its emanations in the intelligible world. Unilateral causality is not alien to Spinoza's thought. The Lecture opens with an admirable discussion of the Ontological argument, as it has figured in the history of philosophy since Anselm, which leads on naturally to a criticism of the views, championed recently by Prof. Taylor, that in God the distinction of essence and existence is transcended, and that eternity is the form of the divine life. That God is "the supreme value" may, indeed, be questioned; but if we avoid the ambiguous term 'value', to assert that He is (not good, but) goodness is of course the historic teaching of Christian theology. But—and this is the main interest of the Lecture—Prof. Hicks will not allow that God (or any existent) transcends time. Only subsistent entities are timeless, and as such do not exist. The divine mind knows, and knows perfectly, the eternal verities, but the knowing of them is, like human knowing, a temporal act. Prof. Hicks finds it unintelligible to say, as we needs must if God be identical with His goodness, that He is identical also with His knowledge and His love. "That would mean that God's love and knowledge . . . are one and the same" (258). A God, so conceived, would be no longer, so Prof. Hicks assures us, "a living self-conscious mind" (259). He is prepared

to ascribe to God "activity", for activity implies time. Is he also prepared to say that God is subject to change, alike in His nature and in His volitions? This seems the logical issue, and we are driven towards a conception of God on lines not dissimilar to those sketched, *e.g.* by Prof. Alexander. God, like the human mind, will be a product of historical evolution. And if so, why should He not in course of time, better Himself to a degree that would make His final consummation (if there be any finality) as inconceivable by us as was ever the case with the most extravagant negative assertions of the mystics? And how could a temporal God know perfectly? These and other difficulties will rise readily to the reader's mind, as he studies these interesting and provocative pages. That Prof. Hicks should have treated of these high themes with so much learning, acumen and independence of thought is not the least of the many services which, in the course of a long life, he has rendered to the Hibbert Trust.

The *format* of the book is excellent. We noted only two slight misprints: on page 100 *note*, for *Selbstbewusstsein* read *Selbstbewusstsein*, and on page 148, last two lines, delete the brackets.

W. G. DE BURGH.

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*Visual Perception.* By M. D. VERNON, M.A., Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1937. Pp. xii and 248. 15s.

MISS VERNON presents us in this book with an account of the investigations carried out by contemporary psychologists into the phenomena of visual perception. The report which she has to offer is full and thorough. She does not claim too much for the inquiries under consideration and her caution in this respect is very welcome. The book shows the limitations of modern psychology as well as its achievements. But it does full justice to the latter, and one feels after reading it that the work done by psychologists upon vision to-day is of real importance.

In her introduction Miss Vernon explains that she proposes to confine herself to *visual* perception. She divides the inquiry into four parts: first, the examination of the perceptual process itself; secondly, the study of those subjective and individual characteristics which influence the perceptual content; thirdly, the study of the objective structure of the perceptual field; and fourthly, the examination of the development of perceptual content in children and of typical differences in individual observers.

The author is unfortunate in one respect, that she has to begin with a discussion of that part of the subject-matter in which least work has been done, namely, the consideration of the nature of the perceptual process. She herself confesses that experimental work in this connection has been slight, and that far greater work has been done on the side of the perceptual content. She does not say

so much, but one suspects that there are some doubts as to whether the experimental method of empirical psychology can ever be so fruitful in this first field as it clearly is in the others.

Miss Vernon does not attempt to define the perceptual process, but begins with some rather large assumptions. She assumes the following account of the origin of perception: "This process undoubtedly originates in the excitation of the sense organs by some part of the external environment; the excitation is conveyed by the sensory nerves to the central nervous system, where occurs a process of mental elaboration, from which issues the percept as we know it" (p. 4). From the point of view of exact thought one ought no doubt to inquire here into the nature of this "external environment". Is it, for example, a physical, material world, independent of the perceiver? In the second place, it would also be useful to know whether the nature of the process of "conveying" is clear to the physiologist. Is it possible to-day to be given some authoritative statement as to the nature of the process? And, thirdly, are we to assume that the "mental elaboration" occurs in the nervous system? If so, does this make the central nervous system itself mental? Miss Vernon does not discuss these matters. She tells us that she is prepared to admit the assumptions "for experimental purposes". She also informs us that she does not propose to deal with the detailed consideration of "sensation", which she defines as "the aspects of the percept which are more immediately determined by the intensity, duration, extensity and wave-length of stimulation and the retinal area stimulated" (p. 5). Thus, for instance, we do not find in this book any report of the work done and the theories put forward as to the nature of colour. Having thus confined herself to a limited number of aspects of the problem of visual perception, Miss Vernon concludes her introduction with a first rough analysis of the complete perceptual process, in which she finds a constructive, an assimilative and a responsive element.

In the actual discussion of the work done upon the perceptual process itself, Miss Vernon points out the difficulties inherent in any such work, and is most conservative in her promises, but she does claim that certain experiments point strongly to the presence of stages in the perceptual process. Various psychologists have shown through their experiments that perceptual process begins with vague awareness, proceeds to "the awareness that the visual stimulation is connected with some kind of object with an existence in the visual field" (p. 9), passes to the recognition of specific details and a specific object, then on to the understanding of the meaning of the object, and, finally, to the naming of it. But Miss Vernon will not say that this analysis is definitive. In addition to the above elements there may also be certain secondary phenomena, particularly imaginal, but these are not, as some psychologists have maintained, necessary. Miss Vernon concludes this section with a chapter on the perception of words and on the contribution which

the psychologist has to make to the problem of meaning. She believes that at present this contribution is very limited, and feels that before it can be of any value psychologists must make clear to themselves the way in which they use the term *meaning*. She gives us an interesting account of the work which has been done on "imageless thought" and of the conflict between psychologists as to whether such imageless thinking is really possible.

In the second part of the book Miss Vernon turns to consider the content of perception. She deals first with those subjective attitudes which affect perceptual content. In the first place there are temperamental differences; for instance, some observers appear to be synthetic or integrative as opposed to analytic, and this fact influences them in their perception. They are passive, seeing things as a whole, whereas the analytic type is active, analysing what is seen. Then there exist other types, the confident and the cautious, the critical or evaluative, and so on, but these types, Miss Vernon thinks, should not be too rigidly separated. Moreover, training and the proper direction of attention can, for instance, turn the passive type into the active. But there is no denying the influence of such individual tendencies as these on the whole perceptual experience.

With regard to attention, some very interesting experiments in the measurement of the time which one takes to attend to an object are cited. An explanation is also given of the useful term, *set*, in modern psychology. An observer in an experiment is said to be *set* towards an aspect of a situation if he is directed to it by the instructions which he has received. (The problem or task to be solved in the experiment is termed the *Aufgabe*.) And the important point is, as many experiments go to prove, that what the observer sees changes in accordance with the preparations made beforehand as to *set*. This pre-perception determines to some extent the nature of the percept itself. In the laboratory *set* can be produced experimentally, but in daily life familiarity is itself a kind of *set*.

Miss Vernon next turns to the study of the objective structure in perception. In the first place variations in the sensory stimulus obviously condition the percept. But the central teaching of modern psychology is that the perceptual content is never explicable in terms of variations in the sensory stimulus alone. As we have already seen, innate and temperamental tendencies in each individual determine the content to some extent. But now the author considers a still more important determination, namely, "the mysterious organisation known as 'form', 'structure' or 'configuration' which is the essential objective determinant of most percepts" (p. 56), in other words, the organisation which the Gestalt or configurational school has emphasised. Thus what we see is determined by determinations other than the stimulus entering from outside, and Miss Vernon thinks it correct to conclude (though I am not sure that this does follow) "that the phenomenal percept is never an accurate

photographic reproduction of the external stimulus field" (p. 54). Modern psychology, it appears, wholly rejects the earlier representationalist theories.

Six chapters of the book in all are devoted to the examination of configuration. The author is convinced that it exists, and that its existence is of fundamental importance in the perceptual process as a whole. Indeed this is one of the main theses of her book. Many instances are given showing how the mind rejects the asymmetrical in favour of the symmetrical, and how we constantly strive for the formed group. At the same time, Miss Vernon cites other experiments which compel one to modify the more extreme Gestalt theories.

Questions arising in connection with the perception of space are first considered. Miss Vernon avoids the issue as to whether our knowledge of space is innate or acquired. She prefers to consider the subjective and objective conditions of the perception of space. She makes clear the present position with regard to the theory of localisation, both in connection with two-dimensional and three-dimensional estimation of locality. The point she wishes to emphasise is that we judge distance, not so much in the light of any one particular datum, but with the aid of many data, and—more important still—with the aid of these data as forming various structures. She concludes this chapter with the admission that the evidence of experimental psychology is sufficient to show that in our perception of spatial relations "a certain innate power of creating structures" is present. Nevertheless, in connection with several problems arising out of the consideration of spatial perception, contemporary psychology has still nothing to say.

Next a chapter is devoted to configurational organisation, and here the Gestalt theorists, Köhler, Koffka and Wertheimer, are followed closely. The former has remarked that "organisation is the characteristic achievement of the nervous system", and Miss Vernon illustrates this thesis. An important distinction here is that of figure and ground. Figure is that which emerges from ground, and Miss Vernon suggests that we can define perception in terms of this emergence. "Perception", she says, "consists essentially in the emergence of the 'figure' from the 'ground'" (p. 91). Figure has form, is definite and determined: the ground has no form, is indefinite and indetermined. The figure is said to have "thing character". An account is given of Wever's experiments with the tachistoscope on the emergence of the figure. (Miss Vernon adds an appendix to the book explaining the different types of this useful instrument.) In a further chapter the properties of configurations and particularly of a 'good' configuration are dealt with. Wertheimer's famous Law of Prägnanz is discussed, according to which all configurations tend to become as 'good' and stable as possible. The criteria of 'goodness' in this case are simplicity, symmetry, regularity, unification, continuity, inclusiveness and good articulation, and Miss Vernon examines these criteria in turn. She shows the

importance of continuity and consistency of configuration in our perceptual experience.

Turning to the consideration of the ground and its function, Miss Vernon points out that in perceptual experience ground plays an important part. We are influenced by the ground as a "level" from which the figure arises and what we see as figure varies with the nature of this "level". Particularly is this so in the perception of colours, but it is equally true in one's spatial perceptions. It is in terms of this phenomenon that psychologists attempt to explain such illusions as that of the moon on the horizon. The evidence seems to point to "the existence of well-established and long-existent frameworks and 'levels', strongly resistant to change. These 'levels' are in the nature of cognitive schemata" (p. 147).

Much good work has been done recently on what is known as the Phi phenomenon, and a chapter is here devoted to its consideration. In this case the configuration is both spatial and temporal. It is described by Miss Vernon in these terms: "If two similar objects are exposed successively in different spatial positions, given favourable conditions the observer may perceive the Phi phenomenon, a single object apparently moving from the position of the first object to the position of the second" (p. 157). Efforts have been made to determine the optimal condition for the occurrence of this phenomenon, and quite lately psychologists have tried to put forward theories which shall explain at one and the same time both the occurrence of perception of such apparent movement and that of real movement. Up to the present, however, the results are not conclusive. A discussion is also found in these pages of fusion, and the whole matter is summed up in these words: "We may conclude that, although there seem to be no fundamental inconsistencies between the laws governing the phenomena of real and apparent movement and fusion, our knowledge is at present insufficient to trace out these laws and their variations in full detail" (p. 177).

In the fourth section of her book Miss Vernon turns to the study of the development of perception in children. Here, speaking generally, configurational tendencies are found to be more important than in adult life, and to operate more strongly. This is shown by numerous experiments, proving the extent to which children rely upon structure and form. Miss Vernon thinks that there are three factors which count in child perception: (1) biological utility, (2) interest and affective value, (3) simple structural and configurational principles. At the same time the configurational side should not be overstressed, and in certain fields—for example, in respect to spatial orientation—the child mind seems to be less influenced by structure than the adult, and is to that measure freed from some of the illusions consequent upon the structural organisation of the adult mind.

Finally, as to perceptual types Miss Vernon is again cautious. She gives an account of divisions into subjective-objective, synthetic-

analytic and integrate-disintegrate; but she warns the reader that such a hard-and-fast classification of human beings into types is more misleading than true, and that it would perhaps be better to speak of "typical ways of reacting to certain experimental situations" (p. 190) rather than of types of human beings. She further discusses imaginal and synaesthetic types. The discussion of synaesthesia is very interesting. In certain persons the imagery of different modes of sensation is associated, so that a stimulus in one mode seems to call up imagery in another. It may even be the case that the first sensory stimulus incites a second sensory (and not imaginal) process. For instance, P. V. Schiller has found that a perceived flickering flickered more wildly if a loud, dissonant noise was sounded near the observer. The most common type of synaesthesia is the 'coloured hearing' type, and laboratory experiments here have yielded excellent results; but Miss Vernon concludes that at present the evidence is "bewildering in its variety".

Before turning to Miss Vernon's important concluding chapter there are in this account of contemporary psychology very many points of interest which should be noted. This last question of synaesthesia, for instance, is both interesting in itself and also valuable in the light which it throws on the nature of sensation. The suggestion made by certain psychologists to-day that synaesthesia can only be explained by supposing a "general sense" from which the other senses were developed is surely not wholly foolish. There is some evidence also, for instance, from the examination of perceptions in children, that this primitive sensing is, to say the least, quite as much affective as cognitive. This is certainly a line of inquiry which would repay further psychological investigation. Again, the experiments on the Phi phenomenon are important not only as throwing light upon our observation of apparent movement, for instance, when watching a cinema show, but also, possibly, upon the perception of real movement. Can the perception of real movement itself be analysed with the help of such understanding as can be gained from the consideration of the Phi phenomenon? And if this be possible at all, one wonders whether Miss Vernon's remark may not be premature, namely, that "the experience of seen movement is a unique type of percept, not reducible to any simpler type of experience"? (p. 157). But perhaps the most important point which emerges is the uneasiness among psychologists as to the configurational account of perception. Miss Vernon, for instance, makes it clear that the Gestalt school, while it succeeds in explaining a great deal, fails to explain certain further phenomena which equally need explanation. In this connection the criticism of Gestalt, and particularly of the Law of Prägnanz, implicit in certain experiments carried out by Thouless is very relevant. These show that that law does not explain how, for instance, an elliptical shape shown in perspective in such a way that the retinal image is circular is yet not seen to be circular, although this would be simple



enough as structure, but is perceived as elliptical. Thouless wishes to explain this fact as an instance of a "phenomenal regression to the real object". One certainly feels after reading a book like Miss Vernon's that contemporary psychology has yet to make clear the relation between our perception of form and our perception of *thing*. Configuration needs to be further explained.

Miss Vernon's concluding chapter, short as it is, requires special notice. In a few words she sums up the significance of the work upon visual perception carried out by psychologists during this century. Perceptual content is not a number of discrete elements; it is a whole bound together by a close structural co-ordination. Perception, she thinks, is "an intricate process of structural differentiation from among innumerable excitations presented by the physical environment" (p. 214). Beginning with a vague awareness, we perceive a definite pattern "which owes its form to :

"(1) a general shaping in accordance with the configurational tendencies which appear in all individuals at all times ;

"(2) the peculiar channels laid down for it through the previous development of similar percepts in past experience, which have themselves been directed by the particular innate affective and impulsive tendencies of the individual ;

"(3) the more or less random influence of the mood, attitude, mental and physiological efficiency, etc., of the moment ;

"(4) in experimental situations, the particular and narrowly defined course laid down by the experimental conditions and instructions" (p. 214).

Finally, in the last two paragraphs of the book Miss Vernon points out that what she has said is sufficient to refute the naïve view of perception, namely, that "percepts are completely determined by the external stimulus conditions, and are referable in their entirety to some real object or system of objects which exists outside himself" [the perceiver] (pp. 215-216). While this conclusion must readily be granted, it is well to bear in mind that the further conclusion which some might be inclined to draw from this cannot be drawn, namely, that what we perceive is merely phenomenal and not real. I cannot see that anything which Miss Vernon says in this book proves this further point.

It is unnecessary to add that Miss Vernon's book is of very great value, particularly to those of us who find it impossible to keep in close touch with all the work done in contemporary psychology. This is the sort of psychology, it seems to me, which is bound to be very helpful. But I cannot help wondering also whether this patient study of *what* we perceive is rightly termed psychology. Or rather, perhaps, I ought to put my question in this way : If this is taken to be the rightful province of psychology, then what theory of mind does it imply ? To ask that question, however, is in no way to deny the value of the inquiry.

R. I. AARON.

*Seele und Staat: Die psychologischen Grundlagen des National-sozialistischen Siegs ueber den Buergerlichen und Bolschewistischen Menschen.* Von Dr. HANS ALFRED GRUNSKY. Berlin: Junker und Duennhaupt Verlag, 1935. Pp. 123.

THIS little book—hardly more than a large pamphlet—deserves the attention of all who desire to understand the self-interpretation of National-Socialism. Its author, its manner of publication, its contents are all illuminatingly typical of N.-S. mentality. But, apart from this, the book possesses a challenging originality in the way in which the Platonic doctrine of the "analogy" of soul and state is here applied to fit the N.-S. *Weltanschauung*. Indeed, the author claims to have laid here the foundations of a "new psychology"—the "national-socialist psychology of the future"—a psychology which will owe its "Copernican revolution" precisely to the experience of participation in the N.-S. *Bewegung* (p. 112).

The author, a member of the *Partei* of several years' standing, is now Professor of Philosophy at the University of Muenchen. It is typical of N.-S. control of German Universities that his appointment to the vacant chair was authoritatively communicated to the Rector of the University only a few days before the re-opening of the semester. He was not the University's choice; indeed, his very name was quite unknown to most of his future colleagues, as he had published, beside this present book, only a Ph.D. thesis on Hegel which had attracted as little attention in the academic world as young men's theses generally do. It is only fair to Dr. Grunsky to add that he is well trained and has an able and vigorous mind. But he owed his promotion, not to having made a name for himself in the academic world, but to his being one of the few trusty party men who are qualified, by conviction and training, to support Alfred Rosenberg's efforts to work out a systematic philosophy for National-Socialism.

It is typical, again, that his book is published under the *imprimatur* of the *Partei*. It bears the authorisation: "Against the publication of this book no objections are raised by the NSDAP", signed by the Chairman of the Party's Committee of Censorship for the protection of N.-S. literature. Thus, without actually expressing official Party doctrine, it is guaranteed to contain nothing that is in conflict with the principles of the Party or that it would do a good National-Socialist harm to read. The parallel to the *Nihil obstat* of Roman Catholic censorship is obvious.

The theory expounded in the book must be understood in relation to the experience which underlies it and which it seeks to interpret. This experience we should, in another context, not hesitate to call a religious conversion—produced in the author, as in most enthusiastic followers of the *Partei*, at once by the personal spell of Hitler and by the appeal of the values and ideals which are, as it were, the substance of Hitler's gospel. There is the threefold pull, at once, of a leader or prophet, a cause or doctrine, and a community (the *Partei*)


united in loyalty to the leader and exalted by its sense of a fateful mission, viz., to regenerate, as by a leaven working within it, the larger community of the German people, and lead it to renewed moral and spiritual health. As a "national" religion, limiting its appeal to the German people, or the "nordic" race, it may, from the point of view of Christianity or any other "universalistic" religion, be considered a false or spurious religion. But, this does not alter the fact that it does, for its adherents, the work of a religion. It is to them supremely satisfying. It heals torn souls. It provides them with an object of devotion through the service of which their little lives gain historic meaning and supra-individual value. If that service means a life of struggle, physical and spiritual, all the better: it then evokes the qualities of manliness, courage, heroism, the will to victory. If that service means fighting alongside of trusted comrades, it evokes loyalty, team-spirit, self-sacrifice, obedience to a leader. If that fight means that there are deadly enemies of the truth, powers of darkness that would destroy the children of light, then it becomes a chapter in the cosmic struggle between good and evil, in which the flame of love burns all the more fiercely for being fed by hate. It is a religion which shares, in fact, many of the marks of Old Testament religion, with the substitution of the Germans, or the Aryan race, for the Jews as the "chosen" people.

The soil for this religious conversion was prepared by defeat in the Great War; by the "war after the war"; by the class-war between rich and poor Germans; by the manifold other forms of *malaise* from which the modern world suffers and which cause deep divisions and conflicts in individual minds. Hence, the craving for salvation, at least in the sense of the Platonic concept of "Justice" as "peace and order within the soul", answering to peace and order in the community. Souls at one with themselves, a people once more at one with itself, every individual feeling at one with his community—these are the fruits of the salvation which the N.-S. religion claims to offer to the faithful. Hence, the emphasis throughout this book on *Glaube* and *Wille*: faith that lifts above hesitation and doubt; faith that has the courage to venture and take decisions; faith that inspires the will to action; in short, faith that breeds fanatics. The N.-S. Party is busy remoulding the whole life of the German people by the energy of such a faith. It is busy inculcating this faith through education and propaganda, with the professed aim of restoring to the German people its essential Germanity (its *Deutschtum* or *deutsche Seele*), by the cultivation, and, if necessary, the revival, of all that is traditionally German, and by the extrusion of all that is alien and foreign. The thinkers of the Party are busy supplying it with the doctrinal substructure for its practical work of German-soul-saving. To this doctrinal effort Dr. Grunsky's book is meant to be a contribution.

The author's self-chosen parallel with Plato is no mere literary whim. Plato, too, was a citizen of a state broken by war. Plato, too, had seen democracy tried and found wanting. Plato, too, saw

himself in a world delivered over to moral and intellectual degeneration. Plato, too, tried to recall his fellow-citizens to moral health—health of well-ordered souls in a well-ordered state. Only, where Plato's ideal state remained a "pattern laid up in heaven", the N.-S. state is an uncomfortably alive reality here on earth, and the N.-S. soul is, at least for Germans or Nordics, the only healthy type of soul, as compared with the diseased souls of the "liberalistic", "democratic", "bourgeois" (*buergerlich*) types, not to mention the "bolshevist" soul which is the most corrupt of all.

On Plato's model, Dr. Grunsky seeks to interpret the health of the soul in terms of the internal organisation of its functionings. But, where Plato distinguishes three mental forms or functions, Dr. Grunsky has an elaborate scheme of four "poles", the relations of which to each other, with their analogues in social organisation, are best given by reproducing his own diagram:—



The only explanation that needs to be added to the diagram is that the "poles" are best understood as forms of mental energy, and that the dynamics (the *Kraeftespiel der Seele*) of one type of soul differ from those of another type by the relative emphasis, or accent (*Betonung*), of one pole against the others. All four poles are normally involved, but in patterns differing according to the prominence of the functioning of each pole. Thus, *e.g.*, the weak-willed type of mind cannot bring itself to the bold choice between either—or—,

and thus flutters hesitatingly from this to that as though it could have both—and—. On the political plane, this corresponds, for Dr. Grunsky, to the condition of the democratic type of state in which, in parliament and public opinion, there is a welter of views and parties side by side, and often no possibility of a clear-cut decision. (Cf. Sir Henry Wilson's description of the British Cabinet in the early stages of the Great War as a "Cabinet of all the indecisions".)

A more curious application of the scheme is to be found in Dr. Grunsky's comparison between the "nordic" and the "mongolian" race-soul. He quotes Laotse, and Chinese culture generally, as exhibiting a predominance of the poles of receptivity and contemplation. Hence, the Chinaman is "the eternal child"; his attitude is one of "Asiatic calm"; his ideal is "the tranquil sage", not the nordic ideal of the "fearless hero" (pp. 60, 61). The "rhythms" of the inward dynamics of both types of mind are so different that the gap between them can never be bridged. (Unfortunately, Dr. Grunsky does not give us the application of his scheme to the Japanese: judging from their behaviour, they must have nordic souls—due perhaps to an *Einschlag* of Germanic blood?)

His further thesis is that in these different rhythms we have, not merely acquired cultural differences, but innate racial differences. For the four-pole scheme works, in the concrete, subject to the conditions of *Blut* and *Geist*. "Blood" is used by the author in the peculiar sense of "determination of the individual by the community" (pp. 49 and 74), apparently because it stands fundamentally for the individual's biological heredity as a member of a certain race, and therefore causes him to be at home only in a group of others of the same sort (*gleichgeartet*) as himself. Hence, in a healthy life, *Blutwelt* and *Umwelt* must answer to each other: any environment which does not consist of others of the same blood or race being an alien or foreign environment for the individual soul. A healthy soul, therefore, seeks and loves what is, literally, "congenial" to it, and thus it is true, at once, to its own nature and to its race. To run after what is alien (*Fremdgierigkeit*) is a sure sign of degeneracy, of divorce from one's roots, of treason to oneself and to one's race. This is also why the soul of a people is truest to itself in its peasantry, where daily life keeps it close to the soil (*Heimatboden*); and it is most morbid in the internationalised, uprooted population of the big towns, and in the "intelligentsia" which has no faith, no convictions, but sips from all cultural traditions—the more exotic, the better—without making any its own. (This is, of course, characteristic N.-S. doctrine. Cf. Dean Inge's phrase about the "ruin of civilisation by the submen of the great towns and a few misguided intellectuals", in his Preface, page x, to *The Post-Victorians*.)

If "blood" is "instinct" (pole of receptivity) in the concrete, "spirit" (*Geist*) is creative thought in the concrete, and thus "determination of the community by the individual". This takes place through "ideas" which arise in creative individuals and which these individuals strive to communicate to the whole group. By "idea",

Dr. Grunsky means a dynamic ideal; an ideal which the individual conceives as true for the whole community; which, as proclaimed by him, is a picture of what the whole community is to the eye of anticipatory faith, and of what he must lead it to become in fact. Such an idea is effective only through faith and will, incorporated in a leader, and needs symbols through which it can be effectively presented to a multitude. Where blood is combined with spirit in the form of an appropriate idea, and this idea is effective at once in individual souls and in the community of which they are members, there we have the ideal condition of individual and political health. Such an "idea", union of blood and spirit, is National-Socialism.

Divorce of "blood" and "spirit", in one or other of its many forms, is Dr. Grunsky's diagnosis for the sickness of souls and states. Freud, Adler, Jung, he holds, though they correctly perceived the symptoms of mental disease, failed to discover the true cause, viz., either "blood without spirit" or else "spirit without blood". The former two were bound to fail, being Jews, for the Jews (on the authority of Hans F. K. Guenther) are racially so mixed that a unified blood-world with its appropriate "spirit" is for them constitutionally impossible. Bolshevism is the climax of diseased degeneration, being the synthesis of "blood without spirit and spirit without blood" (p. 98). It has the will to propagate an "idea", but its idea is not rooted in blood and race; hence without roots; a biological offence and monstrosity. It could establish itself in Russia, because the blood-basis of the Russian soul had already been corrupted and destroyed through and through. Elsewhere, as in Germany, enough pure and sound racial stock survived for "the sins of the spirit to be cured by the spirit", i.e., for the National-Socialist mentality to beat down and overcome the liberalistic and bolshevist types of mind.

These samples must suffice to show how a whole-hearted National-Socialist philosophises about National-Socialism. I say deliberately "samples", for the 112 pages of text, divided into 12 short chapters, are actually so packed with *motifs* from N.-S. doctrine that a full summary is quite impossible. I will merely add, for its intrinsic interest, that, in a note, Dr. Grunsky criticises Italian Fascism because it denies that culture is rooted in blood and race; because its imperialism leads it to include a racial conglomerate in the state; and because its *Duce* is not a *Fuehrer* in the true German sense.

So far as I can judge, the author's argument implies that National-Socialism is a purely German thing and can be nothing else. If he means, at the same time, to put it forward as the only healthy type of soul and state, it follows that all the rest of the world is in various degrees and forms inferior, diseased, and degenerate. In any case, being tied to German blood, National-Socialism is not for export to, or imitation by, lesser breeds. It cannot fit any other race or people.

For which relief much thanks.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

## VI.—NEW BOOKS.

*Towards a Religious Philosophy.* By W. G. DE BURGH. London: Macdonald & Evans, 1937. Pp. xix, 260. 10s. net.

It is doubtful whether a philosophical book is best reviewed by one whose close sympathy with its manner of thinking may make him less quick than another to suggest objections and difficulties in dealing with which the author might be led to strengthen his arguments and elucidate his conclusions. The present writer is, however, in this position in regard to the work before us, and the following notice will accordingly be rather an account of its contents than a criticism of the reasonings which it presents.

*Towards a Religious Philosophy* is a collection of twelve essays, several of which have already appeared in various journals, and is intended, as the preface informs us, 'not primarily for academic philosophers, but chiefly in the hope of appealing to the larger public interested in philosophy.' The 'religious philosophy' towards which Prof. de Burgh desires to lead his readers is not a 'philosophy of religion, which may or may not be the expression of religious conviction,' but an 'outlook upon the world and life, which, as philosophy, must be grounded on reason, and, as religion, must be centred in God' (p. v). Such an outlook stands in strong contrast with any abandonment of reason in favour of emotion or desire as the guide of life, while, at the same time it is not content, with the dominant tradition of Roman Catholic thought, on the one hand to claim for the *praeambula fidei*, such as the affirmation of the existence of God, a demonstrative certainty independent of any specifically religious experience, and, on the other hand, these preliminary positions once secured, to permit reason to interpret indeed, but not to call in question, the dogmatic statements which are commended to us by what has been, once for all, accepted as divine authority. Prof. de Burgh defends the claim of revelation to address itself to the rational faculties and so to have the right to be taken into account by philosophers; but he would not have reason abandon its native function of criticism in face of revelation, any more than he would allow that, apart from some measure of religious experience, and therefore of revelation, reason can establish the reality of the object of religious worship. There is, from first to last, a co-operation, or rather a mutual implication, of faith and reason. The spheres of 'natural' and 'revealed' religion are not cut off from one another as by a hatchet. Without a rudimentary sense of God reason cannot find Him out (some indeed, and those among the most worthy, seem, as Prof. de Burgh notes on page 43, and again on pages 157, 158, to be 'deity-blind'), and He never to the end deprives reason of its birthright of freedom by a revelation of Himself taking the form of sacrosanct affirmations, exempt from its critical examination.

The first essay in the book is entitled 'Logic and Faith'. In it the writer disputes the propriety of limiting the term 'reason' to processes of inference so as to deny the character of 'rationality' both to the intuition of self-evident premises and of the necessity of inferential conclusions,



and also to direct experiences—social, moral, æsthetic, religious—which lie beyond the pale of what is generally called 'logic', though not of 'reason' in the wider sense which the word has borne in the terminology of some of the greatest philosophers. In the case of religion, it is no more irrational to believe in God's existence than to believe in that of one's friends. Neither belief is the result of an inferential process. As men know other men through the experience of social intercourse, so in religious experience 'they find themselves in presence of a reality, and know it to be God in the response that it evokes' (p. 16).

The problem, raised by the claim that religious faith is rational, of the relation of religious to metaphysical knowledge is considered in the two following essays, on 'Metaphysical and Religious Knowledge' and on 'The Idea of a Religious Philosophy'. The former recognises the autonomy of both religion and philosophy, and urges that each must acknowledge the other's autonomy. In both 'reason includes faith, and the faith, though different in each, is in each rational' (p. x). 'Religion is the response to God of man's whole personality, and its knowledge is by way of personal acquaintance; it thus differs from metaphysics both in form of apprehension and in the object apprehended.'

The essay on 'The Idea of a Religious Philosophy' pursues the same subject. It insists that religion is not merely practical (as Kant and Bradley explicitly held), nor merely emotional (as our Logical Positivists affirm), but gives knowledge; and that 'revelation' and 'faith', which have been supposed to be inconsistent with philosophy, are, as a matter of fact, involved in all knowledge. The distinction between religious knowledge and philosophy would indeed, so Prof. de Burgh holds (with Dante), disappear in a knowledge which should be perfect; but this we must be content to allow that ours, in this life at any rate—in *via*, as the old phrase went—, can never be.

This acquiescence inevitably brings Prof. de Burgh up against philosophers like Spinoza and Gentile, to whose theories of immanence his fourth and fifth essays are devoted. The substance of his criticism of both is that they fail 'to account for the experienced facts of human (and other) individuality' (p. 55). I feel less sure than Prof. de Burgh appears to do that Spinoza, by his doctrine that man's love to God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself, has really cancelled, for a higher level of spiritual life, that denial of a reciprocation by God of man's love for him which won indeed the enthusiastic approval of Goethe, but has repelled many religious readers of the *Ethics*. But our author's judgment that, despite Spinoza's air of finality, his thought at his best has burst through the limitations of his system, is all the more impressive for the obvious fact that the great Jewish philosopher has exercised upon his mind a far stronger attraction that he has, for example, upon that of Prof. Taylor, who has lately been criticising his teaching from a point of view very similar to that defended by Prof. de Burgh in the work before us. With Gentile, the other representative exponent of a thorough-going doctrine of immanence with whom he deals, Prof. de Burgh is less in sympathy; and he effectively presses the question *Who*, in Gentile's system, thinks? suggesting that the Italian thinker is exposed, like the mediæval Averroists, to the *reductio ad absurdum* urged against them by St. Thomas, that, if they were right, *Socrates non intelligit*.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth essays illustrate Prof. de Burgh's conception of such a religious philosophy as he would have us attempt, by a discussion of the light it might be found to throw on the important

questions of Time, of the World-Order, and of Teleology. On the first of these it is argued that time, as we experience it, implies a non-temporal reality, and that, if the evidence of religious experience be taken into account, though not otherwise (and here our author admits that he is diverging—in the present writer's view, rightly diverging—from the main tradition of Christian thought), this non-temporal reality may be recognised as a 'personal' God, that is to say, a God with whom we may be in a personal relation. As to the world-order, Prof. de Burgh holds (like Prof. Taylor) that only if we call to our aid our religious experience can we obtain an adequate assurance that such an order exists. Nor can even religious experience (he goes on to contend) give us this assurance unless, with St. Bernard, we find in love a conception of God's nature, revealed in that experience, which can be affirmed univocally of God's love towards man and of man's love towards God. With respect to the third problem which, in Prof. de Burgh's opinion, such a religious philosophy as he has in view would serve to illuminate, that of teleology, he recognises the force of the criticism brought by Hume and Kant against the argument from design in its traditional form, but defends the principle which that argument embodies against the charge of anthropomorphism, and argues that 'purposiveness within nature implies purposiveness beyond nature, and this in turn implies an eternal purposing mind' (p. xv). (Incidentally it is remarked in a note on page 133 that Hume's *Dialogues*—which seem to be distinguished from his 'writings', but perhaps the word 'other' has dropped out of the text—'should be prescribed for study to all students of theology and to all candidates for Ordination'.)

The ninth essay deals with the relations of morality to religion. Prof. de Burgh, observing that Kant proclaimed 'once for all the independence of morality upon religion' (p. 154), finds the distinction between the two to rest on the fact that religion 'is not merely practical, but essentially a form of knowledge and that its knowledge is of God' (p. vi).

In the three concluding essays he contrasts two kinds of 'humanism'—a 'this-worldly' or 'secular' and an 'other-worldly' or 'theistic'. In the first of the three he points out the unsatisfactoriness of the formula of 'self-realisation' as a description of the chief good for man; in the second he urges that the history of modern thought shows 'secular' humanism to have failed both as a speculative theory and as a working creed, having begun in a 'restricted rationalism' which tended to limit the sphere of reason to the mathematical and physical sciences, and ended in a revolt against reason consequent on the collapse of scientific naturalism brought about by the criticism of the Newtonian physics by the exponents of the principle of relativity; a revolt which can only be met by an 'enlargement of the scope of reason to include intuition and faith' (p. xviii). An additional note illustrates the conception of another kind of humanism, not secular but theocentric, from the system of St. Thomas Aquinas. Prof. de Burgh, however, is not of those who would go 'back to Aquinas' and repudiate the central tradition of modern philosophy as an aberration—still less of those who would see in Aquinas and Kant two mighty opposites between whom the philosopher must make his choice; on the contrary, he brings out very suggestively an analogy between these two great thinkers.

The conclusion of the whole matter, as Prof. de Burgh sees it, is given in a sentence on page 222: 'Think out what it is rational to believe—and you are led to acknowledge religious revelation; think out what is revealed in religion and you find that it is the word of reason'. In the last essay,

which opens with this remark, we find a strikingly interesting, sympathetic and discriminating study of the mind of contemporary youth towards problems which are yet 'common to men in all ages, though they press on us in forms peculiar to our own time'. 'Only through faith in God and his eternal kingdom can the diversity of this-worldly and of our other-worldly experience be thought in unity, or a sure anchorage be found for individuals and for peoples amid the perplexities of a distracted world' (p. 251).

There is a misprint of *vero* for *verae* on page 298, and I may perhaps be allowed to mention that the first series of my Gifford Lectures, to which a reference is made on p. 181 n., bears the title *God and Personality*.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

*Measuring Intelligence.* By LEWIS M. TERMAN and MAUD A. MERRILL.  
London: G. G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1937. Pp. xiv + 461. 10s. 6d.

Of all the mental characteristics which the psychologist seeks to measure, 'intelligence' (as it is loosely called) is by far the most important, as it is by far the easiest, to assess. The medical officer certifying the feeble-minded, the local education authority awarding scholarships for higher education, the vocational psychologist giving advice on future occupations, the educational psychologist giving help to the dull and backward, the social psychologist investigating the causes of delinquency or crime—all require some simple and trustworthy criterion for estimating the innate abilities of individual children. And for this purpose, despite its obvious defects, the scale devised by Binet and Simon nearly thirty years ago remains the standard method. In almost every civilised country these tests have been used; and their very simplicity has often led the practical worker to forget their admitted imperfections.

Binet's own standardisation was based on very inadequate data. His age-assignments, for example, were by no means free from criticism. Some of the tests could be solved by the London child two or three years earlier than Binet had believed; and the mere process of translation often changed the difficulty of the problems. Consequently, both in this country and in America, various investigations were at once attempted in the hope of rendering the scale more accurate. Of the American revisions, that published by Prof. Terman in 1916 was by far the most thorough. It was based on a test of approximately 1000 children. The London revision, carried out independently and about much the same time, was based on 3000. And the results of the two inquiries were in fairly close agreement.

Prof. Terman's 'Stanford Revision' was an undoubted improvement on the French version; but further experience has revealed many minor defects which the author himself has been among the first to recognise. Below the age of five the tests were inadequate both in number and in nature. Above the age of eleven the tests were not only too few, but, as a rule, appreciably under-estimated the intelligence of older and brighter children. Many of the tests, too, were later shown to have but little correlation with intelligence: often they were greatly influenced by teaching or coaching; and in several instances the method of marking was so arbitrary as largely to invalidate the results.

Ten years ago Prof. Terman took up the problem afresh. With the aid of a small band of trained assistants and with the co-operation of teachers

throughout the country a new investigation was planned; and the project received generous financial support from the Social Science Research Council of Stanford University.

The new revision is the result of these joint and long-continued labours, and has been eagerly awaited by psychologists in Great Britain and elsewhere. The compilers began with a systematic survey of all the available work on intelligence testing, and have apparently endeavoured to incorporate every type of test that has been shown to have a sound theoretical and practical basis. The rejection or retention of each test has been determined by three criteria: (i) 'the validity of the test as a test of intelligence', determined ultimately 'by the correlation of each test with the composite total score'; (ii) 'the ease and the objectivity of the scoring'; (iii) 'various practical considerations, such as economy of time, interest to the child, need for variety, and the like'. The upshot is not one scale but two; and each is twice as comprehensive as its predecessor. Binet's original scale contained 54 tests: each of the new scales contains 129. The provision of an alternative form will largely evade the risks of coaching, and will make it possible to test the same groups of children a second time.

One welcome feature of the new revision is the reduction of the verbal element. The new tests for younger children consist largely of problems to be solved with the aid of beads, coloured cubes, diminutive objects, and other materials that appeal to the infant mind. Unfortunately, the special apparatus thus required is costly; and, if the tests are to be widely used in elementary schools, it is to be hoped that the price will subsequently be reduced.

As judged by the age-assignments worked out in this country, the American children on whom the first Stanford revision was standardised were a little above the English average in inborn capacity, but a little below in school attainments. For the present revision the investigators have chosen a more representative group drawn from different sections of the community: 3000 boys and girls were tested from eleven different States; and an attempt made to secure a just proportional representation of all the main social and economic classes.

The assignment of each test to a given mental age has been based on no single or simple criterion. In English revisions the principle usually followed has been to allocate a test to a given age if 50 per cent. of the children of the age below succeeded in passing it. In theory this should yield  $10\frac{1}{2}$  as the average mental age of an average group aged ten last birthday. In practice, since the percentages passing are rarely exactly 50 per cent., a good deal of balancing may be required. We are told that this was done empirically; and that six successive readjustments of the age-assignments were required before the average mental age coincided with chronological age.

The data incidentally collected by this survey must be a mine of suggestive information; and, to the theorist, the most interesting chapter in the book is that which deals with a statistical analysis of the results. A more detailed treatment, we are told, is reserved for a separate publication. The authors propose to make a number of more intensive studies on special problems: the differences between the two sexes, the influence of schooling, the influence of inheritance, and the results of a factor-analysis of the abilities involved, are all to be investigated. Meanwhile, a brief account is given of the conclusions that bear more directly on the validity of the scale. It is shown that, when measured in terms of the 'mental ratio' or 'I.Q.', the standard deviation with both scales is approximately constant from

age two to age eighteen. This justifies the use of the ratio or quotient as a measure of innate capacity. On the I.Q. scale the average standard deviation proves to be about 17 points. This is rather higher than that obtained in earlier surveys; but a better test always yields a wider scatter, and it has long been suspected that the amount of individual variability within the total population has been under-estimated. The new figure, if confirmed, will be of great practical significance. If we assume that intelligence is distributed in accordance with the normal curve, it implies that 4 per cent. of the school population would be adjudged mentally defective according to the borderline commonly accepted in this country. In my view it is doubtful whether exact normal distribution can be safely assumed: but the empirical distribution given by Terman's own charts still reveals, even in the town populations, an unexpectedly high proportion at the lower tail-end.

The greater part of the present volume gives instructions for administering the two scales and for scoring the child's performance. From the note to the English edition it would appear that, with Prof. Terman's approval, a number of verbal alterations have been made to adapt the instructions for workers in this country. Even so, however, many difficulties remain which only a systematic study by experimental methods can hope to eliminate. The most obvious defects are the Americanisms which are still left in the injunctions to be recited to the child. In the test containing the familiar story of a man who saw in a wood the body of a man 'who had been lynched', the London child may have some difficulty in guessing what is meant by 'hanging from the *limb* of a tree'. In the 'tests of comprehension' the Londoner might be tempted to interpret the phrase 'on the streets' rather differently from the American. In general, however, the wording of the old tests has been much improved; and the new tests greatly enhance the value of the scale. One or two, it is true, seem open to criticism. The eight-year-old child is asked, 'What makes a sailing boat move?' The ability to give the right answer must surely in part depend on the child's familiarity with sailing boats. The nine-year-old child is asked why the following statement is foolish: 'Bill Jones' feet are so big that he has to pull his trousers on over his head'. How many adults could give the explanation required?

Plans have already been proposed for a co-operative study of the new revision with a view to making it as valuable in Great Britain as it undoubtedly will be in America. In the past much injustice has been done by those who have assumed that a scale of tests standardised in one country could be forthwith adopted in another. The original Stanford revision was at first widely used by school medical officers without modification, despite the fact that it was far too severe for English children: with Terman's own consent an English revision was prepared, and has long been in private use at most psychological clinics. It is to be urgently hoped that a similar restandardisation will be attempted for the present scale. All who are engaged in intelligence-testing—whether teachers, doctors, or psychologists—will feel an immense debt of gratitude to Prof. Terman and his colleagues for their long and arduous research, and will be eager to congratulate them on the success with which they have managed to combine the requirements of a serviceable scale with the demands of scientific precision.

CYRIL BURT.

*Hume's Theory of Knowledge: A Critical Examination.* By CONSTANCE MAUND. London: Macmillan & Co., 1937. Pp. xxi + 310. 12s. 6d.

COMMENTATORS and critics have presented Hume's philosophy in various guises. He is called, and he called himself, a sceptic. He is called a phenomenalist, an empiricist *à outrance*. He is sometimes regarded as a penitent rationalist, in spite of all. Mrs. Maund regards him as an epistemologist, and a pioneer in that branch of philosophy in a sense in which not even Locke was a pioneer. Some of this epistemology, she admits, is imputed rather than discoverable. "I shall try to avoid [certain] difficulties", she says, "by taking Hume's epistemology to be not simply what he states it to be, but the theory implied by his procedure in relation to this statement. Thus, despite the fact that his statement is inadequate, I hope to show that some of his arguments do provide a contribution to that distinct branch of inquiry which is concerned with the investigation of the different mental processes in relation to their objects and with the nature, and perhaps also the validity, of these different objects."

These remarks give a fair statement of Mrs. Maund's programme, and her book has the merits of careful analysis in a very high degree. She has also the necessary equipment, including a sound and ample textual acquaintance with the *Treatise* and *Enquiry*. A question may, however, be made whether Mrs. Maund's programme is not anachronistic and in ways misleading. Should there not be *some* difference in the methods appropriate to the cross-examination of a contemporary and those appropriate to a cross-examination after a couple of centuries? Are there not *some* disadvantages in asking a defunct philosopher to answer other people's questions when he himself was trying to answer his own?

What Mrs. Maund means by an epistemological question is very well conveyed by her term "accusative"—the "accusatives" of perceiving, conceiving, believing, and the like. She admits, quite frankly, however, (p. 282) that Hume "had no clear conception of an accusative". Therefore he had no clear idea of epistemology in Mrs. Maund's sense. Therefore his "epistemology" was largely unwitting, although he may have had a vivid and almost prophetic interest in the sort of question that Mrs. Maund persists in putting to him. Mrs. Maund's way of gathering honey may be very good. It is one of the uses to which the history of philosophy may be put; but it is scarcely an account and scarcely a criticism of Hume's "theory of knowledge" (unless "theory of knowledge" = epistemology = what Mrs. Maund understands by that term). Hume himself wanted a theory of knowledge that would give him entrance into the citadel of human nature and so enable him at his leisure to develop all the human sciences. (Maundian) epistemology *per se* could not do the business, however great Hume's predilection for that sort of discussion.

Mrs. Maund has pursued her inquiries with so much zeal and patience that all students and lovers of Hume (among whom I should like to reckon myself still) are very much in her debt. These inquiries are often very detailed, and therefore I am sorry to argue generally about her book. They also, through a proper determination to stick to her method, treat slightly (or at least briefly) what Hume discusses at length, *e.g.* causality and self-hood. (On the other hand, her method permits her to be expansive about Hume's scepticism, with great advantage to the volume.) I cannot help thinking, however, that the boundaries between criticism and exposition tend to be confused in her discussion, and that she sometimes denies what is quite obviously true.

Consider, for instance, her discussion of concept accusatives. Here she has to face Hume's denial of abstract ideas (in various senses) and his attempt to undermine the so-called *distinctio rationis* between, e.g., colour and shape. Her argument in general is that since it is perfectly clear that a concept-accusative is not a perception-accusative (in Hume's sense of "perception") and since Hume, *ambulando*, makes various statements that would be unintelligible if a concept-accusative were a perception-accusative, therefore he must be held to have maintained that there are concepts that are neither impressions nor ideas. But surely he tried his hardest to dispense with them, and, in his most explicit argument—the note on pp. 96-97 of Selby-Bigge's edition of the *Treatise*—the last sentence plainly interprets a concept as an idea that may acquire an almost impressionistic vivacity. A Maundian concept-accusative could not conceivably masquerade as an impression.

Take, again, belief. It may be clear in itself that belief attaches to propositions, and Hume's argument may require proposition-accusatives when he refers to future or to "external" existence. What he usually maintains, however, is that belief applies to impressions and ideas, and is a certain indefinable "manner" of accepting (a) impressions of the senses and memory, (b) any ideas causally associated therewith. There is no idea or impression of reality or existence. There is just a real-feeling "perception". Whatever the defect of Hume's analysis may be, that does appear to be his view about the "judgments" that "people the world".

So much for confusion of boundaries; now for denying what is patently true. I shall remark upon a pair of statements, both of importance, and each, as it seems to me, quite indefensible.

On page 165 we read:—"It would be the greatest mistake to suppose that Hume wanted to deny the existence of any accusative which either philosophers or plain men suppose themselves to experience. In Hume's investigation there is no place as to whether there is or is not a certain accusative. If there is anything about which any question can be asked, then *ipso facto* there is that accusative." The reference here is to "abstract or general ideas", but the statement does not stand alone, and it is plainly inaccurate. Consider for instance what Hume says about the Self. "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment conscious of what we call our Self. . . . Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explained. For from what impression could this idea be derived? . . . It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression . . . and consequently there is no such idea." It is true that Hume goes on to explain the "feigned" identity of personality, and finds something in experience to suggest that fiction; but he never maintained that what philosophers or plain men supposed was in consequence necessarily a "real idea", and he never denied that questions could be raised about unintelligible chimaeras like the "substance" of metaphysicians. There were plenty of words about which people disputed when there was no genuine "accusative" in the case.

In the above quotation the question "From what impression could this idea be derived?" is plainly vital. That question is what Reid called Hume's "articles of inquisition", and the question is equally prominent (as Mrs. Maund herself admits) in Hume's attempt to discover a basis for the idea of necessary causal connection. Yet Mrs. Maund says (p. 210)



that the "principle of the Inquisition was Reid's invention and has no application at all in Hume's philosophy".

I may perhaps be expected to say something on a point regarding which Mrs. Maund criticises Stout and myself, *viz.*, the irrelevance of our view that for Hume ideas had frequently to be "ideas of" or representatives known to be such. According to Mrs. Maund, Hume simply meant to assert the neutral proposition that ideas *de facto* were derived from and similar to impressions. I am anxious to confess my faults, but I find Mrs. Maund's statements unconvincing, although I find what she says about the reference in memory (p. 162) very acute. I cannot see, for instance, how she could explain a passage she herself quotes on page 115: "As every idea is derived from a preceding perception, 'tis impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other". Again in the *Enquiry* (which Mrs. Maund regards as more authoritative and more clearly headedly "epistemological" than the *Treatise*) we read at the very opening of the serious discussion in Section II, that "impression" means "all our more lively perceptions" and that "ideas" are "the less lively perceptions of which we are conscious *when we reflect* [my italics] on any of those sensations or movements [*i.e.* impressions] above mentioned". Again, in the next paragraph but one we read, "When we think of a golden mountain we only join two consistent ideas, *gold* and *mountain*, with which we were formerly acquainted".

I hope, however, that I have made it plain that I consider Mrs. Maund's book a very valuable contribution to the growing bulk of recent discussions upon Hume.

JOHN LAIRD.

*John Locke.* By R. I. AARON. Oxford: University Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 328. 12s. 6d.

It is odd that this latest volume of the *Leaders of Philosophy* series is the first comprehensive work in English on Locke since Fraser's small book of 1890. Except when we have wanted help on the *Essay* alone, for which Gibson's fine study (1917) has been invaluable, we have had to be content with Fraser, Fowler's volume in the *English Men of Letters* series (1880), and the biographies by Lord King (1829) and Fox Bourne (1876). If in consequence we have read Locke's own writings more than writings on them, the exiguity of the latter has been an advantage. The most English of English philosophers has certainly not been written about excessively in his own country, even when we include in the account books and articles on particular topics. Even the tercentenary of Locke's birth evoked here only four printed lectures—one given by Gibson before the British Academy, Prof. Kemp Smith's "Adamson Lecture", and the two delivered by Prof. Stocks and Mr. Ryle at the commemorative meeting in Oxford. Prof. Aaron's book, long awaited, is therefore all the more welcome. For it and his recent discovery and publication of the first draft of the *Essay*, every student of Locke will be grateful. My only regret is that the limits imposed by the need of uniformity in volumes in a series have prevented him from expressing more fully his long study of such papers in the Lovelace Collection as have not been utilised by anyone before him: his use of the unpublished material has had to be severely restrained. On page 54 he mentions that among the Lovelace papers

there is a list of the books in Locke's library at the time of his death. Would it not be worth while to have this printed?

The book opens with a clear and well-pruned sketch of Locke's life, followed immediately by an account, critical as well as expository, of the *Essay*, occupying nearly two-thirds of the book. Then come three chapters on Locke's views on morals, politics, education and religion, and an all too brief "Conclusion". The length having been externally dictated, any consideration of Locke's opinions on economic matters has had to be omitted. A selective but sufficient bibliography has been appended, and there are indexes of subjects and names. Throughout the matter has been ordered and expounded with a quiet and easy competence and with a singularly clear style which avoids both rhetoric and the new jargon of aggressive precision. The author has been content to give us what is now none too common, a perfectly workmanlike piece of writing, wholly determined by the desire to present not himself but his subject and cleared of the scaffolding of research. The costly trifles he must have acquired in his long hunting have been firmly kept in his drawer. The book, besides its usefulness to those of us who want to know not simply what to teach but also how to teach it, should be ideal for Honours students and for the general reader intelligently interested in the history of philosophy.

A long note on "How the *Essay* was written" (pp. 54-59) effects a natural transition from the biographical to the philosophical part. On the growth of Locke's views we now have much information at hand—the earliest draft of the *Essay*, together with relevant extracts from the journals, published last year by Prof. Aaron himself in collaboration with Mr. Gibb; the second draft, published by Rand in 1931; Locke's own epitome, published in translation in 1688 in Le Clerc's *Bibliothèque Universelle* and, from Locke's English manuscript, in Lord King's *Life and Letters of Locke*; and the changes in the several editions of the *Essay* itself, noted in Fraser's recension of the text. Through all these and through the manuscript sources Prof. Aaron threads his way with ease, and shows that some of Locke's obscurities and inconsistencies become at any rate understandable when they are approached genetically. Locke's very scanty treatment of ideas of reflection, for example, is partly explained when we learn that the subject was an afterthought, having no place in either of the two drafts (p. 120); and his difficulty in bringing ideas into their rightful classes is illustrated (p. 102) from the change made in the fourth edition, where relations and universals are for the first time regarded as distinct classes instead of as species of complex ideas. The distinction of all ideas into simple and complex revealed its own inadequacy.

On the question what the chief influences were on Locke, the author stresses most Boyle and Gassendi. That, on the side of science, we must adduce Boyle instead of Newton, would be approved by anyone familiar with the biographical facts. Whether the emphasis on Gassendi is right or not I cannot claim competence to pronounce, since my first-hand knowledge of him is confined to his objections to Descartes' *Meditations*, objections which suggest to me that he was a better philosopher than Descartes, and might with advantage to ourselves be given a bigger place in our curricula than his much overrated fellow-countryman. Descartes' relation to Locke, says Prof. Aaron, was "primarily that of liberator rather than teacher. . . . When, as the result of his Oxford training, he had lost faith in philosophy, his reading of Descartes restored it" (p. 9). It is certainly refreshing to be told to look outside England for the source, or at least the armoury, of Locke's empiricism, to be asked to see Locke, as

Leibniz saw him (Aaron quotes aptly on p. 34 from the *Nouveaux Essais*), as a member of the small Gassendist opposition to Cartesianism. I hope the injunction will be examined, and that the examination will recover Gassendi from neglect and draw attention to G. S. Brett's solitary and forgotten, indeed scarcely ever noticed, *Philosophy of Gassendi* (1908). In his emphasis on Gassendi, Prof. Aaron is wishing to underline Locke's empiricism, which recent emphasis on the rationalistic strain has tended to depreciate. While admitting the rationalism of Book IV (knowledge as intuition and demonstration), he refuses to let us forget that the whole point of Book II is to exhibit the empirical origin of all our ideas, and he rightly refers some of the exegetical problems of this book to Locke's occasional straying from his main purpose into side-issues. Indeed, he declares (p. 104) that Locke's empiricism is deeper than, and independent of, the representationism, and in this I am sure he is right; and right also in saying that nevertheless Locke was not a nominalist—though I doubt if there ever was a nominalist in the sense in which this term is usually understood. It was, of course, Locke's empiricist zeal that led to the tedious chapters on innate ideas. On these chapters Prof. Aaron is commendably blunt: "Book I is badly written. . . . One or two brief paragraphs would have sufficed" (pp. 82 f.).

The ambiguities and shortcomings of Locke's representationism are well brought out. Ideas of reflection, for instance, seem to be conceived realistically; and the final assertion of the reality of physical qualities at the time when they are being perceived implies (since it is never argumentatively justified) a dropping of the representative view even of *sensa*. One must admit Prof. Aaron's criticism that Locke leaves us puzzled about what is usually called the metaphysical status of *sensa*, though I know no writer who does not. Mathematical ideas are exempted from any representative office, but are not treated under the heading of universals. The author's discovery of three theories of the nature of universals in the *Essay* (pp. 195-200) constitutes a very interesting criticism of Locke's weakness at a vital point of his philosophy, and leads one to speculate what would have happened if Locke had inquired into the empirical origin of the idea of logical necessity. A clearer view of the nature of universals would probably have enabled him to obviate Prof. Aaron's censure of his feeble account of numbers (p. 160)—except the censure that the series of whole numbers begins "not with 1 but with 0", for from zero alone, without an operational rule which includes the material idea of a unit, I do not see how anything at all can be got.

It will be clear that Prof. Aaron is not blind to the weaknesses of the thinker whom he has studied so closely. He never writes as a supporter or apologist. But he concludes that Locke, with all the uncleanness, inconsistency and incompleteness that twenty years of work on the *Essay* still left, remains the great figure we always thought him to be; for, besides his positive contributions on special points, he has the general merit that, more than anyone else in this country, he started that deep questioning of tacit assumptions with which philosophy renews itself after a period of decadence. "In this connection", Prof. Aaron adds with perfect truth "much of the credit which has gone to Hume really belongs to Locke" (p. 307).

T. E. JESSOP.

*Sinn und Geschichte*, historisch-systematische Einleitung in die Sinn-  
erforschende Philosophie. Von PAUL HOFMANN. Verlag von Ernst  
Reinhardt in München, 1937. Pp. 712. RM. 23.

THIS work claims to provide a new and fundamental basis for philosophic *Weltanschauung* in general; and it certainly contains a very fascinating discussion of one of the cardinal problems of philosophy, besides being of high value as a piece of research. Paul Hofmann emphasises throughout his long book the marked difference existing between the "Ich-bezeichnetem Ich" and the "Ich-sagendem Ich". That is to say, there must be most careful discrimination between the "ego" which can be observed and investigated as a kind of object among other objects and that "I" which alone is truly able to say "I", which we need if we are to observe at all and which can never itself be observed. Of course we may try to observe and to describe even this "subjective I"; but in that case it no longer remains the "Ich-sagende Ich", but it becomes an object and we have another new "I" observing and recognising the first one. We may even continue this process and think of the second one; and thus we may speak here, to use Hofmann's expression, of a possible infinite "springing back" of the "Ich-sagenden Ich", just as we can speak correspondingly of a possible "leaping back" of the object, the thing in itself, because every object in itself, after thought has been directed towards it, leads on to the assumption of another new object in itself lying beyond it. In other words, there exists in all thought, feeling and action a fundamental correlation of "I" and object, the poles of which are connected as well as separated by a possible infinity of iterations (see pp. 490, 25 ff., 3 ff.). Yet, whilst such a doctrine may already be found in Kant and in Cohen's Neokantianism (see pp. 607, 457, 274 ff.), Hofmann is specially concerned with a much more detailed analysis of the "I" and its relation to meaning, to sense (*Sinn*) in general. He therefore develops here only his view of the "Ich-sagenden Ich" as able to become conscious of ("spüren") meaning, *Sinn*; and suggests that as there are certain categories of the knowledge of objects which are the "transcendental" conditions of this knowledge, so there are to be found "introscental" presuppositions of "*Sinn*" (p. 198). Whilst we need relatively "subjective", transcendental concepts (such as unity or relation or the like) for the understanding of the multitude of objects of the outside-world, we need relatively "objective" "*Sinnbilder*", that is symbolic pictures, as introscental conditions for the shaping of the meaning which "lives" and can be experienced in our "Ich-sagendem Ich" (pp. 160 f., 48 ff.). For these reasons "I" and "*Sinn*" or meaning can never be thought of as existing objects or attributes of objects; on the contrary, they are only that element of consciousness or action which within consciousness and action is connected with the "other", the object; but which is in strictest contrast to this "other", to all objects and to any kind of existence at all. The cardinal contrast to existence is therefore not non-existence or nothing, as all "objectivism" hitherto wrongly assumed, but it is the "Ich-sagende Ich", "*Sinn*" whose meaning "lives" in quite another sphere than the sphere of existence (21 f., 25). And according to Hofmann even the logical principles which apply within this "sphere of *Sinn*" are other than those applying to the thought of objects and things: instead of the axiom of excluded contradiction we have here to deal with the axiom of "included contrast" (within the whole structure of *Sinn*) consisting of the "Ich-sagenden Ich" and the "other", the object thought by this Ich. Instead

of the principle of excluded middle, we find in the logic of "Sinn" the principle of the "inclusion of distinguished aspects" ("eingeschlossener Gesichtspunkt der Unterscheidung der Momente"). Lastly, to the principle of sufficient reason of the "Sachlogik" there corresponds in the "Sinnlogik" the principle of the "Sinn-Ziel" of knowledge, according to which the whole of the sense represents the reason, and an example having sense is the consequence in which the interpretation of the meaning of the whole is to be found; for instance, the single and unchanging meaning of a juristic law is interpreted by the decisions taken under it (202, 162). At any rate "Sinn" for Hofmann remains bound specifically to the "Ich-sagendem Ich" from which alone "objective" laws or judgments can receive their meaning; and even the "Ich-bezeichnete Ich" is in comparison with it a kind of object, although this "Ich-bezeichnete Ich" is, on the other hand, identified with the "Ich-sagendem Ich" which has here, so to speak, divided itself into the proper Ich and a "first Thou", namely, the "Ich-bezeichnete Ich" (505, 454). The second "Thou" then consists of my ideas of objects as persons animated by my "Ich-sagendem Ich"; therefore the "Thou" could be characterised as the animated "It" in the "I" as well as the "I" in the "It" (507, 505); for here the being an object is the fundamental point and the animation by an "I" is a merely accessory one (585). Finally, within the proper "Ich", or more precisely within the "Sinn", a distinction has to be made between the mere "form" and the "matter" of Sinn (586 f.).

But Hofmann has not contented himself with these and other similar analyses concerning Sinn which are scattered throughout his work. He has tried also to erect upon this "Sinnforschung" a new Weltanschauung which he calls occasionally the philosophy of "Sinnbewusster Existenz" (682, 680); and here, indeed, I cannot follow him. First, I think that the stress laid on the importance of the "Ich-sagenden Ich" does not represent such an original idea as is here assumed. For instance, the similarity of this research with several tendencies of Emil Lask or with the first drafts of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* is in characteristic points much more remarkable than would be supposed from Hofmann's interpretation of Fichte as an "objectivist" (248, 343). Secondly, I believe that it is impossible to demonstrate—as Hofmann tries to do—that the whole history of Philosophy or human thought has altogether failed hitherto, because it has been too "objectivistic". My studies in romantic philosophy (1927) led me, for example, to quite opposite results as regards the so-called "romantic universalism" (665); and no historian of philosophy will be able to agree with Hofmann on many others of his wide historical generalisations. Thirdly and decisively, it seems to me clearly impossible to draw from the merely formal character of the "Ich-sagenden Ich" such definitely "material" consequences as the identification of this "I" with "love" and with the will to the most concrete self-realisation. (Again Hofmann's polemic against Nietzsche (414, 512 f., 493), is here in my view not convincing.) And it is surely unsatisfactory to solve the problems of the "inter-objective" and the "inter-individual" validity of "Sinn" in such a relatively simple and formalistic way as is done by Hofmann (see pp. 666, 498 f., 474, 501, 578). Indeed, Hofmann has to confess several times that he cannot deal with casuistry, but only with fundamental problems (606, 501). On many points, however, questions which are for Hofmann not fundamental, confront us with the most decisive moral conflicts of our day, which can never be solved with the help of his analyses, although he is convinced they can. Unfortunately, it seems only too optimistic

when Hofmann writes: "Ich darf . . . gewisz sein, dass die . . . tiefsten Überzeugungen und Zwecksetzungen, die ich dem Gebote der Wahrhaftigkeit gemäss in mir selbst zu erkennen strebe, für jedes mögliche Du . . . wahr sind" (683). On the contrary, I think it can scarcely be denied that with the recognition of the same formal "Ich" and the same formal "honesty" by no means the same concrete material decisions on "Sinn" need necessarily be connected, but it may be quite contrary ones such as a "material" ethics of power or an ethics of love. Moreover there are to be found in Hofmann thorough-going confusions between merely formal and "most material" conceptions of "Sinn", just such "ingenious confusions" as appear in the corresponding passages of Kant's *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794 and *Sittenlehre* of 1798. I tried in my book, *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik* (1933), to clear up in detail these most instructive paralogisms, and I shall not deal with them here. Nevertheless, I believe that Hofmann's energetic attempt to revive in modern terminology an extreme ethics of pure intention is to a large extent an illuminating experiment—more particularly as he proposes to supplement his research later on. This continuation we may await with interest.

DAVID BAUMGARDT.

*Surprise and the Psycho-Analyst: On the Conjecture and Comprehension of Unconscious Processes.* By THEODOR REIK, translated by MARGARET M. GREEN. London: Kegan Paul, 1936. Pp. viii + 294. 12s. 6d.

DR. REIK'S book is very suggestive. He describes with ample illustration a psycho-analyst's introspections and how they may be interpreted; he raises questions that are important both for philosophers and psychologists, without, however, claiming to offer complete solutions. Though it is not an outstanding work, the author does well to recognise certain problems; but unfortunately the material is not well handled and grouped. The English edition is very poorly got up and printed; the translation as regards style is never more than mediocre, and as regards accuracy is sometimes unclear or ambiguous where the German was quite clear—a more literal translation might have been stronger and clearer. For example, one sentence at the top of page 3 and another five lines from the bottom of page 113 need to be turned differently; on page 94, line 5, for *less* read *not so much*, on page 97, line 18, for *any* read *every*.

The paper wrapper gives a misleading account of the book, for it gives the impression that the work is chiefly about telepathy. Dr. Reik does treat telepathy seriously, but he does not make more than half-a-dozen references to it; for he regards it as a particular case of a more general situation, and he does not think that the material at our disposal is as yet adequate for dealing with it.

The general theme may be divided up as follows: (1) conjecturing unconscious process in others, (2) comprehending unconscious process in others, and (3) the close connection between these activities, which we may call unconscious perception, and the phenomena of surprise and laughter.

Very probably such a grouping is an over-simplification, but as a rough guide it may serve. We may say that the apparently heterogeneous collection of chapters all describe aspects of conjecture, that the chief

concept used to explain or describe it is surprise, and that comprehension is regarded as the goal of conjecture made complete. The book is therefore essentially a descriptive one whose theme is the psychological process by which the analyst conjectures what is passing in the unconscious of his patient.

Tiny signals of which we are unaware form the key to a person's mind: "We perceive peculiarities in the features and bearing and movements of others, which help to make the impression we receive without our observing or attending to them. We remember details of another person's dress and peculiarities in his gestures, without recalling them; a number of minor points, an olfactory nuance, a sense of touch in shaking hands too slight to be observed—warmth, clamminess, roughness or smoothness in the skin, play a part—the manner in which he glances up or looks: of all this we are not consciously aware, and yet it influences our opinion." He cites how insects and animals have sense functions that we no longer possess, and suggests that these may have left traces that modify our behaviour although they are unknown to us. "Originally most likely it really was first and foremost man's bodily surface, the skin, that showed what was going on within." "*The self-betrayal of another is sucked in through all our pores.*" On such data unconscious inferences are based. It is clear that all this depends upon unconscious perception and the existence of an unconscious that can be rendered accessible, both for patient and analyst, i.e., upon the analyst's interpretations' being objective and not figments of his imagination—"The analyst can be made responsible for the supposedly absurd or inane content of his interpretation exactly as much and as justly as an Egyptologist for the content of a hieroglyphic text that he deciphers." The only satisfactory guarantee of this, Dr. Reik admits, lies in making correct predictions. There is, however, an important feature of analysis over and above those possessed by, say, physics, namely, its heuristic side; therapy is effected only when the case is comprehended by the patient, i.e., when the theory is seen in the facts.

The author skilfully compares the investigation of a crime with an analysis: conjecturing is similar to detecting, and comprehension to judging; logical processes are out of place while conjecturing or in detecting, but in place when comprehending or judging. "Just as in criminology people long failed to realise the importance of guarding the traces on the scene of the crime from unskilful or careless hands, of preserving small indications of apparently minor significance for subsequent examination and use, so the art of analysis will pay increasing attention to the fleeting, barely noticeable impressions which we generally overlook or fail to capture. . . . In the psychology of the unconscious, too, it is very important to 'preserve the traces'."

There is ample material here for a philosophical inquiry of an epistemological character; and the subject should prove of considerable philosophical importance. Whatever philosophy has been implied by the physics of recent years has come up for discussion from time to time; and it is surprising that the same has not taken place in the mental field, where achievements have been no less great. There is much to be sifted in the philosophical aspects of Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, *Totem and Taboo*, and of the work here reviewed. It may be that greater technical knowledge is required for the discussion of mental phenomena than of physical.

The book may be recommended as containing some excellent ideas off the beaten track. I have space to mention but one of these that concerns



research in many fields in addition to that of psycho-analysis. This is the conception of *poised attention*, which implies that the analyst is alert and receptive, ready to spring in any direction, rather than deliberately and consciously attentive to every available piece of datum; any train of thought may be pursued, no matter how illogical it may appear—in fact many a good clue would be lost if logic were followed too closely—it is a case of saying “What ideas occur to me?” rather than “What ideas can I deduce?”

J. O. WISDOM.

*A Creed for Sceptics.* By C. A. STRONG, LL.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1936. Pp. ix + 98. 6s. net.

THIS book consists of five chapters. The first two are mainly concerned with stating and defending a theory of perception. In the third, which is written in French, a philosophy of nature is developed. Most of the fourth chapter is occupied by a translation of a dialogue by Voltaire about free-will. The last chapter is that from which the book takes its title. The author also inserts two poems of his own composition which bear upon the theses of the book. The theory of perception is that previously defended by the author in his *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind*. According to this theory sense data (or “phantasms” as Dr. Strong prefers to call them) are apparent entities which essentially refer to the objects which they depict. Hence phenomenalism, which makes the mistake of regarding sense data as substantial entities, is false. The function of sense data is to enable the percipient to adjust himself to objects with which he has practical concern. An unusual feature of this theory is the view that in internal perception “there is the same duality of datum and object as in external” (p. 3). Dr. Strong boldly maintains that time is composed of indivisible instants and space of indivisible points. The separate instants of time are bound together because the earlier ones produce, engender or create the later. Because instants are the ultimate constituents of time, events are derivative. The points of space are occupied by energies or powers which exist at instants and engender those that succeed. These basic constituents of the world are, for various reasons, held to be animated. This is not to say that they are conscious, but that they possess that sort of blind vitality which is called sensation or sentience. Were this not so, Dr. Strong argues, it would be difficult to see how minds could have evolved. In the last chapter, which is very brief, the author indicates the bearing of these theories upon his attitude towards the world. By implication, if not explicitly, he rejects theism. The non-human world is indifferent to human aspirations. This does not mean, however, that moral distinctions are devoid of an objective basis. They are based upon the nature of human instincts and the necessity of living together. “The fixity of human willing supplies a standard as valid and changeless as could be desired” (p. 97). However strange some of these conclusions may seem, the arguments leading up to them are neatly compressed and clearly stated. But it was almost certainly a mistake to include the poems.

H. B. ACTON.

*Einleitung in die Philosophie.* Von MAX DESSOIR. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1936. Pp. xi + 248.

THIS book ranks high for two reasons at least. It is written by the leading æsthetic thinker of Germany; and its author has probably introduced more students to philosophy than any other living University teacher in his country. As the title of his book indicates, Dessoir does not here want to solve problems any more than he wants to give detailed discussions; he only wishes to give a vivid account of the different functions philosophy had once to fulfil, and has still to achieve in our day, illustrating this most instructively on specially important points throughout the whole of the systematic field and the history of philosophic thought.

He starts with the fact that during the early Middle Ages people who were only able to read and to write were occasionally honoured by the name of "philosophers", whilst in Cicero (*Tusc. Quæst.*) and in the ancient world in general philosophy was understood to be "*vitæ dux*", and in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* (III, 3) to be "*adversity's sweet milk*". Dessoir then proceeds to discuss the problems of "*Metatheoretik*" and of truth in general, and clears up drastically the major complications existing there by demonstrating the defects of radical relativism in respect of objective truth, that is to say, the shortcomings of radical "*historicism*", biological relativism and "*psychologism*".

Historicism, for instance, acknowledges truth only as valid in a special epoch, but does not admit any universally objective science; and Dessoir grants that it is important to understand how special beliefs are only significant for, and are even true only at, a certain stage in the development of mankind, that is, only in a special historical atmosphere. But all the same, he urges, even the power of time has its limits. There is independently valid truth in every phase of history; and consistent historicism itself has finally to grant that it is according to its own doctrine not absolutely true, but only a characteristic expression of an epoch of particular intellectual uncertainty. And corresponding arguments can be used against biological relativism attributing to every race or nation different ideals of truth which exclude each other. The mere fact that the most heterogeneous races and peoples can often understand each other best confutes all such radical relativism. And lastly the so-called radical psychologism implies a similar prejudice. For as Dessoir shows, again very briefly but convincingly, it is impossible to reduce all questions of knowledge to mere questions of psychology. Certainly the sense of truth (*das Wahrheitsgefühl*) is a psychological fact, but this is not the case with regard to the objective truth of what is meant by our thought if we "*feel*" that this thought is true. Even the knowledge of stars is communicated by mental perceptions; nevertheless astronomy can not be merged into psychology.

In a short survey of the whole history of philosophy from Thales down to the present day Dessoir tries further to demonstrate how helpful, and to a certain extent how indispensable, is the knowledge of the history of thought even for the most original intellects of our day; and then with a brief summary of the relations between philosophy and mathematics, natural sciences, "*Kulturwissenschaften*" and religion the small volume finishes. Readers approaching the book from the side of science and logic may regret that too many problems are here touched upon with no attempt at penetrating exposition, but artists and "*Geisteswissenschaftler*" foregoing this and wishing to have a concentrated glimpse of the whole

breadth and wealth of human thought will scarcely find a better introduction to philosophy than this small book, the work of a real artist and of one of the most cultivated thinkers of our age, intimately connected by personal friendship with almost all essential movements of the intellectual life of Germany during the last fifty years.

DAVID BAUMGARDT.

*The Credibility of the Christian Faith.* By H. S. SHELTON. London, Simpkin Marshall, Ltd., 1937. Pp. 291. 8s. 6d.

THE subject of Mr. Shelton's book is, as it could hardly help being, less wide than its title. Mr. Shelton sees that his problem requires the consideration of alternatives, that the credibility of the Christian religion must mean its credibility as compared with that of other possible religions and philosophies. In fact, however, Mr. Shelton is chiefly concerned with the dilemma, Roman Catholicism or naturalistic agnosticism; "for a truly rational position we must choose between Rationalism and Rome". Broad Church Christianity he regards as a compromise, orthodox Protestantism as without intellectual foundation—Calvinism is barely mentioned—and the Greek and Anglican positions as fatally weakened by their lack of a Pope. Admittedly only a few words are given to other religions, on the ground that they are without practical importance for Mr. Shelton or his readers; and non-Christian philosophies, with the exception of Agnosticism, do not come off better.

Mr. Shelton argues that, since natural reason, based on the argument from design, points to God, and since neither revelation nor miracles are impossible, the Catholic faith is defensible without accepting either the inerrancy of the Bible or of the moral teaching of Jesus. In setting out the Catholic position, Mr. Shelton a little forgets that his argument from design did not point to a God with the needful moral, or even metaphysical, attributes.

He is deeply impressed by the Catholic claim to divine authority embodied in a living representative. Catholic morals, if in some respects open to objection, for example as regards religious persecution, he thinks in others to be superior to current beliefs. New religions and new prophets he dislikes: "if Christianity is not the true religion it can be confidently asserted that there is none and never will be".

Strong though the logical position of Agnosticism is in Mr. Shelton's view, he urges against it that it leaves unsatisfied, and perhaps unexplained, the religious instinct and that, in practice, very few, if any, people remain genuine agnostics.

It is not Mr. Shelton's purpose to decide between his two alternatives, but to exhibit the rational grounds for choice, a choice which, as he rightly emphasises, turns upon the question, Is Jesus God?

E. W. EDWARDS.

*Types of Modern Theology.* By H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.Phil., D.D., D.Th. London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1937. Pp. vii + 333. 10s. 6d. net.

THIS volume contains, in an expanded form, the Croall Lectures delivered in 1933, by the recently deceased Professor of Christian Dogmatics in the

University of Edinburgh. Its subject-matter belongs to the sphere of dogmatic theology rather than to that of philosophy; for, though the theory of knowledge, etc., of some of the theologians dealt with is briefly touched upon, the book is not concerned with any of the fundamental questions, issuing from various sources, which the critical philosopher must raise when confronted with the truth-claim of Christian dogma. Hence a detailed consideration of its contents, however excellent and important they may be deemed as a contribution to dogmatics, would scarcely be in place in this journal.

Throughout these lectures the truth of the fundamental doctrines of ecclesiastical theology is presupposed: the New Testament, notwithstanding the forthcoming conclusions of critical studies, is an authentic witness to Christ, whose deity alone can explain His influence; Christian faith is insight; Christianity differs absolutely from all other religions; and so on. Prof. Mackintosh was sanguinely convinced as to such matters, and does not seem to have entertained the opinion that one of the surest ways of arriving at certainties is, in Cartesian fashion, to begin by critically examining the *credenda* as to which we cherish certitude.

So the dogmatic systems successively expounded and evaluated in these lectures are appraised according to the degree in which they respectively approximate to orthodoxy. Schleiermacher is found unsatisfactory in that he tended to substitute discovery for revelation, and the religious consciousness for the Word of God. The Hegelian interpretation of Christianity deepens the conviction that the speculative reason cannot conduct one to the knowledge of God: "if we are to know Him, with the knowledge which is life eternal, He must speak His free and gracious Word, and we must hear in faith". Ritschl's value as a theologian suffered from his habit of putting historical and ethical judgements in place of the living Lord, and from his failure to understand the gospel of the Reformation in so far as it insisted on justifying faith as the one source of the inspiration of moral life. Troeltsch, the most critical of all the types of theologian discussed, in that he endeavoured to construe Christianity in the light of the history, the comparative study, and the psychology, of religions, is least in favour with the author. Indeed, he quotes with approval the verdict of another writer that Troeltsch's creed frankly renounces all that is specifically Christian—'Christian' here denoting what Protestant Reformation-theology regarded as *de fide*. The next typical theologian reviewed is the only one of the list who is not a German, *viz.*, Kierkegaard. This theologian, we are told, has been called "the greatest Christian thinker of the past century" and "the greatest of all Christian psychologists". Dr. Mackintosh's account of his teaching leaves with me the suspicion that Kierkegaard was too much of a rhetorician, an irrationalist and a lover of paradox to have merited much less superlative estimations than these. But he gains the author's admiration chiefly because of his vehement insistence on that element in Christian faith which is none the less certain for defying satisfactory explanation. The last of the selected types of modern theology is Barthianism; and Barth, on account of his basal doctrine that God has uttered His word and will in the Scriptures, or that He has spoken His Word which attests itself in Scripture, is the one of the "types" with whom the author has most sympathy. Dr. Mackintosh may have justly ascribed to Barth "an unrivalled power to wake up the sleeping intelligence of the Christian society"; but Barth's apparent indifference to a multitude of problems which biblical and other studies during the last hundred years have brought to light—problems which it

should be the duty of the dogmatic theologian to face and reckon with—causes the more critical class of theologians to see little difference between Barthianism and 'fundamentalism' of other kinds, such as can only subsist where ignorance prevails.

F. R. TENNANT.

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## VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. xxxiv. (1937), 16 and 17. A Bibliography of Philosophy in 1936. 18. **Leger Wood**. *Philosophy and Temperament*. [Cites many philosophers as exemplifying that "there exists a precise correlation between the personality traits of a philosopher and his philosophical theories."] 19. **Olaf Helmer**. *The Significance of Undecidable Sentences*. [Seeks to give ways in which sentences proved undecidable by Gödel can be considered significant by positivists. Says that even of such sentences it is true that "we know perfectly well under what observational conditions we should be inclined to speak of the existence of a proof for the sentence in question, and it is not at all impossible that observations of this kind will be made one day. The validity of Gödel's result would not be affected thereby, but we should simply have 'observed' the inconsistency of mathematics."] 20. **Albert C. A. Balz**. *The State of Nature and the Social Sciences*. ["Were Nature completely understood, and were mind infinitely competent, it might be that descriptive science would be normative, and normative science would be descriptive."] 21. **Peter A. Carmichael**. *The Supreme Court and Metaphysics*. [Quotes a dispute in the supreme court as to whether a certain transaction can be said to affect inter-state commerce directly or only indirectly. Says both disputants are wrong because each holds an untenable theory of relations, and complains that for liberal, democratic America, the Constitution is "something of an anomaly."] 22. **Daniel Cory**. *The Cardinal Tenets of Common Sense*. [Says that philosophers are inconsistent if they deny the existence of that which their actions daily presuppose. (Physical objects, etc.) Supports this by referring to 'significant feelings' often neglected by philosophers, such as that of believing on occasions in "the persistent otherness of a massive green thing in an empty room" (a billiard table).] 23. **Roy Wood Sellars**. *Critical Realism and the Independence of the Object*. [Attacks the neo-pragmatism of Lewis. Accuses of blindness "those who can not see that independence and transcendence have perfectly clear and definite meanings for the critical realists."] 24. **Arthur E. Murphy**. *Karl Schmidt's "Generating Problems" and Systematic Philosophy*. [Argues with Professor Schmidt that there is a need for an answer to the question "When are problems which generate a language valid?" Disagrees with Professor Schmidt's solution on the grounds that it does not enable us "to discriminate a genuine problem from a merely specious one."] 25. **George Boas**. *The Ninth International Congress of Philosophy and the Second International Congress of Aesthetics and of the Science of Art*. [Account of the most outstanding papers at these congresses.] 26. **H. C. Sprinkle**. *The Logic of Libertarianism*. [Seeks with the help of symbols to point out a sense of "Libertarianism", "Determinism", "Indeterminism", in which the first is compatible with either of the last two.] 27. **Wilbur M. Urban**. *Value Propositions and Verifiability*. [Shows that value propositions are different from exclamations in important ways. Illustrates the fact that there can be errors in value judgments, and says that

correction of ostensive propositions is not different in principle from correction of value propositions. Claims that value propositions can be verified by "emotional intuition", the existence of which is also necessary to give meaning to the principle of verification.] **Norman Jacobs.** *Physicalism and Sensation-Sentences.* [Granted the physicalist theory of knowledge, behaviourism is irrefutable; but common-sense does not interpret such statements as "I have a pain", "She is consumed with passion", etc., behaviouristically, but intuitively, and e.g., Carnap and Lewis themselves in fact do so. We also must do so in order to avoid the paradox of saying that our knowledge is made possible by the existence of sensations, and that there are no sensations.] 23. **Abraham Edel.** *Two Traditions in the Refutation of Egoism.* [One tradition is to try to show that egoism is incorrect. The other is to try to show what conditions give rise to it and hence how its occurrence can be regulated.] **Eliser Vivas.** *A Definition of Aesthetic Experience.* [Proposes as a definition of aesthetic experience "rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings in their full presentational immediacy." Advantages of this definition are outlined.]

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. IV, 2 (April, 1937). **R. B. Lindsay.** *The Meaning of Simplicity in Physics.* [Attempts without success to reduce the notion of simplicity in physics to characteristics of the type of law employed or relative paucity of the number of independent concepts involved. Provides, however, a fine sample of philosophical simplicity in the conclusion that "Of two theories descriptive of the same range of physical experience that is the simpler which demands the shorter time for the normally intelligent person to become sufficiently familiar with it to such an extent as to obtain correct and useful results".] **J. K. Senior.** *Some Dangers connected with Mathematical Applications.* [Able, destructive criticism of a paper by E. Habermann, *Mengentheoretische Betrachtungsweise in der Chemie*, which attempts to apply the theory of sets to chemistry. Is able to show that Habermann's assertion that the whole set of hydrocarbons has the ordinal number  $\omega_2$  admits at best of a trivial interpretation—and points the moral concerning the dangers of over-zealous use of elaborate mathematics.] **C. A. Richmond.** *The Measurement of Time: A First Chapter of Physics.* [Develops the notion of physical time in independence of any considerations of space. The method consists essentially of selecting "ratable" sequences of events. "(a) Two sequences of events are ratable when the ratio of the respective numbers obtained by counting them within a period of time is without exception nearly (or exactly) the same as when they are counted within each of several other periods of time. (b) A single sequence of events is ratable when there is a considerable variety of other sequences with each of which it has the ratability of paragraph (a)." It is a basic fact of observation that "in all the accessible universe, various sequences of events are linked by well-defined, nearly (or exactly) constant ratios in only one extensive system". Upon this basis there follows a discussion, plentifully illustrated by apt examples, of such topics as the selection of standards for the measurement of time, the extension of subjective time beyond the range of direct observation, the status of absolute time, the establishing of ratability between sequences of fictitious events defined in terms of observable but non-ratable sequences, and the possibility of non-metric time. (A useful paper.)] **R. S. Lillie.** *Directive Action and Life.* [A wide-ranging paper of speculative character,

quite impossible to summarise.] **E. Brunswik.** *Psychology as a Science of Objective Relations*. [A "short outline" (39 pages) of the underlying ideas presented in the same writer's book on *Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt* (Leipzig, 1934).] **W. M. Mallisoff.** *Arranging the Sciences: I. An Experiment*. [Chooses an arrangement in concentric rings for revealing diagrammatically the mutual relations between the sciences. A similar article concerning the applied sciences is promised.] **O. Neurath.** *Unified Science and its Encyclopaedia*. [Details of a new encyclopaedia of the sciences, whose first two volumes are scheduled to appear in 1939. Special attention is to be paid to the construction of "bridges" between the sciences, to the elimination of redundant terminology, and the "unification of scientific language". "The fundamental thesis of our movement is that terms similar to those employed in physics and in our every-day language are sufficient for constructing all sciences." The encyclopaedia is to "exhibit the logical framework of logical empiricism, and will be a mainstay of scientific empiricism in general as well as of the unity of science movement in the widest sense".] Discussion (Correspondence). Reviews and Notes.

IV. 3. (July, 1937.) **N. Bohr.** *Causality and Complementarity*. [Address delivered before the Second International Congress for the Unity of Science, Copenhagen, 1936. A popular statement of the views expressed in his book *Atomic Theory and Description of Nature*, Cambridge, 1934.] **K. Menger.** *The New Logic*. [A very clear survey of the rise of non-Aristotelian logic, with special reference to recent work in meta-mathematics.] **H. Margenau.** *Critical Points in Modern Physical Theory*. [Not unduly technical discussion of the logical structure of quantum mechanics, with special attention to its bearing upon probability and theory of knowledge. Some valuable remarks on the theory of measurement should do much to dissipate current confusions in the subject.] **E. Bisbee.** *Objectivity in the Social Sciences*. ["Objectivity is verifiability by all equally competent persons", but the converse is held to be untrue, unless the material to which the science refers is "homogeneous". (In its context the last term appears to mean amenable to inductive prediction.) The technique of new type intelligence and character tests used for classifying the "heterogeneous material" of the social sciences relies for validity upon the use of subjective criteria (judgment, evaluation). The validity of social laws depends upon "the subjective attitudes of the individuals or groups who must carry out the law." It follows, smoothly enough, that, "in order to be objective in the sense that every person can verify a law by empirical tests with identical results for all, the social scientists must hope to have their laws so subjectively convincing that people who are to carry them out will accept them". This is held, somewhat obscurely, to "re-involve purpose". But how purpose is "the inevitable guide" for the social scientist is left unexplained. (The whole account makes it very difficult to draw the line between the "social scientist" and the propagandist)]. Discussion (Correspondence). Reviews and Notes.

ERKENNTNIS. Band 6, Heft 3. **Hans Reichenbach.** *Moritz Schlick*. [Short obituary notice.] **Marja Kokoszyńska** (Lwów). *Ueber den absoluten Wahrheitsbegriff und einige andere semantische Begriffe*. [Virtually a summary of views of Tarski, as put forward in his "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen", *Studia Philosophica*, 1 (Lwów, 1935). According to Tarski, a satisfactory definition of the concept of truth must

entail 1. the proposition "if  $x$  is true,  $x$  is a proposition", 2. all propositions of the form " $p$  is true  $\equiv p$ " where ' $p$ ' stands for any proposition of the Object language. Such a definition cannot be given in the object-language itself; for to take 'truth' as a term of the object-language leads to contradiction. Neither can it be given in the syntax-language, whether pure or descriptive. But it can be given in the language of semantic, which combines the object and syntax languages. The definition is in terms of the concept of the 'satisfaction' of a propositional function. Examples of other semantic terms are 'designates', 'refers to'. Such terms cannot, as Carnap has suggested, be reduced to terms of syntax. The language of semantic is genuinely scientific and autonomous.] **Rudolf Carnap** (Prague) and **Friedrich Bachmann** (Muenster). *Ueber Extremalaxiome*. [Deals with axioms like Hilbert's "Vollstaendigkeitsaxiom" which assert concerning the objects of an axiomatic theory that no more extensive system of objects satisfies a set of axioms, or else that no smaller system satisfies them. These are called maximal-axioms in the former case, minimal in the latter. A distinction is drawn between 'model'-axioms which deny that there is a more, or less, extensive system of the same structure as a given system, and 'structure'-axioms which deny that there is a more, or less, extensive system of a different structure satisfying a given set of axioms. The definition of a "Maximal-modell-axiom" with respect to a set of axioms  $F(M)$  is as follows:

$$\text{"Max}_m(F; M) =_{df} \sim (\exists N) MCN \cdot M \neq N \cdot F(N)";$$

that of a "Maximal-struktur-axiom"

$$\text{"Max}_s(F; M) =_{df} \sim (\exists N) MCN \cdot \sim \text{Ism}_c(M, N) \cdot F(N),"$$

where ' $\text{Ism}_c$ ' designates complete isomorphy. Corresponding definitions are given for the minimal-axioms. These definitions apply only to the possibility of there being a more, or less, extensive model of the same order as a given model. In dealing with possible extensions of different orders, difficulties arise which might be overcome by the construction of a language in which only the descriptive signs were of a fixed type, while the variables and logical constants could traverse a denumerably infinite series of types.]

**Arthur H. Copeland** (Michigan, U.S.A.). *Predictions and Probabilities*. [Outlines a statistical theory of probability, which is based on the assumption (a) that given any pair of positive numbers  $\epsilon$  and  $N$ , there exists a number  $n$  such that the difference between the 'success ratio' of an event for  $n$  trials and its probability is less than  $\epsilon$ , and  $N$  is less than  $n$ , and (b) that the probability of an event is invariant under the operation of every periodic selection operator. It is claimed that these assumptions afford a consistent basis for predictions. A prediction based on the first of them could indeed never be falsified, but it could be verified; and we are entitled to neglect the possibility, genuine though it is, of assigning a number of distinct probabilities to the same event. A sequence is called 'admissible' when it represents an event whose trials are independent, and it is asserted that all admissible sequences "possess invariant probabilities and invariant admissibilities with respect to all rational (that is periodic) selections". Finally, Copeland attempts to show that his theory is not incompatible with non-statistical theories, such as Keynes's and Poincaré's, but is "an indispensable part of them".] **Lajos Székely** (Leningrad). *Zur Frage der sog. Psychometrie, insbesondere der Testmethode in der Intelligenzforschung*. [Tests do not serve to measure a man's

abilities but merely establish a probable correlation between them and the abilities of other men. Tests are gauged 'topologically' by the extent to which they succeed in grouping together men who are also grouped together in respect of their performances in life. The gauge of a test's 'reliability' is the frequency with which identical elements occur in corresponding groups and the degree of their compactness. The principles according to which external performances are correlated with psychological states may differ for different classes of people. What corresponds, therefore, to a given performance is not a determinate quantity, of a faculty or what-not, but a variety of functions.] **Julius Kraft** (Utrecht). *Das Problem der Geisteswissenschaft*. [The conception of a science of Spirit which must be non-natural and yet be about empirical objects is self-contradictory. Psychology is not such a science, for psychical phenomena are natural, even though not material. Neither is ethics, for in assigning values we always keep within the bounds of nature. Neither is scientific (as opposed to fraudulent) "Weltanschauung", philosophy. To postulate the existence of a science of Spirit is to attempt to infect Science with Theology. Disciplines such as Psychology, History, Politics, which are claimed for the Spirit, may be regarded as genuine natural sciences. Science is a unity, inasmuch as every science depends on observation and makes use of mathematics; but this still permits of there being specific, and not merely gradual, differences between different disciplines. The recognition of this removes one of the main motives for postulating non-natural sciences.] *Summary of the Programme of the 2nd International Congress for the Unity of Science*, Copenhagen, June 21-26, 1936.

Band 6, Heft 4. **Hermann Baege** (Jena). *Die Modernen Tierpsychologie*. [Animal-psychologists have at last come to realise that it is unscientific to explain the behaviour of animals, by a superficial analogy with that of human beings, in terms of unobservable psychical experiences. The behaviour of every living thing is determined in the first place by its physical structure. In testing the powers of animals psychologists have been giving insufficient attention to differences of structure, a test which is adapted to the structure of a monkey will not necessarily be suitable for a dog. Our ability to explain the behaviour of the higher animals is limited by our defective knowledge of the structure and function of the sense-organs and the nervous system, but good progress has been recently made in this field. Behaviour is determined secondly by environment, which must be thought of as comprising internal as well as external stimuli. Each animal has its own environment, that is, the particular stimuli to which it reacts. The selection of them depends on the animal's organisation, structure and individual experience. Acquired reactions can be accounted for, as Pavlov and his school have shown, in terms of the conditioned reflex.] **Kurt Grelling** (Berlin). *Identitas Indiscernibilium*. [Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles is that when two things are numerically different there is at least one characteristic which belongs to one and not to the other, spatial relations not being counted as characteristics. This principle must not be confused with his definition of identity "eadem sunt, quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate"; and the objections which have been brought against it do not affect the definition. Frege and Russell define identity in substantially the same way as Leibnitz. Their critics have mostly made the mistake of confusing their definition with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. G. maintains against Waismann that the diverse uses of



the word 'the same' in ordinary language are such that the sentences in which they occur can be translated into a logically exact language with the use of only one concept of identity, and that one which fits the Leibnitz-Russell definition.] **A. J. Ayer** (Oxford). *Concerning the Negation of Empirical Propositions*. [A note in reply to Juhos who had maintained that basic propositions (Konstatierungen) were not truth-functions of their negations. Juhos had argued that the contradiction between such propositions as "this is red" and "this is not red" was incomplete because it could always be explained away by assuming that different sense-data were referred to. But it is shown that this is not to reconcile two contradictories but merely to substitute for one of them a different proposition which is expressed by the same form of words. For the meaning of a sentence containing a demonstrative symbol depends on the context in which it is expressed. It is possible by adopting suitable hypotheses to hold fast to any empirical proposition. There is no ground for considering a basic proposition peculiarly sacrosanct.] Reviews by **Kurt Grelling** of Philipp Frank's *Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen*, C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim's *Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der Neuen Logik* and Egon Brunswik's *Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt*, and by **Joergen Joergensen** of Otto Neurath's *Le Développement du Cercle de Vienne et l'avenir de l'empirisme logique*.

Band 6, Heft 5/6. 'The problem of Causation.' Proceedings of the second International Congress for the Unity of Science, Copenhagen, 1936. *Introductory Remarks* by Joergen Joergensen, Victor J. Lenzen, P. Lecomte du Noüy, Ferdinand Gonseth, F. Kotarbinski and Otto Neurath. *Obituary notice of Moritz Schlick* by **Philipp Frank**. I. *Physics*. **Niels Bohr** (Copenhagen). *Kausalität und Komplementarität*. [The impossibility of a causal representation of quantum phenomena is involved in the pre-suppositions of our use of the most elementary concepts. It follows from the fact that we cannot in atomic physics speak of the independent behaviour of physical objects in view of the unavoidable interaction between the objects and our measuring instruments, for which we cannot in principle allow. The apparently contradictory pieces of information about the behaviour of an object, which we obtain from different processes of measurement, cannot be reconciled in any ordinary way but must be viewed as complementary to one another. It is suggested that the essential characteristics of living organisms, of whose atomic elements there is no means of giving a precise account, are laws of nature which stand in a complementary relationship to those with which we are concerned in physics and chemistry. Like the quantum of action in atomic physics the existence of life must in biology be regarded as an elementary fact. Reference is made to the difficulties involved in introspection as having some formal analogy with those that occur in atomic physics.] **Philipp Frank** (Prague). *Philosophische Deutungen und Missdeutungen der Quantentheorie*. [There is a tendency always to make spiritual capital out of physical discoveries. For instance the physical hypothesis that the mass of electrically charged bodies could be calculated from the charge was used to support the metaphysical thesis that matter was unreal. The same thing has happened in the case of the quantum theory, with equally little justification. People say that it is impossible simultaneously to measure the position and velocity of a moving particle, or that the particles do not simultaneously possess a determinate position and velocity; but such formulations lead to pseudo-problems. What one should say is that the expressions 'position of a

particle' and 'velocity of a particle' cannot both be used with reference to the same situation. The situations in which they can severally be used are complementary to one another, in Bohr's sense. 'Complementary' situations are found in the realm of psychology as well as physics, but this has no bearing, as some have thought, upon the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will. If Bohr is right in thinking that the exact physical observation of the atoms of a living body is incompatible with its survival, we have too a 'complementary' situation in biology, but all that this involves is the employment here also of 'complementary' languages. It is not an argument for vitalism.] **Moritz Schlick** (Vienna). *Quantentheorie und Erkennbarkeit der Natur*. [The concepts of the quantum theory are required for the correlation of one set of data, the experimental conditions, with another set of data, the experimental results. All that is meant by the abandonment of strict causality is that this correlation is not strictly one-to-one. The indeterminacy principle lays down a definite 'Spielraum' for the experimental results. It describes an objective fact and has nothing to do with any limitation of our knowledge. To talk of measurement distorting the position or velocity of a particle presupposes that the particle really has position and velocity. But the point is that the words 'position' and 'velocity' cannot significantly be used together with reference to the particle. And just as certain classical concepts cannot be used in quantum physics, so is it possible that the concepts of physics do not suffice in biology, although in spite of Bohr this has yet to be proved. But this would not imply that there were vital processes which we were incapable of knowing. It is nonsense to say that anything is in principle unknowable. The actual observations that we make in any field can be described classically; and the task of science is to find a formula which will enable us from the observed behaviour of an object to predict its future behaviour.] **Victor F. Lenzen** (Berkeley, U.S.A.). *The Interaction between Subject and Object in Observation*. [A physical thing, the object of observation, is something of which aspects are given in perception. In classical physics the thing can equally well be regarded as the class of its aspects or as their cause, but in quantum physics the positivist interpretation is the better. The subject of observation is viewed behaviouristically. Observation involves interaction between an object and a subject. The place of the partition between object and observer may, according to contemporary physical theory, be assigned arbitrarily. A distinction is drawn between physical, biological and perceptual partition. *E.g.*, in measuring a temperature the physical partition may be between the environment and the thermometer, the biological between the light and the retina, and the perceptual between the thermometer and the light with which it is seen. An aspect is considered mental if functionally related to the observer, physical if functionally related to external things. The biologist displaces the physical partition further and further into the organism, the physicist into the thing, incorporating instruments of observation into the observer. Indeterminacy resides at the physical partition. The argument of Einstein and others that the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality is incomplete, rests on an insufficient analysis of the conditions of measurement and a confusion of realistic and instrumental criteria of reality. The realistic criterion should be rejected and the state of a microphysical system viewed as an instrument of prediction of the results of observation. One must eliminate the psychological factor of perception from the theory of physical measurement. In the quantum-

mechanical theory of measurement the essential element in causality is retained.] **Martin Strauss** (Copenhagen). *Komplementarität und Kausalität im Lichte der logischen Syntax*. [Possibility of prediction is not a sufficient criterion of causality and perhaps not even necessary. The assertion of causation is primarily a syntactical assertion about the logical structure of a theory and thus only indirectly an assertion about nature. A necessary syntactical criterion of a causal relationship between two events is the validity of a general implication between the corresponding propositions. But the concept of 'complementarity' rules out logically any connection by means of truth-functions between propositions describing the position and velocity of a particle at a given time. The breakdown of the classical form of causation has therefore nothing to do with indeterminacy in the ordinary sense but is a logical consequence of 'complementarity'.] *Discussion*. **P. Lecomte du Noüy** (Paris). *On Frank's Paper*. [The unity of science at which we are aiming is no more than a working hypothesis; its existence is not proved. What one finds more and more are profound differences between the animate and inanimate. It is not easy to see in what way considerations of language help the experimental scientist. He must still go to the facts.] **F. Gonseth** (Zurich). *On Frank's Paper*. [Frank does not dispose of the problem of the junction of our intuitive macrocosm with atomic microcosms. Can he solve even this more elementary problem. How can there exist a rational geometry which seems to be suggested to us by the physical world when none of the notions of geometry can be precisely realised in the physical world?] **Grete Hermann** *On Schlick's Paper*. [Schlick is committed to contradictory views both with regard to the use of classical representations in quantum mechanics and with regard to the adoption of a subjective or objective interpretation of indeterminacy. The contradictions can only be avoided on the assumption that the quantum-mechanical description of a physical system is not, as in classical physics, supposed to characterise the system uniquely and adequately, but is valid only with respect to the currently observed situation, and changes with it. The quantum theory does not show that the law of causation is not an *a priori* principle, in Kant's sense.] **Konrad Marc-Wogau** (Upsala). *On Schlick's Paper*. [What is still lacking is a satisfactory analysis of the concept of causation. To speak of general hypothetical propositions, enabling us to make predictions, is no solution; for these themselves express causal relationships.] **Poll** (Berlin). *On Bohr's, Schlick's, Lenzen's and Gonseth's Papers*. [Our knowledge of biology is not yet sufficient for us to be able to determine how far ideas drawn from the quantum theory are applicable to it. Praises Gonseth's broad synthetic approach.] **2. Biology**. **J. B. S. Haldane** (London). *Some Principles of Causal Analysis in Genetics*. [Discusses ways of approximating to a genetically homogeneous population, and how far it is uniform in a constant or variable environment, and what types of variation are heritable. With slight reservations we can say that all the differences in a population are due to the existence of different genotypes in different environments. Only in rare cases can we say without qualification that a genotype A is better than a genotype B, or an environment X better than an environment Y, with respect to a given character. What usually happens is that A is better than B in some environments and worse in others, and X better than Y with some genotypes and worse with others. This is a point of which political reformers would do well to take notice. To throw light upon the meaning of heredity an analysis is given of what

might possibly be meant by the proposition "Intelligence is inherited in the population of Denmark". It is shown to be very difficult to verify. The genotype of an individual is determined mainly by the set of genes carried in the nucleus. We know the statistical laws by which the genes in a cell are distributed to the gametes but we are not able to predict the distribution at a particular division. Some problems connected with the reproduction of genes are briefly discussed.] **N. Rashevsky** (Chicago). *Physico-Mathematical Methods in Biological and Social Sciences*. [Aims at developing mathematical biology as a rational theoretical science, starting as in physics with idealised cases. Since the cell is essentially a small metabolizing system, the first task is to give a general physico-mathematical theory of metabolizing systems. Any such system is the seat of mechanical forces. An account is given of their nature and effects with regard to cells of various types. Besides the forces due to non-uniformities of osmotic pressures the effects of forces due to inter-molecular attractions are also discussed. A physico-mathematical theory of the typical shapes of early embryonic stages can be derived from considerations of the interaction of forces between cells. Phenomena of irritability offer another field for mathematical biophysics. Investigation of the interactions of irritable cells introduces a simplified mathematical theory of conditioning and learning. Having passed from the single cell to so complex a system as the brain there is no reason why we should not go further and treat the interactions between individuals mathematically. Sociological laws can be expressed mathematically even if they are not similar to physical laws. Science is a unity and if it is not to dissolve into verbal disputes it must be mathematical.] **Georges Matisse** (Paris). *Les systèmes orientés et les êtres vivants*. [Complex bodies may be divided into two groups, those whose elements are distributed at random and those whose elements are disposed in a regular order. Ordered systems are very common in nature at all levels. Living beings have a structural organisation. They are energetic systems in equilibrium, with cyclical or pseudo-cyclical functions. They possess a kind of 'inertia of arrangement'. The fact that the state of an organism is improbable *a priori* is not an argument for teleology; it merely means that we must look for some natural cause. Systematic 'directive' causes are found in the mineral world as well as among living beings. When they are introduced the calculus of probabilities becomes inapplicable. Arguments meant to show that evolution is purposive are viciously *ex postfacto*.] *Discussion*. **Poll** (Berlin). *On Haldane's Paper*. [Compares the function of the genes to that of a system of traffic control, as opposed to the individual policeman. Genes function both as efficient and as final causes; but these can be considered as two aspects of the same occurrence.] **P. Lecomte du Noüy** (Paris). *On Rashevsky's Paper*. [Refers to researches of his own on the equilibria of colloidal solutions. Claims to have accounted for the same facts as R. and some others besides. "The most probable configuration in equilibrium of a system containing proteins in solution is the cell".] **John Somerville** (New York). *Discussion of Rashevsky*. [The addition of a mathematico-physical axiom to a biological problem yields only a bio-physical hypothesis. To state a biological problem mathematically is not to solve but only to reformulate it. To formulate its solution mathematically is only of value if it facilitates the formulation of new problems.] **N. Rashevsky** *Summing Up*. [Acknowledges the importance of du Noüy's work. Argues that it is only his actual development of a part of mathematical biophysics that makes

Somerville's philosophising possible. His claim is to have brought disconnected fragments of empirical knowledge into a unified system.]

3. *Psychology*. **Marcel Boll** (Paris). *Déterminisme, Contingence et Fatalité en Psychologie*. [All objects are defined by relations; beyond relations nothing is formulable. A relation is called causal when time is one of its terms. Causality is a very special case of determinism. Contingence and 'fatality' can both be expressed by mathematical relations. "Free-will is the subjective aspect, under which the ineluctability of certain facts and the determinism of natural laws are spontaneously presented to us".] **Edward Chace Tolman** (Berkeley, U.S.A.). *An Operational Analysis of "Demands"*. [A demand is a 'constructed' intervening variable set between the independent causal variables and the final behaviour. We may distinguish primary appetite demands, which are functions of the maintenance-schedule (e.g., time since feeding) and the consummatory object, primary aversion demands, which are functions of the negative-stimulus object only, and secondary demands, which are functions of primary demands and hypotheses (propensities). All these demands are defined in terms of the animal's hypothetical behaviour. Psychology should not at its present stage concern itself with physiology or introspection.] **Edgar Rubin** (Copenhagen). *Bemerkungen ueber unser Wissen von anderen Menschen*. [Shows how slender and uncertain is our knowledge of the inner life of other people. Refers to the existence of 'psychoidal' configurations which, occurring as wholes, are found by subsequent analysis to contain both psychic and material components. All expressions of human thought and feeling are in this category. The behaviourist is wrong in treating them as purely material.] *Discussion*. **Arne Ness**, *On Tolman's Paper*. [Praises Tolman's form of behaviourism for its avoidance of metaphysics. It is superior to Watson's inasmuch as there is no doubt that its propositions can be tested. It is to be hoped that the psychology which lies at the root of logical empiricism, is compatible with it.] 4. *Sociology*. **Otto Neurath** (The Hague). *Soziologische Prognosen*. [In sociology the limits within which one can legitimately extrapolate are narrow and obvious, but some limits exist for every science. The assumption that a scientific hypothesis of any kind will be valid in the future always involves a cosmological prediction. The sociologist's predictions are not so well verified as the astronomer's but they are as good as the meteorologist's. Rather than take perfect predictions as an ideal, one should aim at distinguishing the more successful predictions from the less, and try to discover what elements make predictions that have some success possible. One may not be able to predict the birth of a great man and yet be able to predict the course of his life to some extent, just as an astronomer who cannot predict the advent of a new comet can predict its path. In sociology there is the special difficulty that the making of predictions is itself a causal factor of which account must be taken. The sociologist is particularly well aware of the dangers of scientific 'absolutism'. Holism and other forms of metaphysics are condemned.] **John Somerville** (New York). *Logical Empiricism and the Problem of Causality in Social Science*. [If logical empiricism aims at establishing the unity of science, it must deal with social science. In physics and mathematics the philosopher's task is to evaluate results already achieved, but in social science he has now to prepare the way for the achievement of results. The problem of causation in natural science is to interpret the results obtained through the practical use of the concepts of cause and

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effect; in social science it is to determine how far these concepts have any use. And here we must distinguish the analytical sociology, which is concerned with repetitive phenomena, from the historical. It is in historical science that causes are most difficult to discover.] 5. *General Questions of the Logic of Science*. **Paul Hertz** (Hamburg). *Regelmässigkeit, Kausalität und Zeitrichtung*. [Deals in the main with asymmetrical causal inferences. Shows that the fact that the implication between them is asymmetrical does not in itself warrant any conclusion about the relative position in time of two events. Such asymmetries are shown to depend upon the presence of special circumstances, among which is reckoned human behaviour.] **Ferdinand Gonseth** (Zurich). *L'idée de la loi naturelle*. [Argues that the paradoxes of modern physics cannot be resolved so long as we take a naïve dualistic view of things and concepts. Our knowledge has three poles, experiment, intuition and abstraction. The relation between them is explained in terms of 'schematic correspondence'. A concept such as that of a law of nature cannot be defined by itself. Its meaning is determined by its relationship with the concepts which schematically correspond to it. A law of nature cannot be conceived purely theoretically or purely empirically. The concept of it is rather a means of linking thought and nature.] **Zygmunt Zawirski** (Poznan). *Ueber die Anwendung der mehrwertigen Logik in der empirischen Wissenschaft*. [Maintains that the parallelism of wave and corpuscular physics can only be understood in the light of Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic. For the two are incompatible, and Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, which implies that both are equally legitimate, would, in two-valued logic, have to be accounted false, in virtue of the proposition

$$"[p \supset (q \equiv \sim q)] \supset \sim p"]$$

But in Ł's logic, which dispenses with the law of non-contradiction as well as that of the excluded middle, without of course being itself self-contradictory, this proposition does not hold. The propositions of both the wave and the corpuscular theories are accounted not true or false but possible. Z. claims himself to have devised a purely qualitative topological logic which agrees with the probability calculus.] **Carl G. Hempel** (Brussels). *Eine rein topologische Form nichtaristotelischer Logik*. [Outlines a logic in which propositions are not assigned numerical truth-values but are ordered on the basis of their relative degrees of truth. Every pair of these propositions is assigned one and only one of the three topological truth-values '<', '=', and '>'. Matrices can be constructed which are topological abstracts of the numerical value-tables of Łukasiewicz's multi-valued systems. Examples are given. It is shown how such topological matrices could be used to determine the laws of inference of a language T, which contained only propositions of the form " $R < S$ " and " $R = S$ ", where R and S were syntactical designations of propositions. T is a self-consistent language but incomplete, in the sense that it contains propositions which are neither logically valid nor invalid. No use for such a topological logic has yet been discovered.] **Philipp Frank** (Prague). *Concluding Remarks*.

Band 7, Heft 1. **Walter Zimmermann** (Tübingen). *Strenge Objekt-Subjekt Scheidung als Voraussetzung wissenschaftlicher Biologie*. [Divides the objects of knowledge into four classes, inorganic objects, organic objects other than men, mankind and its works, oneself. Maintains that for the first three of these at least it is, with the exception of a few special

cases, necessary in practice for the scientist to draw a line between object and subject, in such a way that the content of his propositions about a given object depends only upon the character of the object and not upon the character of the investigator. In the study of inorganic things this principle is generally adhered to, but in biology not. This is illustrated with respect to the morphology of leaves. It is shown that only the phylogenetic classification is objective; others, adopted by biologists from Goethe onwards, are arbitrary and unscientific. The sciences dealing with human beings suffer even more from subjectivism. Here philosophical theories about the value of intuition have a bad influence, as also in biology. One way in which people fail to respect the distinction between subject and object is through substantialising concepts. For instance in the mechanist-vitalist controversy 'forces' are spoken of as if they were real things. To settle this problem we must not quarrel about concepts but must set together organic and inorganic entities and note the objective differences between them. And similarly in dealing with men we must not let ourselves be misled by an artificial, conceptual division between body and spirit. We must not assume that what is distinguishable in thought is separable in nature.] **Wilhelm Holzapfel** (Hessen). *Bemerkungen zur Wissenschaftslehre des Wiener Kreises*. [Attacks mainly the 'formalism' of the Viennese circle. They are wrong in saying that an inter-subjective science cannot be set up on the basis of ostensive, experiential meaning; for propositions about private experiences are inter-subjectively understood. Indeed it must be set up on that basis. Otherwise the decision as to what propositions are to be allowed into the scientific system remains purely arbitrary. Schlick is right in objecting to Carnap and Neurath's coherence theory, but wrong in attempting to base knowledge only on the fulfilment of expectations. We should include among 'Konstatierungen' all records of immediate experience and not merely those that happen to fulfil predictions.] *Programme of the International Congress for the Unity of Science*, Paris, 29-31 July, 1937.

REVUE NÉOSCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Tome 40. (Deuxième série, No. 55). Août, 1937. **A. de Silva Tarouca**. *L'idée d'ordre dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin*. [The conception of the theocratic order of the universe is a central principle in the philosophy of St. Thomas. Order has with him four senses, (1) as phenomenal, the existence of reciprocal relation between given terms, (2) as a transcendental reality, the relation of things to their Creator, from which their relations to each other are derived, (3) as 'modal precision', a certain unity in diversity among the modalities of being (cf. the antitheses 'real order', 'intentional order', 'order of causes', 'order of ends'), (4) as a practical principle of human activity. The 'five ways' of the theistic proof provide the causal and inductive foundation of the ontological order-system; they are all applications of the principle of efficient causality to aspects of the phenomenal. The theocentric order follows from this; the creatures depend on God as their origin and, since they exhibit finality, also tend to God as their end; the theocentric order is constituted by this real metaphysical unity of origin and end. It is only because everything has its *finis extrinsecus* in the Creator that it has also a *finis intrinsecus*. The apparent 'circle' which has been found in this reasoning is only apparent.] **G. Meerseman**. *L'abrégé napolitain d'un cours inédit d'Albert le Grand*. [On the affiliation of the various MSS. of St. Albert's commentary on

the Nicomachean Ethics.] **R. Feys.** *Directions nouvelles de la logique aux États Unis.* [On the work of Quine, Church, and Curry in symbolic logic.] **J. Jacques.** *La méthode de l'épistémologie et l'Essai critique du P. Roland-Gosselin.* [Is it necessary or possible that metaphysics should be preceded by a preliminary 'criticism of knowledge'? The writer agrees with R.-G. that this is so, but holds that R.-G.'s own *Essai* is open to the charge of his opponents, that he commits a *petitio principii* by unconsciously assuming, at critical points, the 'realist' conclusion he is trying to prove.] **L. Noël et A. De Waelhens.** *Bulletin d'épistémologie.* [Critical notices of recent work by Gilson, Gardeil, Verneaux, Tonquédac, Van Hall (who examines the epistemology of Alexander), A. J. Ager, W. Pöll, A. Wilmsen, J. de Vries.] **J. Paulus.** *Monographies récentes sur les philosophes des XIV-XVI siècles.* [Brief notices of a number of recent publications. It is interesting that the three most important all deal with the hitherto insufficiently studied thought of W. of Ockham.] **Reviews of Books.** In memoriam Georges de Craene. **Chronique.** Répertoire bibliographique for August 1937.

## VIII.—NOTES.

DR. F. C. S. SCHILLER (1864-1937).

As noted in the October MIND, the death of Dr. Schiller occurred on 9th August last, at Los Angeles.

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller was born in 1864. One of a trio of able brothers, destined to follow three very different careers, he was the son of Ferdinand Schiller, a Calcutta merchant of German origin. He was sent to Rugby School, where he received officially a "good old-fashioned classical education", and supplemented it by acquiring unofficially both a fair knowledge of modern history, and something (such as a schoolboy might come by, in his private reading) of science. That was, in his case, more than a mere "tincture", for he started with one unusual advantage over most of those who were to be his contemporaries at Oxford. His family home was in Switzerland, a hospitable house, on the Lake of Lucerne, of which some still alive, who were privileged then and later to spend a holiday there as Schiller's friends, think with affection and a double gratitude; for intellectual interests, broad, various, and always lively, were part of its atmosphere, so that a holiday spent there could not fail to be a recreation of the spirit as well as of the body. From that home the young Schiller brought to Oxford, along with the competent, but not outstanding, classical accomplishments Rugby had taught him, a fluent command both of French and of German, and a rapidly extending acquaintance with the existing literature, in both these languages, of Science and Philosophy.

So equipped, and introduced into the philosophical Oxford of Caird, Nettleship and Wallace, a man of his temperament could hardly have failed, it might seem, to become a philosopher; but the disparity of interests between him and his teachers made it at least equally certain that he would turn out a rebel. Both in Classical Moderations, meanwhile, and in Greats, Schiller secured his First; and in 1887 he was awarded the Taylorian Scholarship for German. Whether or not he looked forward clearly already, at that stage, to the life of a "don", he was certainly determined to philosophise, and his mood was already iconoclastic. Iconoclasts, however, must eat to live; and Schiller, who did not wish to be dependent upon his family resources more than he could help, took for a twelvemonth a schoolmaster's post, and taught German at Eton. After that he was able to return and live at Oxford, with some hope, perhaps, of a Prize Fellowship somewhere, but mainly in order to deliver himself of his first book.

*Riddles of the Sphinx*, by "A Troglodyte", appeared first in 1891. Its success was immediate, and, hard though the young author had trodden upon his teachers' corns, "Even the ranks of Tuscany could scarce forbear to cheer". The book is well worth reading, even now, for the essential Schiller, though his attempt to sketch an "evolutionist" philosophy (which turns out to be, at bottom, Idealism with a difference, designed to be able to come genuinely to terms with a rapidly expanding empirical

Science) cannot seem nowadays quite so thrilling and so promising an adventure as it could to that generation. For, in the 'nineties, the avowed antagonism between Science and Religion was still a comparatively new and burning problem for academic England, and English philosophy had so far shown but little ability, or even inclination, to deal with it. The nineteen-thirties, for one reason and another, are, it may be, both less worried by that particular problem, and less hopeful of reaching a solution for it along the road Schiller pointed out.

This first success, however, brought no immediate opening in Oxford. America, on the other hand, afforded him an opportunity. A tutoring engagement was the avenue which led to the creation for him of a post as Instructor in Philosophy at Cornell University. There he remained for four years. The book went meanwhile into a second edition (a third was to follow in 1910) and Schiller's name now appeared (1894) on the title-page. In 1897 he was recalled to Oxford to become a Tutor in Philosophy and a fellow of Corpus Christi College.

There, from 1897 onwards, Schiller made his home; and, though he retired from his teaching duties in 1926, he did not give up his Fellowship, and kept his rooms in College. By 1935, however, when he married (his wife being Louise Luqueer, daughter of Mr. S. Bartow Strang, of Denver, U.S.A.) and went to live permanently in California, he had already for some years divided his time almost equally between Oxford and Los Angeles, where the University of Southern California had elected him to a special visiting lectureship, in 1926, and later to a Professorship. In that same summer he asked to be relieved of the Honorary Treasurership of the Mind Association, which he had held since the very beginning in 1900. His health was already uncertain, and a serious heart attack prevented him from attending the Annual Meeting that July, at which the Association unanimously elected him an Honorary Member. He had always found it terribly hard to be idle, either in mind or in body—for many years he was an active Alpinist—and the comparative idleness which now became imperative was a yoke he did not readily bear. Even the devoted care of his wife could secure for him only a brief period in which he could enjoy with her his Californian retirement. At his death he was Senior Fellow of his College; he was a D.Sc. of Oxford, an honorary LL.D. of the University of Southern California, and (since 1926) a Fellow of the British Academy.

His tenure of the post at Cornell gave a decisive turn to Schiller's future. To his wide acquaintance with European thought he now added a familiarity with the thought of America, and his studies in that led him into personal contact with William James, between whom and Schiller there was speedily forged a bond of intimate personal affection. Philosophically, it would be wrong to call Schiller a disciple of James. The essentials of his "Humanism" were there before he became acquainted with James's views; and James himself (though his notorious readiness to over-estimate his debts to others weakens his testimony) has been heard to declare that he himself was "just a psychologist with some few ideas about religion and philosophy", while Schiller was the metaphysician who had opened his eyes to the philosophical importance of those ideas, and had known how to develop that side of them.

Indeed, although in writing of his two lifelong bugbears, Naturalism and Absolutism, Schiller was always kinder to the former, it is hardly possible to consider the long series of thought-provoking (and often exasperating) articles and books, in which he poured forth the "Humanist" theory of

knowledge, without concluding that he was, in essence, much nearer to Idealism. Two defects, at least, which the captious might claim to discover here and there in his writings, he shares with the most brilliant of his "Absolutist" adversaries, namely, a certain obstinacy in discussion, which an ungenerous critic might ascribe to a wilful, even if only partial, blindness to the other fellow's point of view, and a perversity of style, not fairly describable, perhaps, either as a love of paradox or as a disregard for precise expression, but capable of looking like both. The mainspring, moreover, of his logic and of his metaphysics was the view of Truth as not a *datum* but an achievement, intrinsically improveable *ad infinitum*, and irreducibly conditioned by the individual perspective of each individual agent; and this view, as both he and his opponents ought to have had enough patience with each other to recognise, was common, in its essentials, both to him and to them.

There was some excuse, however, for Schiller's impatience. He thought of himself, from the first, as in revolt against a Monism which preferred fine phrases to solutions. In that he was unjust. But his mind was strongly tinged, all his life, with a practical, Baconian fervour. Schiller could never be content merely to have stated a problem, however precisely; and that the most profound of all studies should be allowed to lead only to a negatively critical result was intolerable to him. Nor could he ever substitute the scholar's interest in philosophy—always strongly characteristic of the Oxford "Greats" teaching—for the directly philosophical approach which he found natural. At the same time, keen though his delight could be in the lively beauties of a sparkling verbal dialectic, his own brain seldom seemed to move so quickly, in such an exchange, as the abounding wit and ingenuity of his writings might lead their reader to expect. Even when time had lent to that wit a dexterity in conversation which few among those privileged to enjoy it could claim, the excellence of his talk lay, not so much in any conspicuous readiness of repartee, but rather in the ingenious turns he would give his thought, in its unflinching combination of subtlety and boldness, and in a certain flavour of the Citizen of the World, which it acquired not only by the diversity of his interests and his wide information, but also from his indefinably non-insular standpoint (this last a trait, by the way, which he was himself perhaps, at times, guilty of overstressing, and which did not endear him equally always, nor in every quarter).

For a mind, in which these virtues and these defects were already, in his Balliol days, somewhat precociously developed, it was almost bound to be a baffling experience to be plunged into the deep end of the bath of philosophical Greek Scholarship, and of dialectic, Platonic and Hegelian, which the then fashionable "Greats" curriculum prescribed, and to be held there, floundering and gasping, for two years. It is small wonder if he himself felt that he had gained by that treatment nothing but a completely muddled mind (as he said in later years to an American audience) and some practice in a useless art of quibbling.

How much more he did, in fact, absorb from his Oxford teachers, is plain even in his most polemical writings. He owed much also, in a different way, to the stimulus of men like G. F. Stout, and the other members of that little group at Oxford, opponents, as he was, of the current Absolutism, whose views found a striking expression in the volume of essays edited by Henry Sturt in 1902,<sup>1</sup> to which Schiller contributed his

<sup>1</sup> "Personal Idealism" (Macmillan, 1902; now out of print).

well-known chapter on "Axioms as Postulates". Later, too, he found a congenial ally in Alfred Sidgwick, to whose writings H. V. Knox, himself a member of that group, and thenceforward Schiller's intimate friend, introduced him. His principal link, however, was with William James; and it was only the defect of one of Schiller's best qualities, if he was apt, all his life, to confuse the task of expounding the "Humanism", which they professed in common, with the personal defence of his friend's reputation. The confusion was, none the less, unfortunate, intensifying, as it must, the impatience of his reaction against the philosophy of his own Oxford teachers, exaggerating the gap between his views and theirs, and thus contributing to isolate him, not only philosophically, but, in a measure, even personally, among the philosophers of his own University. Its loss was probably at least as great as his.

In his personal relationships, Schiller was a generous friend and a frequent and admirable host, both to those of his own generation and to younger people. He was a stimulating teacher, who knew how to get the best out of his pupils, though, like his friend James, he was fated to find that they sometimes took fire from his own enthusiasm, and saw themselves as crusaders for his position, before they were able to understand it. The width of his interests outside pure philosophy, and, no less, the practical zeal which inspired him in all of them, found expression increasingly in the study of eugenical problems (*cf.* especially *Eugenics and Politics*, 1926, and *Social Decay and Eugenical Reform*, 1932). The field of inquiry of the Society for Psychological Research, of which he was President in 1914, attracted his attention early, and always retained it, though he felt that but little progress was made. His motive was partly a concern that these problems, like all others, should be investigated scientifically; but partly also that he recognised their bearing upon various problems of religion. Religious faith and the conception of God were always a main preoccupation of his philosophical thinking, and attention should be drawn to the chapter on "Man's Limitations or God's?" in the book *Should Philosophers Disagree*, 1934.

Of those among his books which may be said to belong to the more strictly "philosophical" canon, *Riddles of the Sphinx* will probably long continue to be read, though in some ways it "dates" more obviously than the rest. Apart from that, *Formal Logic* is still probably the work of his that is most widely known. There is perhaps an irony in this, for its achievement is almost wholly, and intentionally, destructive. When, in 1929, Schiller published at last *Logic for Use*, which was meant as its constructive complement, all the vigour and the real insight, which that book displayed, into the practical problems of thought, left the fundamental issues still very much in the air.

Of Schiller's work for MIND it is enough to say that to him, more than to any other single person, it owes its continued existence and its present financially sound position, the safest guarantee for its future. In 1900, when Henry Sidgwick came to enlist help in Oxford for the founding of the Mind Association, in order that the good work begun by Bain, and so unselfishly carried on for many years by Mrs. Sidgwick and himself, should not have to end with his death, G. F. Stout, the Association's first Editor, Schiller, R. R. Marett, his lifelong friend from the days of the "Troglodyte", and Henry Sturt were prominent among those who gave their active support. Schiller, made Treasurer from the outset, found the publication of MIND endangered, almost at once, by serious financial difficulties. The journal weathered these storms, and the later troubles of war-time, thanks



in the main to his skilful and wary nursing. And, in that work, Schiller showed himself to possess, not only great acumen, but an inexhaustible patience.

J. I. MCKIE.

### MEANINGLESS.

IN his interesting discussion in the October number of *MIND* (pp. 465-467) relating to my article on Meaninglessness (vol. xlv, no. 183, p. 347), Mr. Sidgwick tries to answer my challenge to the advocates of verification theories to give a reason for their views, by contending that, if Q cannot see the meaning of P's statement in the first instance he may come to do so, if it has any definite meaning at all, by finding out either what objections P would think relevant or what reasons P had for thinking it true. I never attacked this view, which I myself described as "arguable" on page 357 and left uncriticised. What I objected to was solely the doctrine that the process of verification must always be effected exclusively by sense-experience. But Mr. Sidgwick's argument for a verification theory leaves it completely open whether or not the verification is to be effected by sense-experience.

Mr. Sidgwick's reason for saying that the "laws of thought" are non-assertive (p. 466) seems to be that a verbally self-contradictory statement may still be true. I agree that this may be the case, just because words which bear contradictory meanings according to the dictionary may not bear contradictory meanings as used in a particular instance, but it does not follow that a really self-contradictory statement, *i.e.*, a statement which contained words bearing contradictory meanings not only according to the dictionary, but in the actual context, could be true, and I cannot therefore see that anything has been said to shake the conviction that the law of contradiction is a law applying to the real world. I had better add that I was not discussing whether we could claim knowledge of "Ultimate Reality" nor was I discussing how far human judgment is liable to error, and again I was not claiming that "dictionaries and grammars tell us all that we ever need to know about the meaning of words and sentences". I am quite willing to give the logical positivist and the pragmatist credit for taking the particular people who use a sentence into account in determining its meaning, but I do not see why other philosophers should be judged unable to do so. Finally, it is surely perfectly possible that a person might understand a statement quite clearly and yet be uncertain whether a particular alleged objection was relevant; *e.g.*, somebody might perfectly understand a statement to the effect that a certain event was going to happen, and yet he might be doubtful whether or not the future could be foreseen in dreams, and therefore whether the fact that he had dreamt that something inconsistent with the predicted event occurred was or was not an argument against its occurrence. What he could not do is understand the statement and yet be able to decide in *no* case whether an objection to it was or was not relevant; but he might well still be unable to decide whether *some* objections were relevant or not.

A. C. EWING.

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